History 1966-67

 ** New or updated material will appear in the color "RED " within the Website. After a reasonable time period, the color will revert to standard black.

INTRODUCTION

Although somewhat lengthy and detailed, the following subsections are a descriptive of the History, including the how, when, where and why the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) came into being. Included (where possible) is the mission, various assignments and operations of the 228th during the year 1966-1967 Republic of Vietnam.

The various submissions and written data of below are a reflection of first hand knowledge, and or consolidated knowledge, by personnel (officers and enlisted) who served in the unit directly, and were eye witness to various events and or actions described in narrative form, as seen and known from their individual assignments and perspectives.

Included is all known contextual data regarding News Articles, Field Manuel Data, Table of Organization and Equipment, Command Flow Charts and other where possible. Otherwise, the reader is invited to view other areas of this Website {see Miscellaneous Data - Photo Gallery and other sections}, where further information and points of interest can be located. 

In effect, this entire Website is dedicated to describing the mission and operations of a "Forward" Direct Support Company as a subordinate entity of a "rearward" Direct Support Battalion (266th Supply and Service Battalion Direct Support), its superior - "rearward" 29th General Support Group, its superior - "rearward" United States Army Support Command, Saigon, its superior - "rearward" 1st Logistics Command and its superior; United States Army Republic of Vietnam, Pacific.

This site is further dedicated to all those Officers, Warrant Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, Regular Army and Draftees who served in the capacity of Direct Support Supply Operations {assigned or attached} to any and all Base Camp and/or Battlefield operations within the Republic of Vietnam....in this case the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) and its attached personnel {other units} as well as sister Direct Support units (506th and 624th S&S Companies (DS) within the same chain of command structure 1966 -1967 and beyond.

Note: The 228th 1966-1972 experienced a known six change of superior command enitities, serving in III Corps and IV Corps, whereas, the 506th and 624th S&S Companies experiened two change of superior command entities; one on arrival in RVN (1965-1966), the second (1966-1972) with the same superior command, all in III Corps.

This site is especially dedicated to all those troopers of all Military services who served their Country in time of War, and especially to all those families of dearly beloved ones who were denied the good fortune to return home.

 

Click on the letter to immediately access particular section desired...and/or use normal scrolling function.

 

A) Basic Version - B) Added Details Version - C) A Panegyric and Addendum - D) Mysterious Encounter Route 15A - E) Stock Control - F) Class II and IV Platoon - G) Graves Registration Platoon - H) Time in Country - Class I - I) Class III {POL} Platoon - J) Laundry and Bath Platoon - K) General Supply Platoon - L) Bakery Section - M) Maintenance and Equipment Repair Platoon - N) 29th General Support Group Selected Quarterly Report Extracts 1966-1967

 

A) Basic Version 1966 - 1967 + Miscellaneous:

20 July 1966 Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam under COSTAR Directive (Combat Service Support to the Army); Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) was "inactivated". 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) "activated" from remnants and existing personnel of Company B whose authorized unit strength of 235 on 20 July 1966 stood at 135 including elements of some 75 personnel TDY in Cu Chi (Laundry and Bath Platoon - Bakery Section), and Bien Hoa Airbase (General Supply Platoon).

20 July 1966 Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam superior Command of Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) "reconstituted" as Headquarters and Headquarters Company 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support)

Note: All personnel assigned in the preceding had been in Republic of Vietnam as of 21 June 1966. In Long Binh since 1 July 1966 resulting from a 3 week plus voyage aboard the USNS General Nelson M. Walker, which left the port of Tacoma, Washington 31 May 1966. However, it should be noted that ones tour of duty began on the date of departure from CONUS, rather than arrival in RVN. Thus, the date 31 May 1966 is the beginning date of tour with 31 May 1967 the ending date of expected tour of duty and rotation back to CONUS.

7 October 1966 the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) with authorized unit strength of 233 {actual unit strength including those serving TDY being 110} were reassigned from Long Binh as of 4 October 1966 to III Corps, War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province approximately 50 to 60 miles to the northwest of Long Binh and approximately 6 miles east of the Cambodian border to setup all manner of supply and logistics support within the Tay Ninh forward base camp of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (aka: "The Chargers" and "Burning Worm"), and to participate as the "Command and Control Center" representing the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support) and 1st Logistics Command, Saigon.

At 0500 hours in the early morning 7 October 1966 as a portion of a larger convoy, 85 personnel of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) hereinafter referred to often, as the 228th left Bien Hoa Airbase, stopped in Cu Chi for 1/2 hour to 40 minutes and continued journey to Tay Ninh Base Camp, arriving by mid afternoon of the same date. Assigned an area, the 228th offloaded personnel and equipment, and began clearing assigned area of termite mounds, killing various types of venomous snakes, and hacking down elephant grass with machetes, in order to provide for the setup and erection of Company Field Tents for operations and sleeping quarters of unit personnel. The 228th was the very first unit outside of 196th Light Infantry Brigade and its subordinate units to arrive in Tay Ninh West base camp.

10 October 1966 Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Fred C. Sheffey reassigned from 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS), with new Commanding Officer; Lt Col. Joseph T. Tambe. (News of change of superior Command began circulating in 228th in mid to late October 1966).

14 October 1966 Capt. B.A.Kuster - AB Ranger (re-assigned from TDY 624th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) of Long Binh (4 October 1966) signed into the 228th as Commanding Officer per orders issued and dated 4 October 1966. In his capacity as not only CO of 228th, Cpt. Kuster was charged as "Officer in Charge; Command and Control Center, 266th S&S BN (DS), and 1st Logistical Command" to facilitate the arrival of 1st PHILCAGV (some 1,500 civic action personnel of the Philippines) in conjunction with the expected arrival of the forward command of Brigadier General G.V. Tobias, his Chief of Staff; Fidel Valdez Ramos, and other forward senior officers of 1st PHILCAGV.

4 November 1966 the 228th suffered direct hostile mortar attack, resulting in 1 KIA, 17 wounded, 2 of 17 severely wounded with 3 slightly wounded...16 rounds of mortar fire fell into Company area. 12 of the wounded were evacuated to 5 different field hospital locations (Vung Tau, Cu Chi, Long Binh, and 2 separate locations in Saigon). The 1 KIA and 2 other enlisted WIA were physically in Tay Ninh, but neither attached or TDY by written orders from superior HQ (266th S&S BN (DS). See In Memory Section regarding Robert Benjamin Nasser for a detailed explanation. Thus, the 228th Morning Report of 4 Nov 66 only accounts for 15 WIA only. The other 1 KIA and 2 WIA although KIA and WIA in Tay Ninh while with the 228th were not attached or TDY to 228th by any orders from superior command, and could not be shown on Morning Report of 228th by Army Regulations covering Morning Reports. Instead, the "assigned" units of these three enlisted were notified by field phone, as was HQ 266th S&S Battalion.

Note: Per 29th General Support Group Quarterly Report dated 31 January 1967, Section C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Paragraph 1. (C), subsection a.  "On 4 Nov 66, the base camp of the 196th Lt Inf Bde (SUP) sustained a mortar attack. The 228th S&S CO (DS) which operates the Tay Ninh FSP {Forward Supply Point} suffered 1 KIA and 14 WIA."..... This report is in error. The Morning Report of 228th clearly indicates 15 WIA. The KIA is technically correct as there was an enlisted assigned to 624th S&S Co (DS) physically with the 228th without orders. However, there were 2 more enlisted severely WIA who were also with the 228th without orders. Therefore (and provable) the 29th General Support Group Quarterly Report is in error regarding number of WIA. The 29th Group indicates "14" WIA the true number is "17" WIA....ABN.....addendum 22 June 2011

14 November 1966 the 228th withstood second mortar attack without injury or damage {most rounds dropping near end of company street and missing quarters and equipment areas}....the 196th and 45th {Field} Surgical Hospital suffering some 50+- KIA and/or wounded.

Note: Per letter home dated 15 Nov 66, postmarked 16 Nov 66 there were 3 KIA and 53 WIA in Base Camp 14 November 1966. The 228th had neither injury to personnel or equipment....ABN....addendum 22 June 2011

Note: This attack is not mentioned in 29th General Support Group Quarterly Report ending 31 January 1967. A review of MR of 228th 14 Nov 66 makes no mention of this second attack either. By Army Regulation, no entry could be made on Morning Report unless a definitive "change" of status had occurred within the Company and/or its personnel. Thus the second mortar attack which resulted in no change to the status of the Company and/or its personnel resulted in a non entry of such attack.

Mid November 1966 the 228th continues in process of setting up, operating all Classes of Supply operations in continued support of Operation Attleboro (largest counteroffensive of Vietnam War to date), was operating Graves Registration (Processing of remains from the field and in base camp - Mortuary Affairs), Operating a Laundry and Bath service in Cu Chi, Tay Ninh and Quan Loi, operating Stock Control (engineering parts, all manner of standard and field equipment, such that records matched actual material on hand), Class II and IV (parts clothing, engineering supply, other), Class I (refrigerated, semi perishable, perishable, canned, and non canned food products such as condiments), Class III, aka: POL (petroleum, lubricants and oil) yard including aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, Class V (munitions storage and transport....not a usual function of a Supply and Service unit) along with all other supply and logistics functions such as water and chemical treatment for potable water, use of heavy equipment for grading roadways, supply areas and other....the 50 to 60% authorized unit personnel wearing many hats above and beyond their respective PMOS (primary military occupational specialties).

Note: Especial thanks is due the 175th Combat Engineers Company of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade who helped the 228th in grading and setting up supply point areas. The 175th were consistently were amenable to loaning us heavy equipment (graders, dozers, etc!) whenever requested. Special thanks to 1stPHILCAGV is deserved as well, as they helped grade our Company street, dig and install our Company water well/ shower point, and supply us with lumber which was always in critically short supply. Further thanks is due the 45th Surgical Hospital and medical evacuation, who consistently offered medical services to the entire base camp whenever and wherever needed. In essence, the entire base camp of units and personnel stationed in Tay Ninh in these very early days, transcended unit differences of mission....in essence acting as one, rather than many...See Links section to enter and view the 175th Combat Engineers and 45th Surgical Hospital Websites.

Note 2: Further research as of August 2013 revealed that the 228th in addition to support from the 175th Combat Engineer Company had received support from yet another Engineer Company (Company B, 588th Engineer Battalion) operating in Tay Ninh. Per Quarterly Report of 588th Engineer Battalion (located in Cu Chi) dated February 1967 covering the prceeding quarterly time period, the following data is extracted:

1 November 1966 - Company B, 588th Engineer Battalion constructed four (4) Heavy Duty Artillary Pads, Tay Ninh West Base Camp, 48' x 65' and constructed with 3" x 12" timber floors. A completion date of 15 November 1966 was established and met. {Of these four Artillary Pads, two were constructed directly across the roadway from the 228th cantonment area, a distance of some fifty to 100 feet}

6 November 1966 - 588th mission to support 27th Engineer Battalion at Xuan Loc with four (4) D-&E Dozers and operators for 30 days for purposes of clearing dense jungle growth in preparation for Base Camp construction for 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment accomplished. {This mission relates directly to eventual cantonment area occupied by 506th S&S Co (DS) in Xuan Loc ... see 506th S&S Co (DS) History 1966 - 1967}

9 November 1966 -  A meeting was held at 588th to dscuss the proposed Tay Ninh quarry operations. Method of operations and site planning were discussed. Arrangements were made for personnel to visit other quarry operations in Vietnam to work with crusher personnel and to train in rock drilling and explosive placement. This project, Cp 66-16- 79 for opening and operating a quarry and crushing facility at Nui Ba Den Mountain was assigned on an availability date of 20 October 1966, however actual date of opening of the Tay Ninh quarry was delayed due to the security of the area which was completely controlled by the Viet Cong. The quarry and crusher facility became operational on 5 January 1967, only thirty days after the site had been secured by infantry units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade

10 November 1966 - Deployed one platoon and five additional 5 ton dumptrucks to support the construction of logistical support area in Tay Ninh base camp area in support of operation ATTLEBORO. The battalion was alerted to be prepared to construct a three thousand barrel POL facility at Tay Ninh utilizing one platoon (1 Officer, 5 NCO's and 40 EM) from the 643rd Engineer Company. The platoon arrived on 12 November 1966 and project was assigned with a competion date of 1 January 1967

15 November 1966 - The Battalion deployed ten (10) 5 ton dump trucks, two TD24 dozers with scoopers and one scooploader to Company B, 588th Engineer Battalion at Tay Ninh for continued operational support mission. The 79th Engineer Group also deployed thirty five 5 ton dump trucks and bridge trucks to Tay Ninh with two 5 ton dump trucks carrying gravel and the remaining twenty five trucks loaded with panel brige for support of Operation ATTLEBORO

15 November 1966 - Company B, 588th Engineer Battalion was given the mission of constructing Class I & V Logistical Support areas at Tay Ninh. Completion date to be as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 1967. {This is a reference to new Class I Yard moved from being adjacent to airstrip and its new location southwesterly in what was termed the South Gate area. Class V area was to the extreme southwest area of the basecamp perimeter ... the responsibility of attached troopers to 228th from 29th General Support Group, 3rd Ordnance Battalion, and also one of the assigned areas for Guard Duty of the 228th}

20 November 1966 - Company B, 588th Engineer Battlion completed construction of a tropicalized double quonset building to be utilized as a Post Office at Tay Ninh. {This structure located near 196th LIB main cantonment area in the northern portion of Tay Ninh West Basecamp was utilized by all units based in Tay Ninh as a drop off point and collection point for mail. Prior to construction mail was transported by daily courier either by convoy or air on a daily basis}

26 November 1966 - Company B, 588th completed construction of the 196th Light nfantry Brigade Post Exchange at Tay Ninh. It consisted of four (4) shed type buildings (40' x 100'). {This post exchange at first was limited in the quantity of items offered and for sale. By December 1966 a good number of goods were available, but still lacking basic items such as boot polish, brass polish, combination locks, etc! ... Electronic Goods were available in limited quantity, as were other items such as SLR Cameras and so on. Film processing continued to only be available by sending undeveloped film to Japan for processing and return to original sender well into May 1967}

2 December 1966 - The platoon from the 643rd Engineer Company (PPL) returned to its parent organization from Tay Ninh after erection and tesating of 3000 barrel POL storage tank at that location. {This reference mentioned twice in the quarterly report only refers to one POL storage tank. However, the 228th was utilizing two POL storage Tanks ... see Gallery 1966 -1967 February 1967 where both tanks are clearly in evidence. A third storage tank was constructed later.}

Late December 1966 - Company B, 588th was given the mission to upgrade the base camp at Tay Ninh and construct approximately six kilometers of perimeter road from Grid Coordinates XT 129504 to XT 160553. {When the 228th arrived; 7 October 1966, the main roadways of the basecamp were for the most part completed. However, the 228th did not have a Company street until provided by 1STPHILCAGV in November 1966. A similar situation existed for 45th Medical MUST, although my understanding is the 175th Combat Engineers of 196th LIB provided their roadway in mid to late November 1966, the 45th having all personnel in place by 9 November 1966 when a contingent of nine assigned nurses arrived} .... ABN January 2013


In addition, and near the mid to late time period of November 1966 though mid December the unit was receiving additional assigned and attached personnel. From 3 officers the unit had 6 assigned officers, 2 attached officers, 1 attached warrant officer, with two Majors by mid December 1966 (both Major's neither assigned or attached, but quartered with the 228th representing co-ordination of logistics between the 25th ID, 15th Support Brigade, 29th General Support Group, USASUPCOM, SAIGON, MACV and 1st Logistics Command with the 228th as the "core" unit of operations). In terms of enlisted personnel the 228th gained an additional 55 personnel with nearly 500+ attached "all purpose personnel"....all the preceding carried on the daily Morning Report of the 228th, excepting the 2 officers (Maj. Ward and Maj. Chamberlin) quartered with the 228th. This nearly 700 officers and enlisted were engaged in all functions necessary to supply and logistics in Tay Ninh Base Camp in order to adequately handle and fulfill the functions necessary to support Operations Attleboro Phase II, Cedar Falls, Gadsden and Junction City, which occurred during the time period the 228th arrived October 1966 through late March of 1967....the unit, assigned and attached personnel performing magnificently if not above and beyond the call of duty.

15 November 1966 the 228th provided hot meals in the partially constructed wooden Mess Hall to 196th Light Infantry Brigade beginning with the 175th Engineers, a part of the 196th. In three shifts per day the Cooks of the 228th fed the entire Brigade, 200 to 300 individuals per shift for several days.

25 November 1966 the 228th celebrated Thanksgiving (see menu provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker in Memorabilla Section)

Mid to late December 1966: Rumors circulating within 228th, that unit had been recommended for a Award of either Distinguished or Meritorious Unit Commendation.

On or about 16 December 1966 award of Purple Hearts resulting from 4 November 1966 Hostile fire awarded in Company formation by Company Commander to those personnel who had returned from hospitalization. Purple Heart award for 1 KIA and 2 WIA neither assigned or attached to 228th were awarded from their individual companies of assignment. Two seriously WIA enlisted never returned to the 228th, having been evacuated to Japan and then for reassignment rehabilitation and/or further surgery in the United States.

20 December 1966 Captain Kuster departed for Long Binh for a period of 2 to 3 days, leaving standing orders that XO (1st Lt. Paul Walker) was to act in capacity of Acting CO and Company was to continue function in all normal activities). These orders were carried out sans one minor deviation, whereby a junior officer attached to 228th had been ordered to assume command by Maj. Ward. This action did not take place as such an order was in direct contravention of standing orders, Army Regulations ... Captain Kuster returned 23 December and the matter became moot.

25 December 1966 the 228th enjoyed a repeat of Thanksgiving menu for Christmas. Note: All units assigned within the armed forces of the United States of America (Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy), and in particular those of the armed forces serving in Republic of Vietnam were served the same menus on any given day where possible. Those serving in the field of battle continued to subsist on C- Rations.

6 January 1967 By field phone 228th Company Clerk informed by verbal command of Captain Kuster from Long Binh (returned from R&R - Hong Kong early) of his re-assignment to 266th and that XO (executive officer) 1st. Lt. Paul B. Walker (then acting in capacity as Payroll Officer Duty for 228th in Saigon, Long Binh, Cu Chi, Quan Loi) would be acting CO pending further orders from HHC 266th.

6 January 1967 In the early evening hour on or about 1600 hours (6 PM) new Commanding Officer arrived; Capt. Jerry D. White to assume command of 228th.

10 January 1967 per written orders dated 9 January from 266th;  Capt. B.A. Kuster re-assigned from 228th to HHC 266th as General Supply Officer.

12 January 1967 letter of appreciation signed by some 100 enlisted personnel (assigned and attached to 228th 1st Shirt on down) written, typed and signed....addressed to Cpt. B.A. Kuster...delivered in person by Company Clerk and Assistant Company Clerk at HHC 29th General Support Group (DS) 16 January 1967.

14 January 1967, revoking previous orders dated 9 January 1967 and effective 15 January 1967;re: Cpt. B.A. Kuster re-assigned from HHC 266th to 29th General Support Group Long Binh as Intelligence Officer....all three Special Orders entered upon Morning Report of 228th for dates provided.....but rejiggered on retyped MR's of newer DA Form 1 which took place at some point in time July, August September 1967 throughout RVN...do not reflect such matters.

3 February 1967 the 228th received visit (for first time since 7 October 1966) from 266th HQ Commanding Officer; Lt. Col. Joseph T. Tambe and staff for an inspection of unit and multiple operations. Orderly Room operations rated "Excellent/Excellent" as did other Classes of operations other than Class I...it receiving one less rating in that Lt. Col.. Tambe desired all refrigeration units storing perishable items be swabbed and cleaned on a daily basis, rather than every other day ("every other day" being a common practice throughout all RVN Class I operations). In addition Lt. Col. Tambe countermanded an order generated by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade Commander in October 1966, in that hence forth all personnel would shine their boots daily along with belt buckles, would be in full and complete uniform (despite 120 degree temperatures), and that all unit personnel (enlisted and officers) would participate in Guard Duty of the Tay Ninh Base Camp perimeter in conjunction with and along side the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

Note: A small aside regarding the preceding. Tay Ninh and its environs were not conducive to keeping ones boots shined, in that, the dirt was a white clay like substance of very fine particulate matter...thus inducing a small cloud of same to cover ones boots with same particulate matter within two to three steps of perambulation. In addition, other or further orders regarding the 228th and it's operational matters were cut short, in that, the good Lt. Col. Tambe was notified by one of the 228th junior officers of a pending Mortar attack announced by the 196th, and he cut his visit short by departing post haste. It was the first and last visit from HHC 266th in Tay Ninh Base Camp from October 1966 through the end of May 1967.

Late February 1967 (possibly early March) the 228th was visited by General Creighton Abrams, his Sergeant Major and assorted Staff who had been engaged in an informal survey of all Supply and Logistics operations throughout Republic of Vietnam... Tay Ninh being their last stop. The 228th Company Clerk was not privy to the words spoken by General Abrams to the Senior Officers of the 228th. However, General Abrams Sergeant Major specifically voiced the following to said Company Clerk outside the entry to the Orderly Room....that being: " I can tell you this...the operations of this outfit (the 228th - Orderly Room and all) are without doubt the best I (we) have seen during our entire tour, and we have visited them all".

22 February 1967 Major Jerry B. Ward (quartered with the 228th) was interviewed by representative of Tropic Lightning News (official publication of the 25th Infantry Division), resulting in the following extracted article from the Tropic Lightning News dated 27 February 1967, Page 6, Entitled "196th Log Base Supplies Them All"

A a good reference for all interested in various unit activity in War Zone C, III Corps 1966 forward. Click on link and pick week of interest. 

Link:.... http://www.25thida.com/TLN/

"The Tay Ninh Supply Point, a massive logistical base, sprawls across 176.5 acres within the 196th Lt. Inf. Bdg's base camp. Though the logistical base was designed to provide supplies and services for 15,000 men, it greatly surpasses that goal.The command is currently handling roughly three to four times the amount of supplies it was designed to handle, said Major Jerry B. Ward (Typo by TLN - Should be Major Jerry E. Ward) of Columbus Georgia, the supply point commander who controls 480 men (see Note following) who provide these vital supplies and services. The 196th Bde. Opened its perimeter to greet Major Ward's command in late November (1966), But rice paddies and anthills in the area destined to be the home of the supply base stood in the way of progress. Maj. Wards command methodically carved out refueling points, storage areas, and maintenance shops for military assistance forces in Tay Ninh Province. Primary customers are the 196th Bde..4th Div..Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam and other units at Tay Ninh not assigned to the 25th Inf. Div. We handle all classes of supplies. Foodstuffs, petroleum products, and ammunition receive the most emphasis, Maj. Ward said. We also provide services: laundry, a hot shower point - I believe the only one on post - graves registration and direct maintenance to non-division units. He described these supplies and services more fully: There are three types of ration supplies. The first is perishables which include fresh meats, vegetables, fruits, potable ice, milk and ice cream. Canned goods and combat rations are the other two types of rations. When we speak of general supplies, we speak of everything from stoves to toothpicks, including pencils and paper, mess trays, field equipment, dog food, and thousands of other items. Petroleum products are aviation and diesel fuel, gasoline, oil, and lubricants.The vital link in supplying ammunition, he said, is trailer trucks. They must be loaded and unloaded as fast as possible. They're too valuable in Vietnam to be left idle for very long. The services which handle the greatest number of customers are laundry and maintenance. The laundry is a field type with mobile equipment. It handles work such as socks, underwear, and bedding for troops. The most important customer is the 45th Surgical Hospital. The maintenance crew works on a limited scale. It works mainly with engineer and ordnance equipment of engineer units here on post. I also does some generator and forklift repair work for the 228th S&S Co. Operations Attleboro and Cedar Falls called for teamwork, and the logistical base asserted itself in versatility as well as volume. Major Ward commented, The engineer detachment performed these duties while the 196th Bde. Combat Engineers supported infantry troop movements. The 228th S&S Co commanded by Capt. Jerry D. White of Homestead, Fla. is the basic unit. Attached are the 507th Engr.,551st Ord. And 140th Maint. Det. Elements of the 483rd Field Service Co. and the 48th Trans. Gp. as well as miscellaneous personnel from the 226th S&S Bn. Maj. Ward said, It's an activity of the Saigon Support Command and responsibility for its operations is delegated to the 266th S&S Bn., 29th Gen Sp. Gp. The exact volume of work done by this team is classified, but the value of its work is obvious.Whether its supplying troops on the ground or refueling helicopters in the sky, The Tay Ninh Supply Point stands ready to keep the Chargers brigade on the move".

Note 1: With all due respect to both Major Jerry B. Ward and Captain Jerry D. White (AB Ranger), both fine, honest, fair minded officers and gentlemen, with both being a credit to the uniform they wore, there were a few details of factual data that were slightly incorrect as printed. First: Major Jerry E. Ward arrived in Tay Ninh after Operation Attleboro Phase I and II had ended (on or about 5 December 1966). Second: The good Major was "quartered" with the 228th and neither assigned or attached. Third: All personnel of various units mentioned were carried as "attached" on the Morning Report of the 228th, meaning that Major Ward and his one Clerk {TDY from the 228th - SP4 Grant E. Lowery, Clerk Typist} never once issued a Morning Report, created rosters, orders, or any other paperwork normally associated with a "Command", but did generate paperwork associated with the planning and implementation of logistics co-ordination with 1st Logistics Command, 266th Supply and Service Battalion, 25th Infantry Division and 29th General Support Group. Fourth: In a round about way, the 228th (per article) is admitted as being the core unit, whose superior command was the 266th S&S BN (DS), whose superior command was indeed the 29th General Support Group, who in turn answered to USASUPCOM, Saigon followed by the 1st Logistics Command. Fifth: The number of "480" total personnel is inaccurate. In fact there were nearly 700, there being 185 assigned and attached directly within the 228th itself, along with some 500+ attached "all purpose personnel" as represented by the various units listed. Sixth: By either oversight or error, Major Ward neglected to mention another unit of all purpose troops attached TDY to the 228th, they being troops from the 75th Heavy Material Company (DS) aka: 75th Supply and Service Company (GS), these same personnel referring to themselves as belonging to "75th Supply Company, or simply the 75th". Seventh: It is believed the "elements of" belonging to the "226th" Supply and Service Battalion, in actuality (it being a possible typo error within the article) refers to a few enlisted personnel from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion Last: Captain Jerry D. White although in Company for some 3 plus weeks when interview took place, is given credit along with Major Ward for all that had been accomplished by the 228th and attached personnel since October of 1966....whereby the impression is given, that until he; Major Ward had arrived and the 196th had "opened its perimeter" to he and "his command" in late November (1966) along with Capt. White, whereby, and up until his arrival, nothing in the area of forward supply operations had taken place. A small vanity on his part perhaps, but unfair to those personnel (officers and enlisted) who had accomplished so much with so little prior to said arrival of either Major Ward or Captain White....But, such is life.

Addendum: Per 19 June 1967 issue under Awards and Decorations by 25th ID in Tropic Lightning News: "Bronze Star; Major Jerry E. Ward HHC 266th S&S BN. This is an oddity, as Major Jerry E. Ward up through 27 May 1967 (older Morning Report DA Form 1 in use January - May 1967) had been quartered with 228th from the 15th Support Brigade. Possibly at some point prior to 13 May and rotation orders, Major Ward had been reassigned to the 266th S&S BN (DS)...or had to have been, per newer and retyped Morning Reports of 228th (new DA Form 1) where Major Ward rotates out of 228th (no entry ever showing he had been assigned and joined or attached, unless prior to 13 May 1967) per orders generated by 266th S&S BN (DS) ....A.B.Neighbor 11 March 2012

Note 2: For clarification purposes the units and elements named in the article and nearly 500 all purpose troops attached to the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) are more correctly identified as follows:

551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo)....subordinate of 29th General Support Group 

140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (DS)....subordinate of 29th General Support Group 

483rd Field Service Company (GS)....subordinate of 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)

75th Heavy Material Supply Company (DS), aka: 75th Supply and Service Company (GS)....subordinate of 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)

507th Engineer Detachment....subordinate of HQS, USA Support Command, Saigon, the main HQ consisting of 14 Engineer Detachment units of which the 507th was one.

48th Transportation Group....separate entity consisting of 11 Companies, 2 Detachments -Light and Medium Truck, with detachments handling (TTPO) and (TTPB)...a subordinate of 29th General Support Group

15th Support Brigade was the unit from which Major Jerry E. Ward, became quartered with the 228th. The 15th Support Brigade was a separate entity consisting of a Signal Detachment, a Maintenance Battalion with 5 Companies (DS) and also under the command of HQS, USA, Support Command, Saigon, the same as the 29th General Support Group and 507th Engineers. The 15th Support Brigade was one of the rearward supply entities located in Long Binh and operating (on par with 29th General Support Group, both being subordinate to USASUPCOM, Saigon and 1st Logistics Command, Saigon) who arranged by convoy and airlift (via 25th Aviation) a good deal of supply to Tay Ninh, especially during Operations; Gadsden, Cedar Falls,  Junction City which had followed Operation Attleboro. Supply in all Classes arrived from either Saigon, Long Binh, or Cu Chi on a daily basis to the 228th by Convoy or Airlift, was offloaded, redistributed by the 228th assigned and attached personnel to other entities of Tay Ninh Base Camp and/or other battlefield units operating outside or near Tay Ninh for a radius of nearly 20 miles...the 228th its assigned and attached personnel being the most forward supply entity of War Zone C, III Corps, and designated a level II organization in addition to being designated as "Supply and Control Center" representing 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) and 1st Logistics Command.

Late March 1967 All 500+ attached personnel were returned to their respective assigned units of Long Binh, excepting a few (15 to 20 personnel) who had been re-assigned from various enumerated units into the 228th.

By mid April 1967 or thereabouts, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and all associated units left Tay Ninh lock, stock and barrel for a new assignment in Chu Lai. However, according to 175th Engineers Website and Webmaster (see links) the elements moved to Chu Lai in April were "forward" personnel, with the last of all heavy equipment (in particular, that of the 175th Combat Engineers Company) from Tay Ninh not arriving in Chu Lai until late June and/or early July of 1967. In the 1 May 1967 issue of Tropic Lightning News of 25th ID, the article states "the 196th Light Infantry Brigade had completed move to Chu Lai seven days prior" (23 April 1967).

At the same time period, on or about late March 1967 to mid April 1967, the Sign "Command and Control Center with 266th and 1st Logistics Crest" remained in place through 27 May 1967....Orderly Room side of the Company Street at entry from main road.

Note: This sign (see photo gallery) is a mystery of sorts. We in the 228th Orderly Room knew it existed by written Orders dated 4 October 1966, and also knew that for all intent and purpose the Commanding Officer (Captain B.A. Kuster) had the title by such orders to exercise all command decisions related to Direct Supply and Support activity within Tay Ninh Base Camp and its surrounding areas of operations. On the other hand, the 228th had a senior officer (Maj. Jerry Ward) quartered with the 228th from the 15th Support Brigade and one clerk typist (SP4 Grant Lowery - Clerk Typist - 228th) for reports and other logistical co-ordination concerning logistic activity in Tay Ninh. From a command structure perspective (orders or otherwise) Major Ward had no authority over 228th personnel. However, and by what means this writer does not know, Major Ward did assume and have control (or exercised control) over the activity of the attached all purpose personnel in ever increasing increments, such that, by February 1967 he exercised all control as to said personnel and their activities wherever and for whatever reason such personnel were needed in a TDY capacity both within and outside Tay Ninh Base Camp. All the preceding was accomplished on a verbal basis through the 228th and via the new Commanding Officer; Captain Jerry D. White. As to the "Sign - Command and Control Center" it remained in place through late May 1967. In another photograph (1967-1968) photo gallery as taken by Maj. S. A. "Les" Merritt on or about June 1967, one can see that the particular sign is missing, although the frame holding it is still in place.

Note: In a quarterly report discovered in 2012 as issued by 29th General Support Group it is annotated in January 1967, that "the 29th General Support Group has been attached to 15th Support Brigade - Long Binh". This was interesting, in that such knowledge was not distributed or known by any subordinate units of 29th. Further, and by June of 1967, the 15th Support Brigade was "inactivated" and all its subordinate units reassigned to 29th General Support Group....a matter of possible politics and/or other issues in play, one can only suppose.

15 April 1967 the 228th began to receive additional personnel as replacements for the approximate 110 officers and enlisted who were due to rotate (having served their 1 year tour of duty in country) beginning in mid May 1967*. The Commanding Officer of the 228th was approached for the 3rd time since February 1967 regarding two matters. The first was a query as to whether or not he desired a person to be selected to learn (OJT) the duties of Company Clerk and Mail Clerk. To this, the answer was always "It's up to Battalion (266th) to handle the matter".

*The Army had instituted what was known as an "Early Out" process (exact timing and particulars an unknown). For some personnel their individual tour of duty (in some cases separation from service being concurrent) rotated early...in general approximately 2 to 3 weeks on average, but not always. As an example, this writer (SP4 A.B. Neighbor) served 11 months 29 days in USARPAC (United States Army Pacific), RVN, but was released and separated from active service Oakland Army Base 31 May 1967 having served 1 year, 11 months, 15 days of active duty.

The second query to the Commanding Officer of the 228th was with regard to the award of "Good Conduct Medals" to all enlisted personnel rotating beginning February 1967 through May 1967 and would be discharged and separating from active duty in CONUS, having served their respective 2 or 3 year active duty service obligation honorably and with fidelity.

The Good Conduct Medal since inception in WWII had been awarded within Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) at Fort Lewis to all such enlisted personnel separating from service honorably since my tenure in the Orderly Room late 1965 (and previous since mid 1963). The same held true for the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) since inception 20 July 1966 RVN up through the first week of January 1967. In general, the award was bestowed upon an enlisted individual who had served honorably and with fidelity, for a continuous period of either 2 or 3 year active duty obligation and would be separating from such active service upon rotation and return to CONUS.

This query effecting 35 enlisted personnel where warranted for whatever reason(s) went unanswered and was ignored from mid January 1967 through May 1967...a Good Conduct Medal being an in house generated Company order, validated by the Company Commander.

These paricular queries to the Commander (for lack of better words) were never addressed positively or negatively, but simply ignored. Since there was never a response (verbally or otherwise) in answer to such queries (three separate occasions), the point became moot and pursued no further.

As a result, all enlisted personnel rotating who had completed their respective 2 or 3 year service obligation honorably and who would be separated from active duty on return to CONUS from February 1967 through May 1967 were not awarded a Good Conduct Medal. Why the Commander ignored this matter, this writer cannot answer.

The following enlisted personnel rotating and separating from service were eligible, earned, and should have been awarded a Good Conduct Medal w/Ribbon: 

SP4 John P. Kema,-- SP4 Fernando Abad Jr.,-- SP4 Dennis K. Burton,-- SP4 Nicholas Catania,-- SP4 Steven Goolie,-- SP4 Willie C. Harris,-- SP4 Jesse Heard,-- SP4 Robert M. Lenzi,-- SP4 Julius Logan,-- SP4 Patrick J. Mellon,-- SP4 Floyd E. Moore, -- SP4 Spencer L. Nashboo,-- SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor Jr.,-- SP4 Thomas Parrott,-- SP4 Cylde Price Jr.,-- SP4 Terry R. Shipp, --SP4 J.D. Stewart Jr.,-- SP4 Dennis E. Thomas,-- SP4 Louis D. Valentine   ****    SP4 Marvin Eanes Jr.,-- SP4 Clare Easley, SP4 Larry Groth,-- SP4 James R. Harley,-- SP4 Leon Harper, SP4,-- SP4 Norman M. Hopkins,-- SP4 Anthony Low,-- SP4 Dennis L. Lucero,-- SP4 Gerald P. Martin,-- SP4 James R. Normoyle,-- SP4 Moses Oatman,-- SP4 James M. Proctor,-- SP4 Jose L. Sandoz,-- SP4 William A. Taylor,-- SP4 Alfonso Trevizo,-- SP4 William L. Watkins .....Total 35 of 110 rotating from unit prior to 1 June 1967

**** Denotes separation point between actual rank of SP4 verses PFC, as names were extrapolated from February 1967 Roster and a good deal if not all those listed following the "****" were promoted from PFC to SP4 after 1 February 1967 and prior to rotation (per Morning Report data May 1967) pending separation from service at a later time period in 1967. The remaining enlisted rotating (approximarely 75) having served at or near 1 year of active duty were reassigned to other units in CONUS pending their respective 2 or 3 years of required active service...at which time, if they had served with honor and fidelity, their final unit of assignment would (in theory) issue their respective Good Conduct Medal w/ribbon. 

The issue was a further puzzlement as since July 1966 through May 1967 in Long Binh and Tay Ninh there had been no Article 15s or Court Martial within the Company (excluding 1 attached) with reference to these particular individuals. Further, the unit had been recommended for a Meritorious Unit Commendation (Citation) in 1966 (also never received by rotating personnel approximating 110 officers and enlisted prior to 1 June 1967). The MUC as confirmed by DAGO #39 Dated 1970 for time period 1 October 1966 - 3 July 1967, negating the entry of said award on individual DD214s or appearing in rotating personnel 201 Files to any and all who had departed the unit prior to 3 July 1967. Personnel (officers and enlisted) assigned or attached within the unit prior to 3 July 1967 and who rotated afterwards do (as near as can be determined) have the award of MUC annotated within their individual 201 File and subsequent DD214 at their time of rotation and/or separation.

One other minor issue affecting personnel of the 228th who rotated prior to 1 June 1967. It is unclear as to whether it was strict policy of the time or not. Per Army Regulations a person is allowed 1 overseas bar for each 6 months of service in a Combat Zone. At the time and since an early out policy had been instituted, a person who had not served exactly 1 year (365 days or 12 months) was awarded 1 overseas bar on rotation as reflected on their individual DD214's. Research has indicated, that those who desire to pursue the matter can have their DD214 "corrected" whereby, the award of a second overseas bar would be awarded...Army policy having changed in June 1967 to round off to the nearest month. Example: A person with 11 months 14 days might not be awarded a second overseas bar, whereas a person with 11months 15 days would....(speculation, as this is what appears to have taken place). There might well be a present policy in place (2012) whereby a lesser amount of continuous and active service in RVN prior to 1 June 1967 is recognized as deserving two overseas bars, i.e.; more than 6 months, but less than exactly 12 months...the range and actual cutoff time an unknown.

 

For those affected personnel who desire to seek an amended DD214, whereby the award of a second overseas bar, and/or the award of unit MUC is not reflected on their individual DD214, the following should be pursued: Request a copy of DD214 (if not in posession) along with a request for copy of Personnel 201 File from St. Louis Missouri, via Form SF-180 (Standard Form 180)*.

 

Once you have obtained one or both records (4 to 6 weeks) and reviewed, obtain, fill out and file DD Form 149 (Application for correction of Military Record)* as applicable.

 

*Note: Both forms (SF-180 and DD Form 149) are available online for downloading, printing and subsequent filling out with enclosures as necessary. A copy of DAGO 39 whereby the 228th was awarded an MUC for time period 1 October 1966 - 3 July 1967 is also available online for downloading and printing (see Homepage Awards Section for reference purposes or download as well)

1 May 1967 - 1 June 1967 the bulk of personnel who had been in country and with the 228th from the beginning began the process of rotating...packing up goods (allowed two foot-lockers of personnel goods - inspected by officers prior to sealing), receiving a series of vaccination shots from 45th Surgical Hospital, basic physical examination and the lot, and prepping for an allowed 1 day of celebration beer and BBQ for all.

15 May 1967 ETS/DEROS party (beer and bb-q) held by rotating personnel, sponsored by HQ enlisted EM with permission of CO...entire company assigned and attached (officers and enlisted) invited. Attended by Major Ward, nearly all officers, NCO's, 1st Shirt and new 1st Shirt, along with newly assigned enlisted throughout the day when off duty.

23 May 1967  (approximate) the last Morning Report of the Company Clerk was typed and signed by the Commanding Officer*.

 

 

*Note: An anomaly exists within present day Morning Reports of 228th for the entire month of May 1967. At the time DD Form 1 (Morning Report) had been due to expire from usage as of 1 January 1967. However, the new DD1 was not available for use by units stationed in Tay Ninh Province and the older Form 1 continued to be used and submitted. At some point following 23 May 1967, the new DD Form 1 arrived in Vietnam. As such, all previous Morning Reports in use were retyped and resubmitted. This is known as copies of these Morning Reports have been obtained and reviewed. There are a good number of anomalies which could be discussed, but in the main, the data is reliable. The most glaring issue, relates to the signatory. Where it should have read "CPT Jerry D. White; Commanding" they read "1LT Floyd C. Hughes; Company Officer", later "Commanding" -- A comminique with F.C. Hughes in 2011 resulted in the following explaination: "Although a junior officer by rank and time in grade, I was ordered by a COL {1st ID,... possibly 567th S&S BN (DS)} to sign all Morning Reports. I simply signed them as ordered, and had no idea as to whether they were correct or not". The Morning Report of 28 May 1967 (reflecting 27 May) is signed by CPT Gordon I. Ozawa, Commanding....Yet, CPT Gordan I. Ozawa did not assume command of the 228th officialy until 1 June 1967 (reflecting 31 May 1967).  CPT Jerry D. White is reflected on 567th S&S BN (DS) as TDY from 228th (effective 2 May 1967), while 266th S&S BN (DS) reflects CPT White as an assigned Gain TDY with 228th (effective 1 May 1967), but is not released from duty from 228th (while TDY with 567th) until 26 May 1967. Complicating matters, Captain White is reassigned to 266th S&S BN (DS) on 28 May 1967 and physically left Company the 29th of May.

 

All these entries are quite strange and at odds with each other as to actual events. CPT Jerry D. White was physically not only quartered and Commanding Officer of 228th up to and including 27 May 1967, but there had never been any orders stating differently up to the time I operated as Company Clerk of 228th, 20 July 1966 - 23 May 1967. When I left the 228th on 27 May 1967, CPT White was the Commanding Officer. In short, the Morning Reports I personnaly typed (January 1967 - May 1967) in parrticular the month of May 1967, all authenticated and signed by CPT Jerry D. White; Commanding, were in effect ......"Altered".... ABN 27 February 2012

 

27 May 1967 the Company Clerk departed the 228th as had nearly all 110 + - personnel excepting 2 or three who were also scheduled to depart prior to 1 June. On this date, Captain Jerry D. White was still Commanding Officer. As of 1 June 1967 (see 1967-1968 History; Section G) a new Commanding Officer; Captain Gordon I. Ozawa had been assigned from HHC 567th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) as CO, while the 266th S&S BN (DS) had lost operational control as the superior command of the 228th.

Note: The rotating personnel of the original 228th never saw or heard a word more about the recommended DUC or MUC award of December 1966. Not one Good Conduct Medal was issued after 6 January of 1967 - May 1967 {would have effected 35 enlisted personnel of 110 scheduled for rotation}. Nor were any other awards (beyond the 17 Purple Hearts) awarded, including any letters of Commendation to individuals, and/or the verbal mention of several Bronze Stars that one Officer and two Enlisted were told they were scheduled to receive.

Some 40 years later (see awards section as well) and due to the research efforts of former 228th personnel of the time, it has been proved beyond question that the 228th was awarded the following, which does not appear on any single individuals DD214 at their time of separation from active service, and or transfer to another posting in CONUS by 1 June 1967.

1) For time period July 1966 - March 1967 Meritorious Unit Commendation 25th Infantry Division assigned and attached (TDY) Cu Chi: 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) - Laundry and Bath Section - Bakery Section - 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) Superior Command: 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS). Note: This award does appear on DD214 of individuals serving in Cu Chi with the 25th ID

2) For time period 5 October 1966 - 3 July 1967, Tay Ninh - Meritorious Unit Commendation 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) Superior Command: 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS). Note: This award does not appear on any individual DD214 who had rotated prior to 3 July 1967.

3) For time period July 1967 (possibly August 1967) through late December 1968 (possibly January 1969) Individual written Commendations (and other) to specific personnel of 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) - (exact number unknown - see 1967 -1968 History, Gallery) - Superior Command: Forward detachment of 567th Supply and Service Battalion (DS), later a conglomerate of 567th detachment personnel, elements of the 29th General Support Group, in concert with elements of the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion of the 25th ID, later known as Logistics Supply Area/Activity (LSA) Tay Ninh, aka: Tay Ninh Support Command and/or Tay Ninh Support or Supply Area/Activity.

4) For time period 19 February 1969 - 15 August 1969, Tay Ninh - Meritorious Unit Commendation 228th Supply and Service Company (DS)  Superior Command: 277th Supply and Service Battalion (DS). Note: It is believed (pending notification) by 228th personnel of the time period, that this MUC most likely appears on individual DD214s.

5) 13 May 2004 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) - Distinguished Unit of the Regiment, Quartermaster Corps w/Streamer, Fort Lee, Virginia ...Award accepted on behalf of 228th by 4 members of original unit (2 officers, 2 enlisted...see Home Page and Known Awards).

In addition to the preceding there were a number of individual letters of commendation, individual awards including Bronze Stars and/or other including Purple Hearts awarded to personnel both officers and enlisted after 3 July 1967 - August 1970 - (exact number unknown). It is also possible, that the 228th received additional award recognition 1970 -1973 while stationed in Can Tho/Bien Thuy of the Delta area, but research to date, and this writing in 2010 has not produced any evidence of same.

The 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) was activated in Long Binh, RVN 20 July 1966, served in Long Binh 20 July 1966 - 6 October 1966. The unit then served in III Corps, Tay Ninh Province, War Zone C from 7 October 1966 - August 1970 as its primary assignment station, and was then re-assigned to the Delta area of Can Tho and Bien Thuy from August 1970 - February 1972 where it was forevermore "inactivated" (an area still under research, and for which {at present time} there is little data available. In total the 228th was active for 6 years, 7 months in Republic of Vietnam.

.......................................................................................................................................................... 

 

B) Added Details Version 1966-1967:

The roots of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) began at Fort Lewis, Washington. At the time (and those who eventually became members of the 228th) were assigned to Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support). The Battalion commanded by then Lt. Col. Fred C. Sheffey was composed of HHC (Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Direct Support), with Company A and Company B respectively.

The 266th, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Company A and Company B were initially formed in 1963, were part of the 6th Army - Presidio, San Francisco, California, but assigned in Fort Lewis Washington under the oversight of the 4th Infantry Division, whose HQ and personnel occupied the area of the central main Fort.

The authorized unit strength of the entire 266th Quartermaster Battalion approximated a total of about 583 officers and enlisted. Company A and Company B had an authorized unit strength of  235 for each Company (470)...the remainder (117) belonging to Headquarters Company and Headquarters itself.

On 31 May 1966  the entire Battalion (less 1 deserter) boarded the USNS General Nelson M. Walker docked at the Port of Tacoma, Washington. All told, the troop ship carried a contingent approximating 3,500 troops (this is what was discussed, but may not be true). The Walker weighed anchor with the voyage from Tacoma beginning the evening of 31 May 1966 and was a relatively uneventful one lasting three (3)+ weeks. On or about 20 June 1966 the Walker dropped anchor in Qui Nonh Harbor Republic of Vietnam. The following day anchorage was at Cam Ranh Bay where (not positive) Company A, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) offloaded. The following day, the Walker anchored at Vung Tau on the 23rd of June 1966 where HHC 266th and Company B offloaded by clambering down rope netting, steel pots, rifle and gear bags into waiting LST's.

No known briefing of any sort had been given to enlisted or officers as to what to expect upon landing. Arriving at the beach-head, the LCM doors dropped and the unit walked ashore. A six piece band was playing near a small dune some 100 feet away, the tune un-recognizable, but military in nature, while all about the beach were a number of soldiers (RAR) in swimming trunks, drinking beer and/or soda...most alongside various Vietnamese ladies.

Walking further up and over the small pathway between the dunes, the unit was met by waiting Army buses (approximately 6) with steel bars and barbed wire across the windows, somewhat akin to County Sheriff buses used in most local counties within the United States. Before boarding said conveyances each man was issued three (3) rounds of ammunition for his M14 without instruction, other than " in case we meet enemy fire". The bus trip lasted about an hour and a half (although it seemed much shorter) where the Company offloaded at Tent City A, Saigon, the three (3) bullets collected by the initial issuers. The unit personnel were instructed to find a place to quarter in the empty field tents with approximately 20 bunks per field tent. Note: Two officers accompanied the enlisted personnel of Company B; Captain B. A. Kuster and 1st Lt. Ralph R. Meshon. All other HQ Officers and personnel of HQ Company 266th as well as other officers from Company B, 266th were flown from Vung Tau to Saigon.

Note: To be more precise about preceding and per 1st Lt Paul B. Walker (already in Country, stationed in Long Binh), the following applies: "The route alluded to would be Route 15 to its juncture with Route 1A, at the top of the triangle of Long Binh, then left down Route 1A to Tent City A. At the time, and throughout 1966 Route 15 was not routinely open for travel. It was very insecure and used only when there were troop movements from debarkations at Vung Tau. Typically, it required elements of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) and/or the 173rd Airborne Brigade to open the road and secure these troop movements. Distance wise, this was a bit over 50 miles up Route 15, then a bit over 15 miles down Route 1A to Tent City at Tan Son Nhut, Saigon".

The following day, orders were received from HQ United States Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM), subordinate command of 1st Logistics Command, stripping 100 unit personnel from Company B...... in the main, light and heavy duty truck drivers, along with our entire leather and clothing repair section who were re-assigned to various units throughout Vietnam.....leaving the unit with 134 personnel, or put another way at or near a 60% unit strength. At the same time all personnel were required to remove their 6th Army insignia shoulder patch, to be replaced by the 1st Logistics Command shoulder insignia, aka; "the leaning outhouse".

The unit remained in Tent City A for a period of approximately five (5) days, and then received orders to proceed  by convoy to a small outpost called Long Binh, some 8 to 10 miles northeast of Saigon. Arriving in Long Binh, one couldn't help but notice there was very little there. At the time, there were two Company sized units, i.e.; the 506th Quartermaster Company (DS) and the 624th Quartermaster Company (DS)....both having been in Long Binh for nearly 8 to 10 months. In addition, there was an outfit known as the 569th Quartermaster Company (Composite) and a few other scattered detachments of personnel within the relatively small compound.

The compound itself consisted of of a small rubber tree grove, a looped roadway and several dirt hardened roadways of compacted laterite (a semi orange red clay like substance), that when wet stuck easily to combat boots....when dry put out a very fine dust that blanketed freshly shined boots within several steps.

As one entered the main gate of the compound, immediately to the front right were the quarters of the 624th Quartermaster Company (DS). If one turned immediately right down a road adjacent to Highway 1A one would run into the quarters of the 506th Quartermaster Company (DS) on the left.

The HHC of the 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) and Company B were assigned and located less than 1/4 mile northeasterly from the main gate entry, where one turned right onto a main roadway. Company B set up Field Tents on the left side. Several hundred feet southeastward, on the left became the 266th Battalion HQ consisting of an upside down reverse "L" shaped wooden structure approximately 20 to 25 feet in width and approximately 75 feet in length. Across the road were quartered all Officers in another wooden structure, with a second wooden structure adjacent and housing 266th HQ Company personnel.

The first order of business assigned Company B was to build specialized wooden quarters for the Battalion Commander, which was situated midway between Battalion HQ and the Field Tents of Company B. Upon completion of quarters, personal shower point and personal outhouse of Battalion Commander...Company B pool table, refrigerator, phonograph player and air conditioning unit were requisitioned and installed in the Battalion Commanders quarters along with the only Company B generator to operate electric lighting and other electrics within said quarters. In truth, the Company had no need or use for these items. The Company was quartered in field tents with dirt flooring, had no electrical service, and therefore no need for the company refrigerator, air conditioning unit or phonograph player, let alone the company pool table, as the company had no recreation room either.

During this time, Company B personnel used flash-lights for lighting there being but a few kerosene lanterns available for use. Coincident to the time, the Monsoon rains were in evidence, so much so, that within a half hour of rain there was water 8" deep in the company field tent area. By evening there was a good six to eight inches of water flowing freely through the field tents, whereby if one looked carefully an occasional frog, snake or other insect beastie of considerable size swam or washed by ones bunk.

During one of these continuous downpours lasting day and night, it was most pleasant change of pace to hear music emanating from the companies former record player some 20 feet away within the Battalion Commanders quarters as nurses and other Battalion senior personnel were at times entertained.

Within the week, 19 Company B personnel of the Bakery Section (20 personnel assigned) excepting one, where re-assigned TDY (Temporary Duty) to the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi. At the same time approximately 30 personnel from Company B Laundry and Bath Platoon and its assigned Officer (1st Lt. W. I. EcKhart) were assigned TDY to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion in Cu Chi to provide Laundry services to 25th Medical Hospital....in effect leaving approximately 80 to 85 personnel of B Company assigned and physically in Long Binh. Note: The 1 Baker not assigned TDY to Cu Chi with the 25th ID ; (Terry R. Shipp} remained assigned to Company B, 266th {later 228th}, but TDY to the 266th in Long Binh for his entire tour of duty.

Coincident to the Bakery Section of Company B being assigned TDY to the 25th ID in Cu Chi, the Bakery section of the 506th was assigned TDY to Saigon area (277th QM BN (DS) suspected) with the 624th Bakery section assigned TDY to the 569th Quartermaster Company (Composite - later Provisional), then stationed in Long Binh.

A week later, on or about 15 July 1966 approximately 30 enlisted and one officer (1st Lt. R. Meshon) were assigned TDY to Bien Hoa Air Force Base where two Field Tents were set up adjacent to the airstrip where F105s were worked on, fired up to test proper engine function and conduct other maintenance repairs. The assigned duties of these personnel were to supervise the offloading of all manner of air supply, check manifest records, sign off on same, and then load materials onto trucks for ground transport to Long Binh supply area...leaving approximately 55 personnel of Company B physically stationed in Long Binh. Of these 55, our POL Platoon was assigned TDY to the 64th Petroleum Battalion then operating in Long Binh, further south of main compound adjacent to Highway 1A, along with the POL Platoons of the 506th and 624th Quartermaster Companies (DS)...but all three Platoons remained quartered with their respective Companies.

The next order of business assigned the Company was to build the wooden Battalion Mess Hall, followed by the clearing and construction of an area for the Orderly Room with two inline wooden structures directly behind the Orderly Room for the personnel of what had been Company B, 266th (see following regarding 20 July 1966), all completed on or about 25 July 1966. The Company never did have its own shower point, but used the 506ths, and/or just stripped down, soaped up and stood in the downpour of the seemingly constant monsoon rains.

On 20 July 1966 there was a COSTAR {Combat Service Support to the Army} directive throughout all RVN and CONUS {Continental United States} whereby a good number (if not all)  existing Quartermaster (Direct Support) Supply units were "inactivated" and/or "re-constituted" as "Supply and Service (Direct Support)" units with some remaining whole in terms of personnel, whereby the unit simply had a name change. Examples: The 506th and 624th Quartermaster Companies (DS) were "re-constituted" to became the 506th and 624th Supply and Service Companies (Direct Support), whereas Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) was "inactivated" (shut down) and a new entity created "activated" ...basically composed of the same personnel who had been assigned within Company B.

The newly "activated" unit became known as the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support).

The 266th HHC Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) the superior Command of Company B, 266th was reconstituted as HHC {Headquarters and Headquarters Company} 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support).

On this same date (20 July 1966) a good number of personnel from these newly designated units were shuffled about, transferred and re-assigned between each other in Long Binh. The Commanding Officer of Company B {Capt.B.A. Kuster, AB Ranger}, 1st Shirt {Master Sgt. Carlos Baruz}, COs' driver {PFC J.D. Stewart}, Assistant Company Clerk {PFC Ronald L. Fischer} and approximately 15 others were re-assigned to the reconstituted 624th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support). Others were re-assigned to the reconstituted 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), and/or HHC 266th Supply and Service Batallion (Direct Support). Still others but very few were re-assigned from the 506th, and 624th into the newly "activated" 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support). 

Note: As a general rule of thumb, and even though all units (paperwork wise) used the designation "Direct Support or (DS)" in all paperwork, Orders, Morning Reports, etc!, other entities and higher authority beyond the 29th General Support Group  seemed to always drop the Direct Support or (DS) designation. Thus, most "Direct Support" units in a good number of articles, orders and the like from higher authority (Westmoreland for example) never used the "(DS)" or Direct Support designation. Likewise, a (GS) - General Support entity somehow lost the "(GS)" designation by higher authority beyond 29th General Support Group.

At this time (20 July 1966), the newly formed 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) had 3 Officers assigned with an authorized number of five (5). The unit also had an authorized enlisted number of 228, but actually had a total of 123 enlisted, of which, 25 to 30 were TDY at Bien Hoa AFB, with 30 TDY in Cu Chi with the 25th Infantry Division {25th Supply and Transport Battalion}, and the entire POL Platoon TDY with the 64th Petroleum Battalion in Long Binh. The 20 personnel of Bakery Section of former Company B, were (as best I recall) reassigned to the 266th (possibly the 569th quartermaster composite provisional), excepting the 1 Baker {Terry R. Shipp} assigned to the 228th but remaining TDY with the 266th. The Acting Commanding Officer of the 228th was 1st Lt. Lawrence A. Clark, the new 1st Shirt; Staff Sergeant Balbino E. Billamor Jr. The other officers being, 1st Lt. W. I. Eckhart TDY in Cu Chi, and 1st Lt. R. Meshon TDY at Bien Hoa Airbase.

In effect, the newly formed 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) with an authorized unit strength of 233 (5 officers, 228 enlisted) had three (3) Officers assigned, one of whom was TDY in Cu Chi. The 228th had 123 enlisted assigned, of which 50 were TDY either in Cu Chi or Bien Hoa, leaving 53 enlisted physically stationed in Long Binh....25 of those 53 were TDY with the 64th Petroleum Battalion, but still physically quartered and stationed in Long Binh.

{See Table of Organization and Equipment - Miscellaneous Data - Part 5 - History Section for other interesting organizational aspects related to the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS)}.

From 20 July 1966 - 6 October 1966 the 228th remained in Long Binh performing various duties as assigned by HQ 266TH Battalion. The unit strength by October 1966 numbered (including those TDY in Cu Chi and Bien Hoa) at approximately 110...less than 50% of the authorized unit strength of 233.

On 4 October 1966 the 228th received orders from Battalion HQ and 29th General Support Group that they were being re-assigned to War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province of III Corps some 60 miles northwest of Saigon about six miles from the Cambodian Border to set up authorized supply operations and logistics base in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (The Chargers, aka: The Burning Worm) an attached element of the 25th Infantry Division Headquartered in Cu Chi {See Note following}.

Note 1: There is conflicting evidence online regarding the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. The 25th ID claims the 196th was an element of the 25th Infantry Division. However, the 196th claims it was a unit onto itself and never mentions an association with, and/or being a part of the 25th ID. However, The Newspaper of the 25th ID (The Tropic Lightning News) issued weekly covered the 196th extensively, and leaves little doubt, that for all intent and purposes the 196th was considered an element of the 25th ID by the 25th ID. On the other hand, the Website of the 196th never mentions the 25th ID, but does mention an association with the 1st Infantry Division after 1966/67. All data and research seems to indicate, that the 196th Light Infantry Brigade was an entity on to itself, but may have been an attached element to the 25th ID. This reportage shall leave it to the 196th and 25th ID to sort this issue out.

Note: As of August 2010 personnel of the 175th Combat Company Engineers, aka: 175th Engineers {a part of the 196th state, that it appears they were "attached" to the 25th ID, but did not know about the matter until some 44 years after.

Note 2:  The 196th Light Infantry Brigade had arrived and set up a base camp in Tay Ninh in August 1966. At the same time on or about September 1966 an advance forward staff contingent of the 1st PHILCAGV  (1st Philippines Civic Action Group) commanded by then Brigader General G.V. Tobias, his Chief of Staff; Maj. Fidel Valdez Ramos, a Major Belzer and others were also in Tay Ninh as of mid September 1966. In addition there were Special Forces personnel encamped at or near Tay Ninh Base Camp and near as well as atop Nui Ba Den (The Black Virgin Mountain).

On 7 September 1966 Capt, B. A. Kuster accompanied by his assistant/driver/associate (PFC R. L. Fischer) had been assigned TDY by 266th HQ from the 624th S&S Company (DS) Long Binh as representatives of the 266th and 1st Logistics Command to facilitate the arrival of some 3000 1st PHILCAGV personnel in conjunction with General Tobias and his forward staff command. This is noted, as Capt. Kuster had been Commanding Officer of Company B 266th in Fort Lewis from approximately late March 1966 up to 20 July 1966 in Long Binh, RVN. It is also noted, as on 4 October (referenced above) Capt. Kuster was re-assigned from 624th Commanding Officer TDY in Tay Ninh "Command and Control Center" to Commanding Officer of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) still in Long Binh. On the same date (4 October 1966) 1st Lt. Lawrence A. Clark Acting CO of the 228th was re-assigned to 266th Battalion Company HQ.

Thus, on 7 October at 0500 hours 85 personnel of the 228th S&S Co (DS) and their equipment led by 1st Lt. Ralph R. Meshon (Acting CO) left Bien Hoa airfield as a portion of a larger convoy to Tay Ninh Province...stop over for 45 minutes in Cu Chi and arriving at Tay Ninh Base Camp on or about mid afternoon of 7 October 1966. The units assigned encampment area was located across the road from the 196th Light Infantry Brigades secondary Ammo Dump inside the base perimeter (see photo gallery). There were no other units encamped in any direction until early November 1966;  the 45th Surgical (MUST) Field Hospital, and 45th Med Evac some 800 to 1000 yards to the northeast of the 228th, whose forward personnel had arrived on or about 2 November and in process of setting up basic operatiional site.

The personnel of the 228th began the task of unloading their equipment, tearing down 4 to 5' high termite mounds, killing a number of poisonous snakes (kraits and two steppers), and cutting elephant grass with machetes. That chore accomplished, the first Field Tent erected was the Orderly Room followed by the Company Supply Tent, and then the remaining personnel Field Tent quarters.

Within the week 23 other 228th enlisted personnel who had been TDY elsewhere {3 from Bien Hoa, 20 from 64th Petrol Battalion} arrived in Tay Ninh. Thus, the total officers and enlisted physically in Tay Ninh amounted to a total of 110, with yet another 30 still TDY in Cu Chi.

By the second week of October, the remainder of POL Platoon (excluding 3 personnel) along with a portion of L&B section TDY in Cu Chi arrived in Tay Ninh. Additionally, the 5 remaining personnel TDY at Bien Hoa Airfield arrived.

On or about 7 to 10 October Capt. B.A.Kuster, signed into the 228th to assume Command and continue in his capacity as "Officer in Charge Command and Control Center" representing the 266th and 1st Logistics Command with 1st PHILCAGV arrival and to assist the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in setting up Class I, II, III, IV operations along with a Graves Registration facility, Laundry and Bath Hot Shower Point and other direct supply functions.

To make matters a touch more difficult, during this same time period, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade had launched the largest Counteroffensive of the War effort to date ( 23,000 combat troops in the field), and the 228th found itself smack dab in the middle of this same Operation...called Attleboro Phase II. Note: Per data online, Operation Attleboro consisted of two parts; Attleboro Phase I and Attleboro Phase II. Part I consisted of probing for the enemy, while Part 2 consisted of actual contact and engagement with the enemy...(see Part C and Addendum following)

In essence the 228th found itself in the position of not only setting up it's own company area, but heavily involved in setting up and developing supply point facilities related to any and all supply and logistics necessary to the base camp known as Tay Ninh West. In addition the limited 228th began supporting the 196th LIB and associated troops from 25th ID operating within the field of battle (see Part C entitled Panegyric and in particular Addendum following).

Note: The preceding is not intended to state, that the 228th and only the 228th was involved in supply operations. The 196th as an element of the 25th ID (?) was being supplied by both air and ground forces (convoy) from a number of locations and by other entities from Saigon, Long Binh, and Cu Chi, as well as various aviation units out of Bien Hoa, and Saigon.The key point, is that the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) was the "only" Supply unit physically assigned and representing the 266th Supply and Service Battallion (DS), United States Army Support Command and 1st Logistics Command as well as "Command and Control Center", with actual boots on the ground within Tay Ninh Base Camp and its environs. As such, the 228th was charged with developing, operating the various supply points necessary, to stock, manage, distribute "all" logistics materials arriving by convoy and various aircraft as well as participating in same (convoy runs and the like). This charge included setting up and operating Class I (all food items, canned, semi perishable, perishable and refrigerated) Stock Control. Class II, and IV....materials, engineering, parts, clothing, etc!, Class III, POL..(Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants, including fuel storage (Gas, Diesel, Aviation Fuel, etc!), L&B...(Laundry and Bath, Hot shower points, laundry in particular for Field Hospital units) and other functions such as light and heavy duty vehicle repair, parts, mechanics and engineering supplies. Further, the unit was charged with supply and distribution of clothing materials, boots, shirts, pants, various Class V, orders of munitions, ordinance et all. This mission also included water treatment facilities, converting non-potable water to potable and delivery of same to various units stationed inside and outside Tay Ninh base camp. A GR facility was set up and operating adjacent to the airfield near the L&B Hot Shower point, as was Stock Control, Class II AND IV ( GR later re-located near Class I and outer perimeter, as was Class II and IV, as well as Class V).

Note: The Laundry function for 45th Surgical Hospital, in combination with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, its associated subordinate units, other units and the 228th itself became an overwhelming burden immediately. As such, Laundry operations were eventually subcontracted out to Tay Ninh City civilian operations, while the 228th maintained, ran and operated a Hot shower point facility adjacent to the airstrip within the Base Camp itself.

During this time period, the Commanding Officer of the 196th specifically excluded the 228th from serving Guard Duty on the perimeter or within the Base Camp. He also condoned the wearing of T-Shirts (or no shirts) rather than OD shirts as temperatures in the shade reached 120 degrees during the day. His instruction was quite clear "You folks take care of Supply - My folks will take care of Combat and Guarding the Base Compound".

The preceding did in fact take place until January 1967. As the Company area continued to improve, the unit continued improving the Class I Yard and other supply points with major help from the 175th Engineers. The Hot Shower point set up adjacent to the airstrip continued to operate throughout the day and into early evening. Stock Control, Class II and IV were also functioning adjacent to the airstrip as was our Graves Registration Platoon. A POL Yard (Class III) was put together, set up and running near the main gate entry and airstrip. Class I was eventually relocated from airstrip to the southeast near the perimeter and near the South Gate of the Base Camp where the 175th Engineers were encamped initially in Field Tents and individual two man tents. At the same time and since July 1966 the 228th still had Laundry personnel TDY to 25th Supply and Transport Battalion of the 25ID in Cu Chi. The Bakers section prior to COSTAR directive remained in Cu Chi, as did a portion of L&B Platoon assigned TDY in Quan Loi, Trai Bi, and French Fort. In addition several 228th personnel remained TDY to the 64th Petrol Battalion, and 266th S&S Battalion in Long Binh.

During Operation Attleboro from its beginning (late September 1966) to the the time it began to wind down (early November 1966), the 110  personnel physically in Tay Ninh wore many hats, performed many jobs outside their primary PMOS (Primary Military Occupational Specialty) and were working 12 to 15 hour shifts 24/7 on a daily basis.

One of the immediate needs in mid October was a request for 5 additional Reefer units in addition to the two already in use by the 228ths Graves Registration Platoon (Mortuary Affairs). The problem being, that they were processing 20 to 30 remains from the field per day, and each reefer unit could only hold a maximum of five remains each. Class I was handling, transporting, turning over well over 85,000 C-Rations per day. This was due to supporting some 23,000 combat troops in the field of battle, in addition to supplying the 45th Surgical Hospital, 45th Med Evac, the 228th itself, other units in base camp, special forces partial supply to 1stPHILCAGV and other elements of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 25th ID operating outside and within the immediate area of Tay Ninh basecamp.

Note: The number of Combat Troops supported within the battlefield of Operation Attleboro varies as reported by different entities. Stars and Stripes claimed 28,000. Time Life Books states 17,000. Various news articles in CONUS range between 15,000 and 28,000. The Tropic Lightning News of the time states 23,000. Other Websites involved in Attleboro state 30,000. Major Ward in a February 1967 article in Tropic Lightning News states that by February 1967 "three to four times the design factor of 15,000", which translates into 45,000 to 60,000. As far as the 228th was concerned, the actual and true figure based on combat rations supplied would be in the neighborhood of 29,000 to 35,000 from October 1966 - January 1967. Note: The actual T0&E of a reduced strength Supply and Service Company (DS)...5 Officers, 228 enlisted for a total of 233 was designed to support 16,000 rather than the 15,000 stated by Major Ward. (see TO&E discussion in Miscellaneous Data). In short, the 228th was supporting twice its intended design and with substantially fewer people than allowed.

In addition, a demand for vast amounts of Aviation Gas, Petroleum products (Gasoline and Diesel) storage bladders and other was escalated in order to supply the vast needs of the Base Camp and to support ongoing battlefield operations, such that there were daily convoys of single and double tankers of fuel supplies arriving and departing on a regular schedule daily. These products included JP4-MOGAS-AVGAS and Diesel fuels. The preceding not only arrived by ground convoy, but by airlift as well.

At the same time the first order of business and first wooden structure built in the 228th encampment was the Company Mess Hall. Completed during on and off hours by the personnel of the 228th by late October 1966, the Mess Hall was christened and first opened by serving the entire 196th Light Infantry Brigade, beginning with the 175th Engineers quartered near the South Gate of the Tay Ninh Base Camp. For 3 days straight the 228th Cooks in three shifts provided the first "Hot" meals, with a desert of ice cream to the 196th and its subordinate elements who had not had a "hot" meal for well over 2 months. These fine folks arrived in 2 and 1/2 ton trucks numbering 200 in number at a time all day long for three days straight.

The Hot shower point set up and running adjacent to the airstrip allowed the 196th and other units of the 25th ID, Special Forces (Green Berets) etc! the luxury of being able to have their first hot shower in two months as well....the norm being showers from cold water wells, or simply soaping down outside ones quarters when the rains hit (which were often).

To say the least, the 228th was one busy outfit, and its understaffed Officers and enlisted performed magnificently without complaint....the informal motto of the Company being "Anything, Anytime, Anyplace" as recalled by SP4 George Savare of Class I, who joined the 228th on or about February 1967.

On 4 November 1966 the 228th at 0200 hours was mortared by incoming hostile fire, 16 to 18 rounds (Russian made) falling directly into the Company area. This action resulted in a direct hit to one of the Cook Field Tents, whereby SP4-E4 Robert Benjamin Nasser (Clerk Typist/Cook) with 228th,but assigned to 624th S&S Co (DS) was KIA and died in the arms of SP4 Spencer Nashboo who was in process of comforting Robert while awaiting urgent medical aid. Two other cooks with 228th but assigned to 624th S&S Co (DS) were severely wounded, transferred to 45th {Field} Surgical Hospital and subsequently returned to CONUS for further hospitalization and/or rehabilitation. 15 assigned in the 228th were wounded by said incoming mortar fire. Three of the 15 were determined fit for further duty. Twelve were evacuated. This hostile action activity and results appear on the Morning Report of 4 November 1966.

All of the above personnel were awarded Purple Hearts which were distributed in formation December of 1966 to those still in Company or had returned.

The same action of hostile fire while in progress was reported by field phone to 266th HQ in Long Binh by the 228th Company Clerk where the OG/OD (Officer of the Guard and Officer of the Day) happened to be one 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker of the 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) who by mid December was re-assigned from the 506th in Long Binh to the 228th as XO, Stock Control and Class II and IV Officer in Tay Ninh with the 228th.

On 14 November 1966 a second Mortar attack within the Base Compound and 228th encampment occurred, without incident to the 228th. However, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 45th {Field} Surgical Hospital sustained a number of KIA and wounded numbering at or near 40 to 45 individuals....the rumor, not confirmed. According to 45th Surgical Hospital Website (see Links), they treated approximately 13 to 14 severely wounded, with a good number of minor wounded. The 228th GR section handled approximately 20 to 25 KIA.

Note: The two incidents of hostile mortar attack mentioned are done so with reference to the 228th area of quarters only. The reader is advised that there had been continuous mortar attacks sustained by the Base Camp for a period of three to four months (October - January), but that only 2 of the attacks affected the 228th directly.

On or about late November 1966 through December 1966 the 228th began receiving additional officers assigned to the unit along with other officers attached....such that, instead of 4 officers assigned, there were now 6 officers assigned, 2 attached with a WO1 (Warrant Officer) attached. In addition, and by January 1967 some 500+ all purpose troops were attached to the 228th and all were carried on the Morning Report of the 228th.

The 500+ attached personnel consisted of elements of the 507th Engineers, 551st Ordinance, 140th Maintenance Detachment, elements of the 483rd Field Service Company (DS), 48th Transportation Group, and miscellaneous personnel from the 226th Supply and Service Battalion and 75th Supply Company, actual name; 75th Heavy Equipment Supply Company (DS)...all quartered within 228th assigned encampment area, and carried on the 228th Morning Report as "Attached TDY". Note: Rosters of these personnel were not kept by the 228th. The personnel were picked up via the actual orders and unit assigned from. Accountability for each person in each unit was left to the NCOIC or OIC of the actual personnel involved, whereby any change of status was reported directly to the unit of actual assignment. However, it was also expected, that any change of status regarding "attached" personnel should have been reported to the 228th as a matter of course. It was not. Instead, there seemed to be a situation of constant flux, with various attached personnel assigned for all types of "all purpose" duty both within and outside the confines of Tay Ninh Base Camp. Thus, these 500+ all purpose troops were located in Trai Bi, French Fort, Tay Ninh and other locations as needed, and by direction of Major Jerry Ward (neither assigned or attached, but quartered with the 228th).

As operation Attleboro ended, Operation Cedar Falls began, followed by Operations Gadsden and Junction City. The 500+ attached personnel remained quartered and attached with the 228th from late November through March 1967. It should also be mentioned that a Major Jerry Ward of the 15th Supply Brigade and representative of USASUPCOM and 1st Logistics Command was quartered (neither attached or assigned) with the 228th from early December 1966 -  late May 1967...his function to facilitate planning of Supply Operations and co-ordination of same in conjunction with ongoing battlefield operations of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 25th Infantry Division. Major Ward requested a clerk typist from the 228th and SP4 Grant Lowrey was assigned TDY to Major Ward and his field tent of operations located directly across the company street from the Orderly Room of the 228th. Major Ward and SP4 Lowrey used the front section of field tent for operations, and rear portion for their respective sleeping quarters.

On 25 November 1966 the 228th enjoyed a hot Thanksgiving meal, a copy of said menu (provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker) who had saved same while assigned to the 506th (see Memorabilia Section for copy of menu). The meal was 1st rate with all the trimmings.....the same menu being served to all armed forces throughout Vietnam wherever feasible.

Continued buildup of the various supply functions necessary to the base camp and operations by the 196th and 25th ID continued in full force on a daily basis. Christmas had arrived and personnel celebrated same with another specialized meal, which in effect was a duplicate of Thanksgiving Menu.

Near the end of December 1966 and through March of 1967 the 228th began the slow process {lumber being in short supply and a premium commodity} of transitioning from Field Tents to wooden structures with tin roofing. The particular inhabitants of each field tent (when lumber was available} performed all carpentry themselves, and without guidance or plans...such that, if one looks closely at photographs of the time, one would note variations of detail from structure to structure when completed. The most glaring mismatch being the structure built by personnel of HQ Tent (Company Clerk, Class I Clerk, Company Armorer, Assistant Company Clerk, Company Generator Operator, and COs' Driver). Nearly all structures had a 4/12 pitch excepting the HQ structure which bordered on being a 5/12 pitch, such that it stood out like a sore thumb and appeared on the verge of being called a church rather than quarters. (see Photo section).

(From November 1966 through December 1966 the base compound continued to be mortared by hostile fire. However, the 228th was only effected directly by mortar attacks of 4 November and 14 November 1966. At the same time Artillary fire set up some 100 feet across the road from the 228th kept up a continuous barrage of 105 Howitzer and 175 fire (night and day) into the outer perimeter of the Base Camp towards Cambodia)

The transition to wooden quarters occurred in bits and spurts, as lumber continued to be in short supply and considered a premium commodity. To resolve this issue, the 228th arranged a trade of nearly 1000 pairs of smaller sized combat boots (5, 6, and 7) with 1st PHILCAGV, who had an abundance of lumber available in their ongoing civic action capacity of building and facilitating the living standards of the free Vietnamese citizens of Tay Ninh City and its outlying areas. Note: The 228th had a special ongoing relationship with 1st PHILCAGV, both entities being of especial help to each other for the entire tour.

In late December 66 the 228th Commanding Officer and 1st Shirt (within a few days of each other) had both departed for R&R one to Hawaii (1st Shirt), the other (CO) to Hong Kong for a 7 day time period, both having been in country for the required six months. The acting CO was 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker, the acting 1st Shirt Staff Sergeant Ernest E. Shelley. Neither had much to do Orderly Room wise, and Lt. Walker continued his prodigious work effort at Stock Control, Class II and IV, while acting 1st shirt Shelley put together KP rosters and dealt with other functions assigned the 1st Shirt of any company sized unit with 185 assigned and 500 attached. Note: From mid October 1966 to early January the 228th began receiving personnel in small bits and spurts to fill open slots in its organizational structure, but still remained well short of its authorized unit strength of 233. Of the 185 assigned, 28 were TDY in other locations, leaving 161 physically stationed in Tay Ninh. The 500 all purpose troops attached to the 228th, and their function is explained in Miscellaneous Data, as well as mention in other portions of this History.....(see TO&E in Miscellaneous Data)


4 January 1966 Capt. Kuster reassigned while on R&R in Hong Kong recalled to RVN early.

6 January 1967 New Commanding Officer arrives in early evening; Capt. Jerry D. White - AB Ranger from 483rd Field Service Company (GS)

7 January 1967 by field phone Capt. Kuster advised Company Clerk and Assistant Company Clerk, of definite re-assignment and that 1st. Lt. Paul B. Walker was to act in the capacity as Acting Commander of the 228th pending further instructions and/or orders by HHC 266th 

9 January  orders were received by the 228th whereby Capt. B.A.Kuster had been officially re-assigned from the 228th to HHC 266th as a General Supply Officer, with a reporting date of 10 January 1967.

12 January 1967 Letter of Appreciation to Captain Kuster typed and signed by nearly 100+ enlisted, assigned and attached personnel.

14 January 1967 Orders received revoking orders of 10 January 1967 of Capt. Kuster to HHC 266th general supply officer (S-4) at 266th with new assignment to HHC 29th General Support Group as intelligence officer (S-2)

All operations continue on a normal basis in all Class functions of Supply and Service. The GR unit had moved from the airstrip to a location near the south gate and Class I, as had Stock Control, Class II, and IV. The hot shower point remained in place, as did the Class III POL yard. The 1st Shirt returned from R&R. An L&B operation was started in Quan Loi. A provisional GR collection point was established at Dau Tieng. Operation Cedar Falls had come to a close and Operation Junction City had begun. During this time period the 228th (assigned and attached personnel) were stationed in Trai Bi, French Fort, Cu Chi, Long Binh, Dau Tieng as well as Tay Ninh. This was accomplished to help support various supply operations of ongoing battlefield operations being conducted by the 196th and 25th ID.

15 January 1967, Company Armorer SP4 John A.P. Kema having served his 2 years of active duty honorably and with fidelity (usually served as guard for Payroll Officers each month), was the first to rotate from the unit (228th) to CONUS for discharge and separation. Some weeks prior to rotation, in company Orders typed by Company Clerk for award of Good Conduct Medal were prepared and awaiting signature. The CO declined to sign orders.. This being the case, i.e.; SP4 John Kema departed the 228th without a Good Conduct Medal. It was the first instance of non-award of The Good Conduct Medal to a deserving enlisted person of the 228th, but it was not the last. From that date forward through rotation by 31 May 1967, all eligible enlisted personnel (some 27 - 35) of 110 eligible did not receive the award of a Good Conduct Medal and Ribbon. The long and the short of the matter being that the new Commanding Officer seemed indifferent to the matter, ignored it, and would not address it. This despite the fact, that there had been no Article 15s or Court Martial within the Company since inception. (Exception: several attached from other units)

Late March (possibly early April) informal visit to 228th by General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. and his Sergeant Major. Sergeant Major clearly indicated to Company Clerk that 228th operations were superior in nature.

Late March 1967, all 500+ attached personnel in the 228th returned to their original assigned units in Long Binh, or elsewhere...some personnel remaining in Tay Ninh and re-assigned from their primary units into the 228th from "attached" to "assigned".

April 1967, The 196th Light Infantry Brigade and its assigned units moved from Tay Ninh to Chu Lai. Complete movement of entire Brigade and Equipment completed by June/July 1967 per 175th Engineers. (see links)...a terrific Website

May 1967, 110 personnel of the 228th since inception began rotation process for separation and or new assignment. At the same time, replacements for those rotating were arriving, such that, for the first time in entire 228th's history (excluding attached personnel of various units mentioned previously) the unit was nearing its authorized and assigned "full" unit strength of 233.

During May 1967 a new Battlefield Operation called 'Manhatten' began. This operation in the main was supported by the 228th replacement personnel arriving or already in Company.

1 June 1967, Rotation process for initial 110 personnel completed excepting 1 individual whose orders had not arrived.

Respectfully submitted by:

Company Clerk, Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support), Fort Lewis, Washington December 1965 - 20 July 1966 Long Binh, RVN - 1st Company Clerk 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), Long Binh 20 July 1966 - 7 October 1966, Tay Ninh 7 October 1966 - 12 May 1967...Arthur B. Neighbor Jr.

Additional credits 1966-1967 Personnel:

Captain B.A. Kuster (ret. Col. United States Army, CO Tay Ninh) - 1st Lt. W.I.Eckhart (L&B Officer Tay Ninh, Cu Chi, Quon Loi) - 1st Lt. T.B. Bourlier (ret. Col United States Army - Class I and GR Officer Tay Ninh, Dau Tiang) - 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker (XO - Stock Control and Class II & IV Officer, Long Binh, Tay Ninh) - 1st Lt. Ralph R. Meshon (Class I Officer Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh) - SP4 Ronald L. Fischer (Assistant Company Clerk, Tay Ninh) - SP4/CPL Fred C. Marcus (L&B NCOIC Cu Chi) - SP4 Dawson M. Gamble (Class I NCOIC ,Tay Ninh, deceased 2008) - SP4 J.D. Stewart (CO, Driver, Tay Ninh) - SP4 George Savore (Class I Clerk, Tay Ninh) - SP4 John A.P. Kema (Company Armorer, Long Binh, Tay Ninh, deceased 2010)- SP4 Spencer Nasboo  

Addendum:

For General knowledge purposes:

General G.V. Tobias, Brigadier General, Commanding, 1st PHILCAGV 1966 forward in Tay Ninh by 1977 was head of The National Philippines Housing Authority.

General Tobias Chief of Staff;  Major Fidel V. Ramos of 1st PHILCAGV Tay Ninh, became President of the Phillipines 1992 - 1998. While in service at Tay Ninh 1966 - 1967 Fidel V. Ramos father was National Security Advisor under Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Fidel V. Ramos also served a total of 37 years in the Philippine Army.

LTC. Fred Clifford Sheffey, Commanding Officer HHC  266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support), Company A and B, Fort Lewis, Washington....later Commanding Officer 1966 -  HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support), 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), and other Direct Support units (June 1966 - October 1966), was born 27 August 1928, retired 1 August 1980 as a Major General United States Army as Commander Fort Lee, Virginia Quartermaster Corps and Quartermaster School. He passed from Lung Cancer 25 July 2000.

MAJ. Jerry E. Ward "quartered" with 228th from 15th Support Brigade (December 1966 - June 1967) per Tropic Lightning News (25th ID Publication) dated 19 June 1967 in Awards and Decorations Section is annotated as a recipient of the BRONZE STAR with his unit of assignment being; HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS). Oddly a review of "altered" Morning Reports beginning in May 1967 - June 1967, indicates that MAJ. Jerry E. Ward was never assigned or attached to the 228th, yet his orders for rotation and his name appears on the 228th Morning Report as an "Assigned Loss" by orders generated by HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) in mid June 1967. In short: Somehow MAJ. Ward mysteriously and without entry of "Gain" on prior Morning Reports became a member of the 228th for one day at rotation in mid June 1967, by orders of the 266th and (per Tropic Lightning News) was awarded a Bronze Star by the 25th Infantry Division....the only individual of some 700 to 1,000 actually assigned or attached within the 228th (October 1966 - May 1967) to have singularly achieved an award of honor (Bronze Star being the fourth highest award) for service in the Military.

{The preceding is not meant to disparage MAJ. Ward. On the contrary, there is no dispute that he most certainly might well have deserved such a high and honorable award. The oddity, is that MAJ Ward was the only individual of some 700 to 1,000 personnel (officers and enlisted), quartered, assigned, attached within the 228th to have done so.}.... ABN 3 March 2012 

In 1966, 1967 up through 1968 per Logistics Study RVN and Book written by Lt. Gen, Joseph M. Heiser Jr., Department of Army, 1991, there were "Eleven (11) operating Laundry and Bath sections (Hot Shower Points - Laundry facilities for Troops and/or Hospitals) in all of South Vietnam. Of those 11, one (1) was operated by 483rd Field Service Company (GS), two (2) were operated by the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) - four (4) were operated by the 624th Supply and Service Company (DS), and - three (3) were operated by the 506th Supply and Service Company (DS)...meaning ten (10) of the eleven were (at one time) under the superior command of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) stationed in Long Binh. It is suspected, that the 11th unit was operating in or around Cam Ranh Bay and the former sister Company "A" 266th QM BN (DS), which on 20 July 1966 under COSTAR directive was either "inactivated" and "activated" as had Company "B" 266th QM BN (DS), and/or was reconstituted as a Supply and Service Company (DS), the name of which, is unknown to date, but under research.

A small factoid generally not known by personnel (Officers or Enlisted), but known by Commanding Officer, Company Clerk, Assistant Clerk and 1st Shirt and superior command structure was a monthly report accomplished by the Company Clerk and signed by the Commanding Officer. In it, a breakdown of personnel was made regarding ethnicity and citizenship. In general, the breakdown by ethnicity for the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) 1966 - 1967 was as follows: Black 12%, Hispanic 15%, White 71%, Other 1%. In addition, and in terms of Citizenship, the 228th had the following assigned in terms of Foreign Citizenship: 1 Canadian Citizen, 1 Dominican Republic Citizen, 1 Guatemalan Citizen, 1 Citizen of Haiti, 1 Citizen of China. 2 Citizens of Mexico. In addition, the 228th had 1 Native American Indian. At this time period and well into future years, these non-citizens (excepting native american Indian) were not eligible for automatic American Citizenship despite Military Service in the United States Military (War Zone or other) and with an Honorable Discharge. It did however allow them a credit of priority should they seek American Citizenship in the future and after full term of 7 year service obligation. Presently, andwith an "all volunteer" service that particular policy has been changed, and those of foreign citizenship can achieve "automatic" American Citizenship by serving their full term in US Armed Forces Honorably.  

.......................................................................................................................................................

C) A Panegyric   {a writing of elaborate praise} re: 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), submitted by then "Captain B.A. Kuster, First Assigned Company Commander, Tay Ninh 4 October 1966 - 5 January 1967.

 "As the first {assigned} Company Commander of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), formerly consisting of remnants numbering approximately 110 personnel of Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) where I had been Commanding Officer in Fort Lewis Washington, and Long Binh Republic of Vietnam, January 1966 - 20 July 1966, it was a distinct privilege and great honor to have been selected for a second association with some of the finest individuals it had ever been my pleasure to command. I was blessed with a cadre of competent officers and enlisted soldiers whose complete dedication to Duty, Honor, and Country could only be termed as remarkable and magnificent.

I signed into and assumed command of the Company in early October 1966 in Tay Ninh, War Zone C with a unit strength of approximately 50-55% (authorized 233). At the time, Tay Ninh Base Camp consisted of large open fields covered with abundant shrubbery, elephant grass, rock hard six foot high termite mounds and many deadly snakes. The immediate task of surveying and clearing our assigned area to build a cantonment area with bunkers and motor pool, plus simultaneously establishing mission support sites in this difficult terrain was monumental. In the midst of the above tasks, we serviced and supported (depending on the operation) between 11,000 - 25,000 combat troops with all manner of supply and services. In addition, the same type of support was rendered to the entire base encampment of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade its assigned elements, the 45th Field Service Surgical Hospital, and the 3,000 man 1st Philippine Civic Action Group (1st PHILCAGV).

 In the midst of establishing our cantonment area and mission support sites, the largest counter offensive combat operation ever attempted in Vietnam to date, had been launched in Tay Ninh. Combat units from various locations flowed into the area. Without flaw the personnel of the 228th provided this operation (Operation Attleboro) and all units housed in and around Tay Ninh with all manner of food, clothing, petroleum (aviation and motor), ammunition, potable water, Class II & IV materials, laundry, bath services, and graves registration services. During these critical weeks the only thing in short supply for those magnificent soldiers of the 228th was a paucity of sleep. 

 While supporting Operation Attleboro, preparations were being made to expand the mission operational sites for follow up combat operations - Gadsden, Cedar Falls and Junction City....all between 7 October 1966 and the end of February 1967. What made this all so remarkable, was the fact, that the Company had so few men to accomplish so much in such a short period of time. Towards the end of October 1966 the Company started receiving some help, such that by late November 1966, the Company already doing the job of a Battalion or larger, received 500+ attached all purpose personnel TDY to the 228th. Thus, these additional attached soldiers greatly helped to further enhance the already established "anything, anywhere, anytime" exceptional reputation of the unit. It was not until the end of February 1967, that the Company finally neared its nearly fully authorized strength (At the time I had been re-assigned from the 228th to the 29th General Support Group (DS) as Intelligence Officer, and thus knew the condition and unit strength of all units subordinate to the 29th General Support Group).

To loosely paraphrase Winston Churchill - never have so many owed so much to so few for accomplishing so much in such a short period of time. Recognition for the superior and outstanding accomplishments of this illustrious group of individuals was never rendered to those soldiers during their tour of duty (1 June 1966 - 1 June 1967). Although recommended for a Meritorious Unit Citation in December of 1966, it was not until some 40+ years later, and after diligent research, it was discovered, that the unit in whole and in part, was in fact awarded 1 MUC to its Laundry Section TDY in Cu Chi with the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, 1 MUC to its Bakery Section TDY in Cu Chi with the 25th Infantry Division, and 1 MUC to the 228th Supply and Service Company as a whole, stationed in Tay Ninh, all three MUC awards occurring with a beginning year of 1966 with ending dates of March 1967 (TDY personnel in Cu Chi) and 3 July 1967 for the 228th as a whole.

In May of 2004, the Army Quartermaster Corps (on first review) recognized and inducted the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) into the Quartermaster Hall of Fame, Fort Lee, Virginia for the exceptional service rendered, in particular, during the time frame 1966 -1967. Few units have earned and received this special recognition and honor of induction into the Quartermaster Regiment as a Distinguished Unit of the Regiment.

I have only the deepest admiration and greatest respect for those heroes of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) with whom I had the honor and great privilege to command and serve with. They (the 228th) have now joined an august company of individuals and units of other heroic Quartermaster soldiers and units who have proudly served before, as well as those who are bound to follow.

 The Modern Army slogan of today; "Be all that you can be" was definitely in effect in the 228th many years ago in 1966 -1967. Those soldiers, officers and enlisted alike, were, "All that they could be" and much, much more.

By this writing and my appended typed name of below, I offer this testimony in deepest respect and sincere gratitude to those magnificent men of the 228th, for their unwavering loyalty, support to me, and for their superior, if not most exceptional service they gave to their Country during a time of War".

Submitted by:

Bernard A. Kuster -  Colonel, Quartermaster Corps - United States Army (Retired) - dated: 14 March 2010

 

                                                 ADDENDUM - OPERATION ATTLEBORO - SURPRISE

"While assigned TDY to Tay Ninh from the 624th Supply and Service Company (DS) in early September 1966 in the capacity of representing the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS), 29th General Support Group, United States Army Support Command, and 1st Logistics Command to facilitate the arrival of some 3,000 troops of the 1st PHILCAGV to Tay Ninh Base Camp, I also became associated with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade who had arrived in Tay Ninh a few weeks prior, in August 1966. On or about 14 September 1966 Operation Attleboro was launched. By early October 1966 Attleboro was in full operational force in War Zone C and the environs of Tay Ninh.

On 4 October 1966 I received orders of re-assignment from TDY 624th Supply and Service Company (DS) to Commanding Officer of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS), due to arrive in Tay Ninh within days. On 7 October 1966 the 228th, all 85 of them {26 still being TDY in Cu Chi, another 5 still TDY at Bien Hoa AFB, with several more still TDY in Long Binh with the 266th} arrived at Tay Ninh Base Camp.

With all these dates in mind, and recognizing that I had a Company unit strength well below the authorized number of 233 {5 Officers, 228 Enlisted}, the reader might well imagine the total shock and SURPRISE I was about to experience. With the fancy title  (by orders) I had not only been assigned as Commanding Officer of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS), but had also been assigned the title of "Command and Control" Officer, representing all of my superior commands {266th, 29th Group, US Army Support Command} but the 1st Logistics Command as well. Much to my amazement {then and to this day} one would think that HQ of the 266th, the 29th, or someone in higher authority at Saigon Support Command or 1st Logistics Command might have taken the time to inform their only logistics unit at ground zero, that they (myself and the 228th) would be responsible for providing all supply and services (food, fuel, ammo, etc!) to all combat forces not only in Tay Ninh Base Camp, but the massive flow of men and material suddenly arriving to support and conduct the largest Counteroffensive ever launched within Vietnam to date. It must have been some big secret that neither I or the 228th could be entrusted to keep.

The way I first found out about the Operation was by sheer accident. While returning from a coordination visit with the 1st PHILCAGV, I went by the airfield, where I couldn't help but notice a very large number of combat troops assembling near the airfield pagoda. C-130 aircraft were landing one after the other, where even more combat troops were being disgorged in full battle gear. Helicopter gunships, and Huey's seemed to be everywhere like a large swarm of bees blackening the sky. They were arriving from all directions and seemed to be everywhere. I stopped at the airfield pagoda (see photo gallery) to find out what was going on. Two Battalion Commanders of several from the 25th ID proceeded to inform me of the operation and the support they would be needing. There is no other way to state, that I promptly swallowed the very large lump in my throat, and eloquently commented with one or two of the most profound statements I could muster...such as; "Holy S___" followed by "You gotta be S__'ing me". To say the least, I was totally shocked. What was rapidly moving through my mind, was how in the "H" are we (the 228th) going to support this operation with the small amount of men and supplies we had on hand.

With the entire area abuzz with thirsty helicopters, I quickly drove to our petroleum supply point (POL yard) for a first hand look and fast inventory of our fuel on hand status. Remembering that the 228th had only recently arrived, were working night and day to set up various supply points already, I found we were critically low on JP4 and AVGAS, the two items that helicopters and planes would need in abundance. I rushed to the Company Orderly Room field tent and proceeded to by-pass every higher Headquarters that had not bothered to inform me and my command of this major Operation.

At this point it requires a small time-out to explain the only communications we had in those days. We had field telephones connected by wire (land lines) literally laying on the ground. These were connected to a small switch board from the Company area to a larger switchboard of the 196th. In turn, this switchboard was connected to other land-line switchboards in various locations throughout South Vietnam. It was not unusual to have to go through four, five or more switchboards to get a call through or back to Headquarters. Switchboard operators worked under a call priority system that they (and we) had to follow in which to allow high priority calls as opposed to routine calls to be placed. Being on the the low end of the totem pole our calls were generally considered to be of low priority, and if a call did get placed, we were often cut off by some switchboard down the line that was responding to a higher priority call. 

As best I recall, FLASH or FLASH OVERRIDE were the highest priority calls that could be placed and then only for critical combat life and death situations by senior commanders. I was definitely not authorized to initiate such a call, which would insure that no switchboard operator would disconnect the call. Since some 46 years have passed, I can now state for the record, that I violated the system and placed a FLASH call, by declaring a Tactical Emergency (TAC-E) to Saigon Support Command.

Fortunately I was connected with a senior officer that understood the situation and was most efficient in organizing the resources necessary to our immediate needs. Within the hour of my call, C-130 and C-123 cargo aircraft were arriving at the Tay Ninh airfield with pallets of 55 gallon drums and 500 gallon roll-on and roll-off rubber bladders full of JP4 and MOGAS. The immediate crises had been solved. Shortly thereafter in the Operation long convoy lines of fuel tankers and trucks hauling food, munitions and other supplies were arriving on a daily basis.

As stated, in my first posting entitled A Panegyric the very understrength unit personnel of the 228th (2 Officers, 84 enlisted) performed with flawless efficiency night and day in supporting Operation Attleboro, the Base Camp and other battlefield requirements. It was not an easy task. Operation Attleboro ended on or about 5 November 1966. By mid November 1966, the 228th had gained assigned personnel (6 additional officers, 1 warrant officer, 25 enlisted with 500 all purpose personnel attached). With these added personnel in place, the 228th was handling all Classes of Supply Class I, II, III, IV, and V. Class V (munitions) for the most part being handled by Ordnance personnel attached to the 228th from 29th General Support Group.

After completion of Operation Attleboro (on or about 25 November 1966), there still was no rest for the 228th and its attached personnel. In preparation for Operation Gadsden, Cedar Falls and Junction City, more permanent supply point facilities were in process of being built, including two large steel petroleum storage tanks.

Submitted By:

Then, Captain Bernard A. Kuster, Commanding Officer 228th S&S Co (DS), Col. Retired, United States Army...30 June 2010


                                         

..............................................................................................................................................................

 

D) The 266th QM BN’s Mysterious Encounter with National Route 15 on 23JUN66 
 
          (Or, how did elements of the 266th QM BN come to be on Route 15 on 23JUN66?)
 
This brief summation of conditions on National Route 15, between Vung Tau and Long Binh during 1966, is provided as an item of interest for those who transited that route on 23JUN66 (see earlier in the History, Section B, for description of debarkation and travel on that date).
 
The following information is provided by 1LT Paul Walker, 228th Stock Control and II&IV Officer DEC66 – FEB67. At the time HHC and Company B (which later became the 228th S&S CO) of the 266th QM BN debarked at Vung Tau on 23JUN66, Walker had been in-country for almost 4 months, serving as the 506th QM CO’s II&IV Depot and Graves Registration Officer, with extra duties as the 506th’s Operations and Security Officer at Long Binh. (Note: any first person references are Walker’s personal opinions or observations.)
 
When first learning (in late 2009) that elements of the 266th had been brought in-country via this route using unescorted or very lightly-escorted busses, I was genuinely astounded.
 
As the 506th QM CO’s Security Officer from MAR66, it had been repeatedly emphasized (in security briefings conducted usually weekly at the 60th Ordnance Group, predecessor of the 29th General Support Group in Long Binh) that Route 15 was never to be used under any circumstances. And, occasional reports of KIA/WIA involving incidents along Route 15, much of which ran very close to reported Main Force VC base areas.
 
Also as II&IV Depot Officer, I knew that when supplies were being moved from Long Binh to Vung Tau, this was never done via Route 15 (either Chinooks out of the II&IV Depot yard, fixed-wing out of Bien Hoa, trucks back down National Route 1A and then by ship from Saigon Port, or once curiously by barge down the Song Dong Nai – but never down Route 15).
 
By JUN 66, much of the 2nd BDE, 1st Infantry DIV had occupied Bearcat base (aka Long Thanh North) about 10 miles south of Route 15’s juncture with Route 1A at the “top of the triangle” at Long Binh. Subsequently, informal convoys of 5 – 10 vehicles were permitted to travel to Bearcat, but not beyond. The remaining 40 miles or so of Route 15 remained routinely closed.
 
I became aware of occasional rare exceptions to this routine later in 1966, involving opening of Route 15 to move units debarking at Vung Tau to Long Binh or elsewhere. These typically required elements of the 173rd Airborne BDE to open and secure the northern portion of Route 15 and elements of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) on the southern portion.
 
All this I knew from service with the 506th at Long Binh.
 
Being fascinated by the 266th’s movement over this route, I decided to put my CRS (“Can’t Remember Stuff”) to the test – was I somehow mis-remembering all this? So, I researched all the relevant websites I could find (RAR, 173rd AB, 1st ID, 48th Trans GP, and many others.)
 
My research showed that:
(1) The RAR did not begin significant efforts to control Route 15 until July 1966.
(2) Even after that, it was not "controlled", but rather "secured" for different short periods.
(3) As late as October 1966, RAR and 6th Trans BN material refers to Route 15 (or portions of it) as being previously uncleared or unsecured.
(4) Securing Route 15 usually required at least one battalion of the RAR and much of the 173rd AB, conducting named "Operations" for the purpose. These were done to protect the transit of a variety of combat elements.
(5) Specifically in 1966, Route 15 was opened 22JUL ('A' Battery 2/35 Artillery, Long Binh - Nui Dat), 11-16OCT (3d BDE 4th ID, Vung Tau - Bearcat), 4-14 DEC66 (199th LI BDE), and 14-23 DEC66, and 27 DEC66-5JAN67 (9th ID). Interestingly, the 11th AC RGT was flown out of Vung Tau and did not use Route 15.
(6) Wherever there was information from multiple sources, they were invariably consistent with one another.
(7) II Field Forces had intended that Vung Tau Port and Route 15 would become a viable alternate to Saigon Port, for troops and supplies, in 1966.
(8) No references could be found that Route 15 might have been used for unescorted/lightly-escorted travel on even an occasional basis.
(9) And, the 2nd Battalion (155mmSP), 35th Artillery, also debarked on 23JUN66 (same day) from the USS Walker (same ship as the 266th) and was flown out of Vung Tau to Bien Hoa.
 
So, how did the 266th QM BN come to be on Route 15 on 23JUN66? Was this some kind of test to see if something like that could possibly be done? Were they unknowing guinea pigs of some kind? If so, under whose authorization? Were they just “small fish” unworthy of any security effort? Was anything similar ever done before or after? It all remains a mystery.
 
Submitted By:
 
Then 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker.........5 July 2010

{Update: The preceding conumdrum has been most vexing from a recall standpoint. As Company Clerk a good portion of my job was to know the status and what had happened within the Company on a day to day basis. There existed a "fog" within my memory related to just how the Company arrived at Tent City A, Saigon. For over two years (off and on) I have revisited this problem through reflection. Contact with former members of the Company, both Officers and Enlisted shed no light on the matter. All recall boarding Army buses at Vung Tau. None recall any event after boarding, but all recall arriving at Tent City A some 1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2 hours later. What had happened? Why did none have a recall of traveling Route 15 by bus? There had to be an answer.
One afternoon recent in time (February 2013) I once again was dwelling on the problem, when I had a sudden flash of memory. I had definitively recalled being aboard a C123, shoulder to shoulder with a number of troopers. Further, the flashback clearly had me seated with steel pot, rifle, canvas duffle bag, and the flashback ended. From this small remembrance I realized, that the only possible time such an event could have taken place, was when the Company arrived at Vung Tau, RVN.
The following is what must have occurred:
After boarding the Army buses, B Company and HHC 266th QM BN (DS) had to driven to Vung Tau airstrip where Officers and Enlisted boarded C123's. However, HHC 266th was flown directly to Tan Son Nhut, whereas B Company was flown to Bien Hoa. At Bien Hoa, B Company offloaded, reboarded Army buses and were driven to Tent City A, Saigon, where we once again offloaded.
This had to have happened. The scenario accounts for the approximate time recalled (1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2 hours). It matches up with being issued three rounds of ammunition at the beginning, and subsequent collection of same rounds at Tent City A, Saigon. It further accounts for "no recall" of countryside, photos or other between Vung Tau along Route 15, which was rolling and steep terrain, if not extremly hazardous in nature, as per Lt. Walkers recall.
In summation: HHC 266th flew directly to Saigon from Vung Tau as somewhat of a forward contingent. B Company 266th was flown from Vung tau, offloaded and then reboarded Army buses and were driven to Tent City A from Bien Hoa AFB, where they once again offloaded.
Note: In writing this missive, I had another small flashback. It is speciffically recalled that HHC 266th was already at Tent City A, whereby HQ and Commanding Officer had made arrangements for quartering of B Company....Mystery solved}....ABN 1 March 2013

 

............................................................................................................................................................

 

E) 228th S&S CO Stock Control History, 1966 - 1967

The following information focuses primarily on DEC66 – FEB67 (unless otherwise indicated), as provided by 1LT Paul Walker, Stock Control Officer (OIC) during that time, with contextual information from Company Clerk Art Neighbor. Information after February 1967 was provided by (then) LT Dan Hillard. (Note: any first person references are Walker’s personal opinions or observations.) 

 
Stock Control OIC’s were 1LT Paul Walker (DEC66 – FEB67), 2LT Ronald Holcombe (FEB67 - ???67), LT James Talley (???67 – NOV67) and LT Dan Hillard (NOV 67 – APR68). NCOIC DEC66 - ???67 was SFC Leo Conway. On 1FEB67, there were 8 other assigned enlisted GI’s E-2 – E-6.
 
Stock Control was initially located on the road running just east of, and parallel to, the airstrip on the left (heading north), about half-way between the airstrip’s south end and its “terminal” building, in a GP medium tent. SC was relocated sometime between FEB67 and NOV67, on the road to the ammo dump on the right just beyond Class I and before the Engineer IV yard, as it was at the latter spot when Dan Hillard was assigned as SC Officer in NOV67. It didn’t really make a lot of sense for it to be near the airstrip, except we had one GI courier almost constantly back and forth between Tay Ninh and Tan Son Nhut, so it was handy for scrounging rides.
 
Supported units included the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 45th Field Hospital and Medical Evavacuation, 1st Philippine Civic Action Group (1stPHILCAGV), and all other support units located at Tay Ninh. Following the 196th’s departure from Tay Ninh in APR67, support was provided to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and other 25th ID units subsequently stationed there. Major operations supported included Attleboro (OCT66 – NOV66)*, Cedar Falls (JAN67), Gadsden (FEB67), and Junction City (FEB67 – MAY67). In DEC67, SC became heavily involved in supporting Task Force Merritt at Katum. (see 1967 -1968 History)
 
*Note: Operation Attleboro was the largest counteroffensive ever launched in Republic of Vietnam by allied forces since 1961. According to accurate sources Attleboro officially began 14 September 1966 as a probe of enemy lines. By early October 1966, Attleboro was in full operational force throughout War Zone C, and in particular "Tay Ninh" and its surrounding environs. Operation Attleboro officially ended 25 November 1966. The 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) having arrived in Tay Ninh 7 October 1966, found itself in the position of being an understrength unit {authorized 233, actual personnel numbering some 110} of having to support between 11,000 to 25,000 Combat troops in the field of battle, not to mention the added burden of other units either arriving or already stationed within Tay Ninh Base Camp, as well as the 1st PHILCAGV, some 3000+ personnel of the 1st Philippines Civic Action Group...A.B.Neighbor
 
Primary duties of Stock Control were: maintain stock records on Class I (rations), II&IV (general supplies), III (POL), and Engineer IV; requisition Class I and selected II&IV and Engineer IV items to support daily consumption plus maintain reserve quantities; prepare ASL’s (Authorized Stockage Lists) and RO’s (Requisitioning Objectives) for the preceding; requisition/expedite any II&IV and Engineer IV items not on ASL’s; and inventory of items in the yards (object: try to keep stock records matching what was actually out there). These were all pretty much “works in progress”, as most everything was during this time.
 
(Note: Sometime between FEB67 and NOV67, the Class I and Class III units began maintaining their own stock records. Class V records were always maintained by that activity or its superior commands at battalion level.)
 
The 228th SC took care of the ASL's, RO's, requisitioning, expediting etc. for "normal" consumption (not for the large operations). The purpose of these ASL’s and RO’s was to facilitate a targeted 90-days’ supply of items ordinarily used day-to-day, and SC evaluated its records and worked with supported units to figure out what these should be. Of course, early on there was little experience to go on, and the ASL’s and RO’s were always no better than “moving targets” that we wanted to always stay ahead of.
 
(Note: the targeted 90-days supply was not actually “in-stock”, but a combination of “in-stock” and “in the pipeline”, because of the lead times between requisitioning and actual receipt. As noted further below, there was a tendency to over-requisition, because of the often unpredictable lead times, Tay Ninh’s distance from the supply sources in Saigon and Long Binh, and the occasional suspected disappearance of supplies while passing through Cu Chi. In reality, there was typically less – sometimes well less – than 30-days supply actually in-stock in the yards, varying quite a bit depending on the supply class, specific item, and actual consumption.)
 
SC operated a courier service between Tay Ninh and the 506th Field Depot and PA&E (Pacific Architects and Engineers, for Engineer IV) in Saigon, normally via flights to Tan Son Nhut. These trips were normally every other day (one day out, one day back) and transmitted all SC requisitions, reports, etc. to the 506thFD and PA&E, as well as picking up any paperwork they had for SC or the supported units.
 
Planning for support of the big operations was done by MAJ Jerry Ward (quartered with the 228th), the 1st Logistical Command units he worked with, and whoever those units worked with in the combat commands (as we in 228th SC would have been clueless about what might possibly be required for those operations). SC assisted as called on with the paperwork for those operations.
 
The paperwork for all these activities (consisting primarily of DA Form 2765-1 and DD Form 1348-1) was just massive. (The SOP for this consumed almost 4 typewritten pages.) Despite sometimes different methods of paperwork, “creative requisitioning”, "liberation", etc., I don't believe we were ever out or short of anything important (except one instance noted below) in the time I was there. There was, understandably, a tendency to overstock wherever possible, as a Stock Control OIC’s “nightmare” (and an absolute nightmare for any supported combat unit) was the possibility of not having something important when it was needed, and in sufficient quantities.
 
There was, of course, always the issue of stock records agreeing with actual stock quantities (or, not). SC had an Inventory Team, who would go out to one yard or the other pretty much every week and count either everything, or (more commonly) check out just selected items, and after a few weeks they probably would get around to inventorying everything in the yards. This was done in generally good cooperation between SC and the OIC’s and NCOIC’s in charge of the yards. I remember being consistently pleased that there were generally very few significant differences between records and actual stock. Pretty good, I think, which was a credit to all involved (especially to the NCOIC’s in SC and in the yards).
 
I remember only once (sometime in JAN67) when this was a problem. There was a “flap” (G-rated term for excitement involving more senior officers than I’d want involved) regarding a particular Engineer IV item that was shown in-stock on the SC records, but not found in the yard when the unit came to pick it up. I don’t recall what the item was, but thankfully not an immediate mission-critical kind of thing, so it was an embarrassment that stopped short of a major flap. This resulted in me setting up a procedure (complete with a typed DF so the brass involved in the flap had the paper they wanted to see to prove we were really serious about fixing this!) that required the yards to notify SC if the last one of any item was issued, and SC to notify the yards if an item was reduced to zero on the SC records, and in either case we’d send someone out to the yard to hunt around with yard personnel just to be sure the item really wasn’t there (and correct the SC records if needed).
 
SC OIC “extra duties” included scrounging excursions to Saigon/Long Binh in JAN - FEB67, working from a “wish list” that 228th CO had put together. These involved “hand-carries” to the Saigon and Long Binh depots which did fulfill some of the wishes, including a number of fridges and 10kw generators in our continuing effort to improve living conditions.
 
In summary, during the period 1966-67, the 228th created from scratch and operated a Stock Control unit which reliably anticipated and met the needs of all supported units located at Tay Ninh during a period of substantial troop and unit buildup, and with the primary supported combat unit (the 196th) conducting many major operations during the period. This is a credit to all GI’s assigned (notably with each GI typically performing the work of two due to the 228th's chronically understrength condition), and especially to SC NCOIC SFC Conway, who could always be depended on to “get it right”. (Note: I was never once concerned with being on trips away from this unit, even for several days at a time, because of the dedication and dependability of these fine troops.)
 
 
.........................................................................................................................................................
 
 
F) 228th S&S CO Class II&IV History, 1966 - 1967
 
The following information focuses primarily on DEC66 – FEB67 (unless otherwise indicated), as provided by 1LT Paul Walker, Class II&IV Officer (OIC) during that time, with contextual information from Company Clerk Art Neighbor. Information after February 1967 was provided by (then) LT Tom Bourlier and (then) LT Dan Hillard. In early 1967, there were typically 15 or so assigned enlisted GI's E-2 - E-5.
 
(Note: “Engineer IV” was a separate unit with its own yard, and will not be covered in this section.)
 
Class II&IV OIC’s were 2LT John Schneider (NOV66 – JAN67), 1LT Paul Walker (JAN67 – FEB67), 2LT Ronald Holcombe (FEB67 - ???67), and 2LT Tom Bourlier (???67 – ???67). NCOIC NOV66 - ???67 was SSG Clyde Parrish.
 
II&IV was initially located on the road running just east of, and parallel to, the airstrip on the left (heading north), about half-way between the airstrip’s south end and its “terminal” building. By DEC 66, it occupied 6 GP medium tents plus a yard area for larger items that could (theoretically) tolerate unprotected storage. II&IV was relocated by mid-FEB67, on the road to the ammo dump in the same general area as Class I and the Engineer IV yard.
 
Supported units included the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 1st Philippine Civic Action Group (1stPHILCAGV), and all support units located at Tay Ninh. Following the 196th’s departure from Tay Ninh in APR67, support was provided to 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and other 25th ID units subsequently stationed there.
 
The primary mission of II&IV was direct support of the above-noted units with “Class II&IV” supplies. More specifically, II&IV supplies were everything EXCEPT rations (I), POL (III), construction and fortification materials (Engineer IV), and ammunition and explosives (V).
 
Sometimes referred to as “General Supplies”, II&IV included almost countless thousands of items worn or used by GI’s on their persons (uniforms, web gear, etc.), in their hootches (beds, linens, typewriters, paper, field phones, commo wire, toilet paper, and equipment and consumable supplies of all kinds), while performing their combat or support duties. Thinking about it today (2010), if you imagine a combination Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Office Depot (less the groceries and construction items), then that will give you a good idea of the kinds of things II&IV included.
 
For smaller items consumed in fairly large quantities, there was a “Self Service Supply Center” (SSSC) concept. This allowed supported units to use a “Shopping List” (within certain quantity limitations) instead of the cumbersome requisition process. The number of SSSC items was over 700.
 
For items that “wore out” (e.g. uniforms, linens), there was a “Direct Exchange” (DX) Point. This allowed one-for-one exchange of worn items for new items. There were almost 200 DX items.
 
Up to 50 tons per day were routinely handled, with support of major operations involving daily tonnage volumes up to 150 tons for sustained periods. For instance, 152 tons/day were handled during the 22 days of Operation Junction City Phase I 21FEB67 - 14MAR67.
 
All this required working forklifts to offload incoming supplies brought by the convoys from Saigon/Long Binh and loading the heavier items on supported units’ transport. In the rainy season, it was a constant challenge to keep items dry and out of the mud.
 
By late JAN67, plans had been drawn up, in conjunction with the 506th Field Depot in Saigon, for construction of what would have been very nice buildings for both the SSSC and DX Point. However, by the end of 1967, these had not been built and these II&IV functions continued to operate out of tents and Conex containers in conjunction with Stock Control.
 
Reliably providing these thousands of items for the supported units is a credit to all GI’s assigned (notably with each GI typically performing the work of two due to the 228th's chronically understrength condition), and especially to II&IV NCOIC SFC Parrish, who could always be depended on to “get it right”. (Note: As similarly noted for Stock Control, I was never once concerned with being away from this unit, because of the dedication and dependability of these fine troops.)
 
Submitted By:
 
Then 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker, Executive Officer 228th, OIC Stock Control, Class II&IV - (December 1966 - February 1967) ... 10 April 2010
 
..........................................................................................................................................................
 
 

G) Graves Registration Platoon - 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) - Tay Ninh 1966-1967

The following is submitted from a first person perspective of then 1st Lt. Tommy D. Bourlier regarding the operations of the Graves Registration Platoon (recovery and processing of remains) a function of the 228th as well as other Direct Support Supply and Service entities operating in the Republic of Vietnam.

Background:

"As an enlisted SP4 stationed in Germany, I decided to continue my military experience near the end of my tour by signing on to a grueling 23 week physical and mental endurance training course of Officers Candidate School, which I successfully completed and passed.

Being a green and relatively new 2nd Lt. having graduated from OCS with a primary military occupational specialty as a Tank Commander, I was somewhat surprised to learn that my first and immediate assignment was to the Quartermaster Corps with an outfit known as the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support), then stationed and operating in a place known as Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam.

I reported in to the 266th on or about 20 October 1966 where I was subsequently assigned to the 624th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) also stationed in Long Binh. I was quite enthusiastic and looking forward to my new assignment as a Class I Officer. For all intent and purposes, I enjoyed my assignment which turned out to be a rather short lived few weeks.

Within the month, I received orders for a new re-assignment to Tay Ninh Province with an outfit known as the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), a sister company of the 624th and 506th S&S Companies, all three under the operational command and control of the 266th S&S Battalion.

Arriving in Tay Ninh by C123 in mid November 1966, I found a unit (the 228th) who was operating and performing the functions and duties normally associated with a Battalion or larger with a mere 130 to 140 personnel assigned. Furthermore, the unit was in process of not only setting up and operating all number of Class supply points (Class I, II, III, IV, but Stock Control, Laundry and Bath, Graves Registration, and believe it or not Class V (munitions), which was definitively not a normal function of any Supply Company, let alone a General or Direct Supply Battalion.

Furthermore, I found myself assigned to a unit that was doing its level best to perform all the preceding (if not more) on the tail end of supporting the largest counteroffensive ever launched in the Republic of Vietnam since 1960, called Operation Attleboro. This understrength unit of some 130 were at times supporting 11,000 to 23,000 combat troops in the field, the entire base camp of Tay Ninh, including the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, its associated units, other units such as the 45th Field Hospital etc! In addition, as if the preceding was not a heavy enough burden, the 228th was also supporting a 3000 plus/minus contingent of the 1st Philippine Civic Action Command commanded by one General G.V. Tobias.

Briefly I was assigned as Class I Officer, which was touch and go (at least for me) as my experience factor regarding Class I and its associated activities were in effect limited to the mere few weeks at the 624th. It was not without a genuine sigh of relief, that thereafter and within a very short period of time, I was re-assigned within the Company as OIC of the Graves Registration Platoon...another function of a Direct Support unit of which (at the time) I had virtually no experience or training.

I would be less than honest, if I did not state I found both assignments quite intimidating. To be brief, my introduction to Graves Registration, which I had not been schooled in for even one day, came at the hands of one CPL Kenneth Grayham who had been with the 228th since its inception and activation on 20 July 1966 in Long Binh. Ken was a very mature young man who ran the GR unit with the skills of an SFC-E7 (the 228th being quite understrength at the time, with many sections of the entire unit being run and operated by enlisted personnel of much lower rank than the TO&E specified or called for). CPL Grayham first took me back to a reefer unit, pulled out a drawer, which held the remains of one SFC Jones. He then proceeded to explain and tell about the various expected duties and obligations of the Graves Registration operation from A to Z.

He not only explained what I was expected to do, but what forms and paperwork I needed to sign, what NOT to do, and so forth and so on, such that we (especially me) came to an understanding. I soon realized and found, that the GR section was mostly made up of duty soldiers who had been "volunteered" (assigned by Company Orderly Room) to work in GR. Although I cannot remember one or two, under my command were three (3) specialist personnel; CPL Kenneth Grayham, SP4 Ted W. Brown, and SP4 Robert M. Lenzi, who were the only school trained personnel I had. All others had simply been assigned to GR to fill open slots in the Company TO&E (understrength in every section), and were operating on an OJT basis (on the job training), they being (as best I recall) a PFC Alfred E Prout, a PFC Carmelo Galendez-Figuero and a PVT (later PFC) Robert M. Straight. What a bunch of guys! To do the job they were performing, stepping up to the plate, so to speak....remains to this day (2010) a reminiscence of total and complete admiration.

As an example of their complete and total dedication I offer the following:

One day we received word of a mission recovery the GR section (we never were a full and complete Platoon) was expected to perform. The mission involved the recovery of two remains involving a helicopter pilot and a warrant officer who had taken off from Tay Ninh airstrip and for some unknown reason, had flown straight into the side of Nui Bau Den (The Black Virgin Mountain). It being a virtual impossibility to recover remains by ground troops, due to heavy VC fortifications, tunnels and other throughout the entire mountain complex. To be sure, SP4 Robert M. Lenzi was not overly enthused about performing this mission, but I told him it was our duty, and like it or not, we had to do it. To his everlasting credit, Lenzi rappelled down a rope dangling from a helicopter, placed what little remains he could locate into a recovery pouch, and sent them upward to the hovering Huey. SP4 Lenzi then wrapped the rope about his waist where he too was hauled upward towards the hovering chopper for a return trip to the base GR unit. For lack of better description, let me simply state, that there was very little brought back, that resembled anything human. We did know that the helicopter had a Captain and a Warrant Officer as pilots. One of the recovered parts had a "WO" ring on, so we were at least able to separate the two, as to whom was who.

Prior to my assignment as OIC of GR, the 228th personnel had handled a good number of remains resulting from Operation Attleboro, both on the battlefield casualties as well as on base casualties resulting from incoming hostile Artillery/Mortar attacks. It was my understanding that a direct request had been made to 1st Log Command for the immediate delivery of five (5) additional reefer units to supplement the two (2) already in use. For whatever reason, these five additional reefer units were never delivered during my nearly one year tour of duty (November 1966 - October 1967) with the 228th. Thus, the 228th GR section had to make do, operate with the two refrigeration units on hand (each with a capacity of holding five recovered remains only). As such, and being the only GR recovery and processing collection point for a radius of over twenty (20) miles, we were hard pressed through four (4) major battlefield operations to keep pace. Although difficult, the GR unit far exceeded all expectations in its performance. Although operating at a strength of sometimes less than 50%, it became a routine to collect, process and turn over remains for post haste transport to Mortuary Affairs in Saigon ASAP.

As time elapsed we were able to build and run a fairly nice and fully operational collection and processing point. Initially set up and operating adjacent to Tay Ninh airstrip, the entire operation was subsequently moved to the southwest portion of the base camp near the 228th Class I, Stock Control, Class II&IV  areas near the perimeter, but prior to the Class V staging areas and munitions pads. Basically the GR point was a large Quonset Hut (see photo gallery 1966-1967) with a cement floor, which was sloped inwards from either side towards the middle with a built in drainage system. No separate air conditioning existed for this basic work area, so GR personnel coped with their extraordinary work in the sometimes greater than 120 degree temperatures of Tay Ninh without added relief. Thanks to the ingenuity of CPL Kenneth Grayham he designed and we built an operating water holding tank above ground and atop a wooden tower, to allow for a gravity feed of somewhat pressurized water which allowed for GR operations to proceed with an eye toward the best sanitation possible under difficult circumstances.

One day, and all at once, the GR section received twenty three (23) remains belonging to an entire platoon of the 173rd Airborne. This platoon had unfortunately walked into an unsuspected enemy ambush and no one had walked out. One of our GR fellows noticed that one of the twenty three KIA was the same soldier who had been at the 228th GR section the week before to identify another KIA of the 173rd. That moment in time really got to us all. There was not a single one of us who had much to say to each other for the remainder of that very, very sad day.

Overall, and I cannot state it more clearly....the GR section, the personnel of the 228th performed their individual job functions in the most honorable manner feasible while I was there. I realized most quickly how special a mission the GR function was, not only for me, the men working the GR section, but especially for the families of those who had fallen, and had lost their loved ones forever more.

In all candor, my life has not been the same since that first day I became OIC of the GR section. For me it was a profound moment in time, when I first beheld the remains of SFC Jones. I felt an overwhelming desire of reverence as I knelt beside that fallen soldier. I wanted so badly to do something to change what was. Yet, I knew deep down within my heart and soul, that I was helpless in changing or reversing that which had occurred. I thought in my mind, and felt in my soul, that it was so wrong for that man to be motionless upon that litter. It was then and there, in that split second of time, that I pledged to do everything within my power, to not only insure that his (and all others following) personal effects got home to their respective families and loved ones intact. I further resolved, that any and all fallen soldiers who passed through my unit of operation would receive nothing but respect, honor, and the best quality of treatment possible.

Soon after that moment, I located a poster of Nathan Hale and posted it on the door leading to the prep room. It was posted because of the written words below his picture from the early history of our Country..."I regret that I have but one life to give to my Country", which somehow seemed appropriate. Service to the fallen from that day forward became my life mission, and has remained so to this very day.

In closing, I'd also like to state for the record; that it was a pleasure and an extreme privilege to be associated with that Company of unique men known as the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) within that particular time period. Although some who were there are no longer living among us, the remainder continue the deep bonds of friendship developed (officers and enlisted) which hold to this very day. For that too, I am most grateful and genuinely thankful."

Submitted By:

Then 1st Lt. Tommy D. Bourlier, United States Army; Col. (ret.), Mortuary Affairs, United States Army, Fort Lee, Virginia (civilian capacity) ... 2 May 2010

 

Note 1: To elucidate somewhat, the following is offered as a perspective regarding the magnificent and remarkable job performed by GR unit Officer and enlisted of the 228th. The TO&E for a Quartermaster Direct Support unit from 1960 - 1967 ( TO&E # 10-107D and FM 29-3, dtd: 19 October 1960 and May 1965 respectively) allowed for a fully assigned allotment to GR Platoon of 1 OIC, 1 NCOIC, with 20 enlisted for the collection and processing of remains, hostile or non-hostile in nature. The 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) already operating at a TO&E allocation considered as a "reduced strength" operational status, allowed for GR Platoon to be staffed by 1 OIC, 1 NCOIC, and 16 enlisted. Since the 228th in Tay Ninh was operating at or near 50% to 65% of authorized strength....Lt. Bourlier, the OIC, had no NCOIC (usually an SSG-E7 or SFC-E6). Instead, and as indicated, a CPL-E4 was acting as NCOIC, with 5 to 7 enlisted for collection and processing through four (4) major battlefield operations; Attleboro, Gadsden, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. As further testament to the magnificent work and dedication of the 228th GR section, it should be noted, that for the most part, nearly all officers and enlisted no matter the unit assigned to, avoided dealings with GR and its mission as a matter of course. Two examples shall be cited as witnessed and known by signatory of this note: First, other than the Commanding Officer, no other party as a general rule of thumb (if they could help it) visited GR, unless doing so for identification purposes of remains. Second, and prior to Lt. Bourliers' arrival at the 228th (during operation Attleboro) there was a call for volunteers to help offload incoming choppers carrying numerous remains from the battlefield. Five personnel from the 228th (Company Clerk, Class I Clerk, Supply Clerk, COs' Driver and Company Armorer) drove to the airstrip and began the process of offloading, placing remains on trucks, transporting to GR and offloading same for processing. That hour was the longest hour of our lifetimes, and we were forevermore grateful, that we were never requested to volunteer or repeat the performance. Those who day in and day out dealt with these matters 24/7 from that day forward were held in nothing but the highest esteem by those of us who had but a small taste of their mission, Last, and with apologies to those assigned (without schooling) as OJT (on the job training) to GR (or other sections) there was a reason. As Company Clerk and in conjunction with the desires of the Commanding Officer, and Platoon OICs' there was little choice but to assign personnel where they were needed most. It was a difficult juggling act, as stated previously in this history, to use personnel efficiently (who indeed wore many hats) whenever and wherever needed. The unit dealt daily with this complex situation, and was entirely dependent on the 266th S&S Battalion to supply the authorized manpower, which for whatever reason(s) never seemed to manifest itself until at or around mid April 1967.

Note 2: Actual TO&E of a Quartermaster Direct Support Company, fully authorized, reduced and augmented TO&E is discussed and covered in Part 5, Miscellaneous Data - History Section....A.B. Neighbor

 

..........................................................................................................................................................

 

H) Time in Country - Class I

Although a slight departure from format of, facts, figures, numbers and other data discussed up to this point, the following submission written by the 2nd Class I Clerk of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) of Tay Ninh, is offered in it's entirety. Nearly every GI ( Officers and Enlisted) can relate easily to the experience outlined by SP4 E4 George W, Savare and his reminiscences. The submission is placed in the 1966 -1967 time period, as George is one of the few individuals who arrived at the 228th in Tay Ninh at or near the midway point between the first contingent of personnel and some three to four months prior to their departure. Thus, George had a birds-eye view of the transition from one set of cadre to the next..........Enjoy..... Note: Photos submitted by George are posted in 1967-1968 Gallery, as photos taken begin in July 1967

'"I left Travis AFB {located approximately 60 miles north of Oakland California} on a C-141. Those of us aboard were seated facing the back of the plane. The first stop was Wake Island, where we were allowed to disembark long enough to refuel or change pilots. There wasn't much to Wake, other than it's a small isolated island in the Pacific Ocean that has a runway and location where varied military (sometimes other) airplanes can land, refuel and depart. While there we simply stood on the runway, walked about and stretched our legs. The next stop was Clark AFB in the Philippines where once again we stood on the runway, stretched our legs, as we were not allowed to drift far from the C-141. I guess the Military thought if any of us got to the terminal there might be a good number of possible desertions. From Clark, we were flown to Bien Hoa AFB in mid February 1967. In the finest of Army traditions I arrived between 2 and 3 AM, bussed to the 90th Replacement Center, located in Long Binh. The bus was somewhat intimidating with wire screen on the windows. The one thing that struck me immediately was the smell of the Country. I can't explain the odor but if I ever smelled it again, I'd know I must be in Vietnam. At the time, I was wide awake and wired, as I could not believe I was actually in Vietnam. Arriving at 90th Replacement, we all sat through an orientation welcoming us to Vietnam, where we turned in our American greenbacks, because we were told if you're captured, they ( the North Vietnamese) could convert them to gold and that would help fund their War effort The last thing any of us wanted to do, was to fund their War, so the conversion to MPC {Military Payment Certificates} was accomplished.

90th Replacement Center:

The 90th Replacement Center was pretty primitive. As I recall, there were three wooden buildings with rows and rows of tents. {Note: Once again George is right on the money. The 90th Replacement Center, aka; Battalion was operating both in Saigon and Long Binh by February 1967. By mid June of 1967 the entire replacement center of the 90th was operating from Long Binh only....ABN} We were required to attend three (3) formations a day. In these formations names were called out along with the assigned units one would be sent to. All sorts of outfits were named. The 101st Airborne at Phang Rang, other units in Saigon, some in Long Binh and many other locations throughout RVN. If your name wasn't called, then you'd be assigned to some sort of duty like policing the area, filling leister bags with water, guard duty, KP, or some other BS thing. I can remember standing in line for hours at the EM Club for what turned out to be hot kool aid. That, in and of itself was at times the highlight of the day. Most of my time was spent talking to the guys rotating back to the "World". I was doing my best to obtain as much information as possible. Not that the information was going to help, but it is what I did. After 2 to 3 days my name was called where I was informed I would be assigned to 29th General Support Group. Folks following me were assigned to the Saigon area.

29th General Support Group:

A fellow named Ted Fife (still a good friend to this day) and I had both been assigned to the 29th. When we arrived, we were both basically told to get out of the way. Eventually someone led us to what Ted and I considered a smaller version of 90th Replacement Center. We were told to put our gear in one of two field tents at the far reaches of their encampment area. We asked the guy where the mess-hall was and what we were supposed to do. He gave us directions to the mess-hall, but gave no further incite as to what we were supposed to do during the remainder of day, or days thereafter. So, basically we just sat around, met a few others in the same boat, as they drifted in. One fellow was named "Joseph E. Eady" and another a "Fred Hienkin". For two days the four of us did nothing but talk, smoke, eat, drink and shoot the bull. After two days of just hanging around and about, we were assigned to Guard Duty at the ammo dump {3rd Ordnance}. The rumor was the ammo dump, or part of it was blown up several weeks earlier and the explosion could be felt as faraway as Saigon {Note 1: At first, it was thought that the rumor regarding the 3rd Ordnance ammo dump explosion might be referring to 28 October 1966 when an entire pad of 8-inch shells (M-110 howitzer ammo) was penetrated and blown, per Paul B. Walker article (see Memorabilia section for article) and experience. However, there was a second major blow up and attack on a 3rd Ordnance munitions pad confirmed by Ben Kuster (June 2010) who was assigned as Intelligence Officer, 29th Group at the time George arrived. The 2nd attack occurred in mid to late January 1967. In both cases, the blast was felt in Saigon, with munitions explosions and debris falling throughout the entire Long Binh area...ABN/per BAK. There were also several smaller attacks during 1966.} The first night Joseph Eady and I went out on Guard Mount we were issued special orders and were assigned shotguns to be used while guarding the ammo pads.

On the truck taking us to the ammo pads were some "veterans" of guard duty and they took it as matter of fact. Joseph and I were about to exit this truck of guards at the next pad, and just as we were getting up from our seats an old timer (probably a week in country) told us to sit down, which we did. As the truck moved forward to the next pad, we asked what's the big deal, and he said "did you see the color of those shells?" Well, they were light green and he said they were phosphorous and if they caught fire, they burned at a 4,000 degree temperature. From that time forward I never got off on a pad with phosphorous shells. We remained at the 29th Group for several more days, where I was informed I was going to assigned to the 506th Supply and Service Company (DS) at Xuan Loc {Thiswould have been Long Giao (Blackhorse) , about 15 clicks south of Xuan Loc where the 506th had been re-assigned from Long Binh in October 1966....PBW}. Before I was sent to the 506th, I along with Ted Fife, Joseph Eady, Fred Hienkin and several others whose names I forget, had a change of orders from being assigned to to the 506th, to an outfit called the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) located in Tay Ninh. We were told we were going to the 228th to help support Operation Junction City. This occurred a little after mid February and before late February 1967. We convoyed up to Tay Ninh in the finest of Army tradition. We had our gear, duffle bags, flack jacket, steel helmets, and our M14's....but we had no ammunition or magazine clips whatsoever.

Convoy to Tay Ninh: 

I remember leaving for Tay Ninh very early in the morning by convoy. The excitement of not knowing what to expect on convoy seeing the vietnamese countryside for the first time, and really being in NAM caused a strange sort of indescribable adrenaline rush within my mind. We left 29th Group in Long Binh, and stopped somewhere in Saigon to join up with other various numbers of vehicles grouping for the main convoy to Tay Ninh. {Note: It is suspected that the convoy formed in Bien Hoa (1 mile west), although Saigon (12 miles south) is possible...ABN}. And, off we went toward what I later learned was Cu Chi. The ride was rough in the back of a 5 ton, but the excitement of being out on the road took my mind off any discomfort. We cleared Cu Chi and were headed toward Tay Ninh along Highway 13. Soon after leaving Cu Chi the column came to a sudden halt in what seemed like the middle of nowhere. We asked the driver who had left the vehicle to talk with other drivers what was going on. Our driver told us, that we were stopped in order to clear mines and possible bomb material from under a bridge ahead and to watch out for snipers. Well, the fact of the matter is we had our weapons but no ammunition or clips. The guys in our truck got together, split into two groups, with one half of us going forward while the other half went rearward. Stopping at each vehicle in the convoy we were begging and asking for any clips and or any extra rounds of ammunition anyone could spare. When we all rejoined at our vehicle, we spent time loading the clips, locking and loading. At the time, we now felt we were one of the best fortified vehicles in the convoy. We were good to go! When the convoy finally restarted, we passed over the bridge that had been the problem. It must have been built by the French because it was cement and built like a fort. Both ends and both sides of the bridge had round turrets for protecting the bridge. There was also concertina and barbed wire hanging down from the sides of the bridge into the water, along with other rolls of wire running end to end at water level and seemingly below water level. I assumed this was to prevent placement of mines or stop the floating of mines by the VC under the bridge to destroy it. I'm sure the guys who did a lot of convoy driving must have seen these types of things all over the place. One of the more interesting things to happen on the trip was while we were going through a small hamlet where all the local traffic had pulled over to let the convoy pass. At least, that's what I thought was going on anytime we passed one of those lambretta/vespa motor scooter buses loaded with people, produce or livestock. Well, as we were moving along some woman threw what looked like a sweet potato at us, and I was thinking; how nice! Joseph Eady thought differently, jumped from his seat and swatted it away. He then broke into a swearing tirade about how that Mamasan was trying to kill us with a grenade. That was an important lesson for me. Joseph had the where with all to sense and realize the true danger involved, where I simply had not even considered it. From that moment on, I was on my guard about anything and every event that took place for the next 12 months. Within a short time boredom set in and I kept wondering when we were going to finally get to our destination. At the same time, I must go on record, that I thought the countryside quite beautiful.

{Special Note regarding the following assignments experienced by George before he was assigned to Class I: As Company Clerk of the 228th an apology might be due George as to how and why he ended up in Trai Bi. I went back through my letters home, and other annotations from my time in the 228th. During the time period George arrived, I was in Long Binh, at 29th General Support Group, followed by 266th HQ and then on to Personnel Records Office Saigon. I was gone for nearly a week taking care of varied paperwork. At the same time, my assistant SP4 Ronald L. Fischer was with me, as was the Class I Clerk; SP4 Gamble. Had I been in Tay Ninh, I would have noted, that George had a PMOS of 76Q20 (Special Purpose Material Supply Specialist). As such, I would have immediately assigned George to any one of about 15 open slots within the Company directly, and he would have never been sent to Trai Bi to fill sand bags....unless he was one of the "all purpose" attached troops to the 228th. Talk about a total and possible misuse of personnel. The 1st shirt wouldn't be familiar with the personnel needs, open slots that needed filling for particular PMOS slots, and thus might have made a command decision based on orders generated by superior authority to send some bodies to Trai Bi....which he did. It shouldn't have happened if George was an "assigned" trooper to the 228th. The other portion regarding seemingly permanent Guard Duty, I cannot explain, unless (again) George was an attached trooper. I would have noticed the PMOS of George once I returned from Saigon, and brought it to the attention of the 1st Shirt, i.e.; this guy shouldn't be assigned to fill sand bags, permanent guard or other standard all purpose work at all. It baffles me as to how or why this occurred. The only thing that might explain both matters, is if George had come to the 228th TDY from the 29th as a portion (or replacement) of "all purpose troops" attached to the 228th. If so, I wouldn't be able to slot him within the 228th TO&E. A short time later, there were a few of these "all purpose" personnel re-assigned from TDY to the 228th, into the 228th itself. Once that occurred, the individual could be assigned easily to any platoon where needed. Another reason I think George might have initially been attached to the 228th as TDY, is where he was assigned to sleep. Those assigned to the Company directly, (for the most part) were quartered in the Field Tents parallel, in line, and first row to the Company Street. All other personnel (for the most part) were quartered in Field Tents parallel and behind the field tents of "assigned" personnel, to discern those who were "attached" verses "assigned". By late March 1967 most of these 500 "attached" personnel were returned to their assigned units. However, and between February and March 1967, there were "attached" personnel who became "assigned" to the 228th, and I'm thinking, this is what might have happened with George.

If it helps George a little, my first two months at Fort Lewis (from Basic training) were spent sweeping out warehouses that had no end in sight. The guy I was sweeping with had a Masters Degree in economics, while I had three years of college with a major in Business Management. So in a sense, I was filling sandbags too.. I too served Guard Duty, KP, and on three occasions had the all night job of stoking coal fired furnaces in the Company area. After that, I spent two weeks stocking and helping guys with requisitions find the correct sized replacement combat boots at the central supply warehouse. Being the lowest ranking EM and a newbie to the two story vintage WWII barracks, it became my job to mop liquid wax on the WWII linoleum floors, wait about five minutes and then buff the entire barracks floors upstairs and downstairs. I remember the first time I turned the buffing machine on, and was carried clear across the barracks floor knocking over foot-lockers, bunks, wall lockers and anything else in the path of that (seeming) 5,000 HP buffing machine. Anyway, if it makes George feel any better, he wasn't alone in being mis-assigned. When I became Company Clerk, I paid special attention to personnel records, PMOS designations and the like. I was trying to be sure that all personnel were assigned to positions where they could be the most efficient and useful. In the end, George did end up in one of the critical positions that was open to a person with his abilities and PMOS, albeit a few months late.....Sorry George......ABN}  

A third point of interest to George (whether he knew it or not), is that his PMOS of 76Q20, is a "Special Purpose Material Supply Specialist" related to just about anything relevant to specialized supply areas. The "76A - 76Z" PMOS designation began with general supply, with chemical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, transportation, medical, ammunition, procurement, weapons, aircraft, communications, electronics, material storage, petroleum, subsistence and other specific specialty areas related to a quartermaster activity. I can state as fact, that a 76Q20 would not be a specialist in "filling sandbags" or pulling permanent "guard duty". In fact, a 76Q20 would have the capability to handle any "specialized" area in any one of the aforementioned areas listed....which is another reason I suspect George was sent TDY to the 228th from the 29th Group, and that the 228th at first opportunity available had George transferred from TDY status from the 29th as an "all purpose trooper" into the 228th directly, where we could use his talent. 

Tay Ninh:  

We finally arrived at Tay Ninh and the 228th. We reported into the Company, the 1st Shirt was located, and I'm not sure he knew what to do with us. The one thing he did tell us, was that we would be leaving for Trai Bi the next day. He took us to a field tent that was located behind the wooden company mess-hall. The tent had cots and nothing else. If I'm not mistaken, I'm pretty sure we had to help finish putting the tent up, or readjust the poles and tighten the ropes tied to ground stakes. Having put our gear on the cots we went to eat dinner. Being new to a Company is like being a freshman in high school or college, as no one whose been around awhile wants to have anything to do with you....especially when you are wearing stateside freshly starched fatigues. You really stand out as a "newbie". Being the enterprising guys that we were, we did hear and find out about the Company EM Club located at the east end of the Company Street. So off we went, where we saw that the main hobby of those in the club was building pyramids out of empty beer cans atop the tables. So, that's what we did too. We had absolutely no problem whatsoever in building a pyramid of our own. While at the club and already having had a beer or two, one of those tanks with twin 40's pulled up fairly close to our location (or so it seemed) and sometime later decided to to fire those twin 40's. Well I'm here to tell you, I ran so far in five minutes, that it took me two days to walk back. It was a terrific Welcome to the 228th and War Zone C. When we finally left the club, it was pitch black and we wandered around looking for our field tent, which we finally found. Now, the big problem was we had no lights, no electricity and no nothing. But we finally settled in and got to sleep. It had been a most interesting first day and night. {Note: George's memory is not faulty. From October 1966 through March of 1967 there was a good deal of outgoing artillery fire at or near the Company area, in particular at night. There were 105's, 175's, tanks, and the twin 40's George is describing {might be referring to twin 50s). Those of us who had been in Tay Ninh for 5 months were used to such fire when and if it occurred. As such (unless it was incoming) we didn't pay much attention to such matters. The 175's were really something. When a round was fired off from across the road, everyones field tent shook from the blast. The best way to describe the feeling is to think of a small earthquake aftershock, as that's how it felt, and it was constant both day and night....ABN}

Trai Bi (Operation Junction City):

The next morning after breakfast the first shirt (SFC E7 Balbino E. Billamor) told us to saddle up. We mounted a 5 ton and were off to Trai Bi (pronounced Try Bee). The terrain started to change more toward a canopy type jungle area, as opposed to the fairly flat terrain of Tay Ninh. Not much happened on the way up to Trai Bi, other than seeing a lot of Infantry and Armor doing their thing. We arrived in Trai Bi around noon where we were met by a SP4 {Harry S.} Weaver. I don't know if Weaver was with the 228th or some other outfit, but Weaver had joined the Army at age 17, possibly before finishing High School. He was not a bad guy at all, but our group consisted of High School graduates and fellows with one or two years of College. I don't want to knock him, but he seemed immature by our standards. However, he was the ranking EM and that was pretty much that. He showed us to our quarters, which were not real quarters at all. They were semi bunkers, which were not the above ground type. These were bunkers that some Cat 9 had scooped out with PSP (or whatever it was called) layered over the top of the hole, with sandbags layered over the PSP. For the record the scooped out hole the engineers had dug were not that deep. As such, one had to crawl into and around on your hands and knees. So, unless you were a dwarf or a horse jockey, it was very uncomfortable. Weaver fills us in on our assignment, which was to fill sandbags around the fuel bladders at the airstrip. The engineers had been kind enough to bulldoze a lot of dirt into a giant mountain, so we didn't have to dig the dirt up. We could just shovel the dirt into the bags, tie them off, until we had a large pile. We did this day in and day out for nearly a week. We developed a system where once we had a large enough pile, we would load them aboard a truck, drive to the airstrip, unload the bags, and build a wall around the fuel bladders 5 to 6 bags high.

Now, there were some interesting things that happened in our week at Trai Bi. (1) Every evening all the troops in this little base compound would go to the perimeter and at some point, someone would start shooting. That was the signal for everyone else to unload whatever you were issued. We would "free fire" until everyones magazines were empty, or the belts on the M60's were emptied along with a few rounds from some M79's. We would also get to fire weapons we had never been able to fire, sort of like an OJT in weapons training. We found out that the reason this was done each evening, was to spoil any movements "Charlie" might have made during the day. That way "Charlie" couldn't sneak in close enough and launch a bonsai attack during the night. Another good thing about this ritual, was that you could zero in your weapon, and the whole thing was fun anyway. (2) In Vietnam the days were very hot and humid. After filling sandbags all day, which was backbreaking hard manuel labor, the one thing we all looked forward to was taking a shower at the shower point. I'm not positive, but thought that the shower point was run by an attachment or section of the 228th. What was interesting about this setup, was that the water was pumped from a nearby stream through large hoses and into an inter-tube that was cut and tied off at the end. As such the water exited with a shower head effect, rather than a solid 5" stream of water hitting you with force. To say it was relaxing and refreshing would be an understatement. It was great! Another thing about the shower point was its location. It was set up next to the main road where 40 to 50 naked GI's were waiting to get into the showers, while another 40 to 50 were getting out to dry off. Well, it looked like one big giant nudist colony. One evening while taking a shower, we were washing down, when across this rice paddy/field clearing we saw two F100's or F105's come streaking down and dropping napalm. It was kind of like the movie Apocalypse Now, where Robert Duval calls in a napalm strike so the guys in his command can surf. Well, I had never seen anything like this before or after my tour of duty. This all happened very close, as the distance from the shower point was between a quarter to one half mile away. Seeing this action really reinforced the fact, that I was in Vietnam and we were not the to play around.

After a week, we received word that we were to return to Tay Ninh. We were very glad to leave Trai Bi, and return to what we considered, some kind of civilization. We also heard, that shortly after we left, the fuel bladders were moved to another location. If so, then someone either had to move the sandbags we had filled, or start all over again. It might be true, or it might be BS. Either way, it seemed like the Army way of doing things.

Tay Ninh and 228th for Good:    

We arrived back at the 228th in early March 1967. This time we were assigned a field tent that was at the end of the Company street to the east. It was located across the street from the Company EM Club, and near the Company wooden structured cold shower point, as well as the only Tree for quite a distance in any direction. When we got to the tent it was mostly occupied by a bunch of guys who were TDY from elsewhere, and they were "short timers" who had been pulling permanent Guard Duty on the 228th assigned area of the perimeter {munitions pads of Class V}. When we arrived they were just killing time, and packing their things for shipment home. One of their pastimes was taking detonators out of hand grenades, capturing a large lizard or frog, and blowing them up.

I guess we were these short timers replacements for Guard Duty, as we seemed to pull the duty every evening. It really sucked big time, because we not only had to man the bunkers and towers, but also had to walk the ammo pads. There were 4 men to a bunker and tower, with 2 men per ammo pad. We used to always be assigned an ammo pad. The way we worked it, was one guy would sleep on top of the pad, so the rats didn't bite him, while the other patrolled the ground portion. When the OG {Officer of the Guard} came down the road in his jeep, the one awake would get to the middle of the pad, wake the other and both pretend to be walking our post. Either one of us could then assure the OG, that we were walking our posting in a Military Manner.

This constant, seemingly permanent Guard Duty continued for 5 to 6 weeks. One of the bad parts was trying to get to sleep afterwards. Basically, we would prepare for Guard Mount after dinner, get inspected, be trucked to our assigned area, perform the duty and return around 0630 AM for breakfast. The hard part, after breakfast was trying to get to sleep, when by 0730 AM it was hotter than hell {95 to 100 degrees}. After you slept, you'd awaken and there was nothing to do except wait for the next Guard Mount that evening. One important thing I learned after returning to the 228th, was to never eat in the mess-hall with the guys from Graves Registration section. These guys would tell some gross tales about the bodies and remains they had processed. The tropical heat of Tay Ninh, sometimes reaching 120 degrees in the shade, had a nasty habit of bloating a body in quick fashion. But, the job these guys in GR were assigned was probably one of the most important jobs in the Army. They had to process and correctly identify the remains of the fallen. I was quite glad, that I was never assigned that duty.

Before I move on to Class I, I'd like to also share the story of my 21st birthday. I had always wanted to spend my 21st in Las Vegas. But alas, that is not what the United States Army had in mind for PFC George Savare. I was still on the permanent Guard Duty Roster, and I asked the NCO and Sergeant of the Guard if I could have my birthday off with a couple of the guys from permanent guard duty and my friend Ted Fife who had been assigned and working in Class I since mid to late February 1967. Well, the SGT was a nice about the matter, and I got the day off along with two friends and Ted Fife. Ted managed to get hold of a couple of large cans of Apple juice, which we mixed with "some", and then a lot of Vodka. During the day a parade of well wishers dropped by our field tent for a drink. Many of these guys brought an assortment of various alcoholic beverages with them. To say that we were feeling no pain by mid afternoon would be an understatement. By 1800 hours (6 PM) we were all totally drunk, which is when the Snellenberger incident began. "Snelly" was a Minnisota farm boy who was not the biggest guy in the world, but he was one of the strongest guys I'd ever met in my life. He hadn't had much experience with the demon rum and he freaked out all of a sudden. He began hallucinating and claiming his Grandmother was caught up in a tornado. It took six of us to finally grab and somewhat subdue him. Even so, he continued acting crazy, so the six of us carried and dragged him to the 45th Field {Surgical} Hospital. We explained to the medic on duty what the situation was, and he sent us to the Psych Ward. A SP6 E6 comes out of his tent, we explain the situation, he goes back into his tent, and came back out with a syringe and gave Snelly a shot. I don't know what the medic gave him, but Snelly was out like a light. We left Snelly with the medical staff and started back to the Company area. It seems everyone took a different route back, while Joseph Eady and I were stumbling down the road. Now Eady was one of those members of the Army who had been given a choice of either going to prison or serving in the Army. He chose the Army. Eady was a Black fellow from south Philly. There was not an ounce of fat on this guy. He was one of those guys who looked like God had chiseled him out of solid granite. Nobody screwed with Eady. Anyway, Eady and I continued to stumble down the dirt roadway toward the Company area, when we literally bump into two GI's who were in about the same condition as as Eady and myself. The problem was, they were both Officers. I only know this, because I noticed the bars on their helmets when the moonlight hit them. Well Eady, for whatever reason was determined to really kick some ass. He didn't like being bumped into by anyone, especially when he was drunk.  It took me awhile, but I convinced Eady that it was best to get back to our tent and continue to celebrate. I don't know what the two officers were thinking, but Eady finally relented after the exchange of a few words, and off we went. I awakened the next morning with the most mammoth headache and hangover ever. I missed breakfast, wanted to take a shower, but couldn't move. It was really the pits. They should have let me go to Vegas.

Assigned to Class I:    

Two weeks later on or about early April 1967 my friend Ted Fife talked with SSG E6 Robert E. Saviour into letting me clerk in Class I. My PMOS was a 76Q20 {Special Purpose Material Supply Specialist}, but from February 1967 to April of 1967 all I had done was pull guard duty in ammo dumps, fill sandbags in Trai Bi, and pull permanent Guard Duty in Tay Ninh. Within a day I was transferred to Class I. In Class I, a SP4 E4 Dawson "Mac" Gamble was the Class I Clerk, and had been since the 228th arrived in Tay Ninh some 6 to 7 months earlier. He was due to rotate around mid May 1967, so he began teaching me the duties of Class I Clerk by OJT. He instructed me about the general idea of his duties, how to fill out and do the 2969 report and how to get the information from the 2770 forms. By early May 1967 he was really short and scheduled to rotate {ETS} out of Tay Ninh. It was then that he told me I was on my own, and he was not to be bothered unless there was an emergency. Even so, he would drop by and see how I was doing.

{Note regarding above transfer of George to Class I: SSG Saviour would have had to approach the 1st Shirt, and or myself in the Orderly Room in order to accomplish this transfer. A quick review of George, his PMOS, record to date, and request by the NCOIC of Class I would have generated instant approval and transfer of duty assignment. Here again, if it's any solace to George, I remember SP4 Dawson Gamble (my best friend) just like George and Ted Fife were best friends, told me that he had a terrific guy to train and take his place at Class I. If Gamble said someone was A OK, then that was good enough for me, and that was that. It also tells me, that by that time, George had to have been assigned into the 228th, as all TDY "all purpose" personnel had relocated back to their original units of assignment by late March 1967....ABN}

Gamble rotated around the 2nd or 3rd week of May 1967 {22 May 1967}. Settling into the routine of of what I'd been taught in Class I was a continuing educational experience of learning the ins and outs of what our mission was, and how to get it done under various circumstances. The Class I office is where I spent the bulk of my time. The office was somewhat primitive, but after all, I was in a War Zone. There was one field phone and the office itself was a wooden floor with wooden sides and a tin roof. The floor was swept with a palm branch and I don't remember ever seeing a "regular" broom anywhere. Odd too, as we (the 228th) were a direct support supply company, and supposedly we had nearly everything that might be needed by us, or the the many hundreds of troops we were supporting. In the office there were six or seven desks, which were no more than flat plywood sheets serving as table-desks. There were no drawers or any other special features. The office staff, as best I remember were all Specialist 4's, as nearly all of us had been promoted to SP4 E4 around the same time. Besides myself, there was SP4 Moore, Rhodes, Anthony, Simonenko, Fife, LaStarza, and Weaver. Our NCOIC was SSG E6 Robert Seviour (later promoted to SFC E7) and deservedly so. He was the heart and soul of Class I, and lead us all with a quiet dignity. He also had a good deal of experience, as he had been with the 228th some 6 to 7 months prior in either November or December 1966 and had been Class I NCO for quite some time. I wish I could remember the Officer who was in charge, but I can't. That's not to say he was not around every so often, it's because I had very little to do with him, and he had very little (I guess) to do with us. SP4 Ted Fife and SP4 Moore handled the stock record cards, while I did the 2969 report. The 2969 report was based on the 2970 forms SP4 Rhodes and Simonenko  provided, while SP4 Anthony and LaStarza did the ration breakdown sheets. Ration breakdown was based on the head-counts each company or organization who drew rations from us provided. Every item that was issued was based on a 28 day menu cycle. Each item issued in whatever amount was based on a number per 100 individuals. For example: 2.5 gallons of milk per 100 individuals. If you have a headcount of 225 from a company or organization, then we would calculate 5.625 gallons (rounded up to 6) and issue 6 to the organization. So for each company or organization drawing rations, I had to figure out the quantity allowed per item based on that days particular menu.

There were 2 breakdown sheets per outfit. One was for perishables, which were issued daily. The other sheet was for non-perishables which were issued every 3rd day. So the drill went like this: The ration sheet breakdown guy would get the head counts off the 2979's, then get the menu for the day, or period. From there the math for what was to be issued would be calculated, with the calculation per organization given to the guys in the yard for pulling and distribution. The NCOIC of the yard was a SGT Potts. Under SGT Potts were other 228th GI's; Olive, Brown, Black, Green and Johnson to name a few. For whatever reason the guys in the yard had other folks with the same last name, so we had duplicates and sometimes multiples of fellows with the same surname, especially Olive, Green, Black and Johnson. Primarily the guys working the yard were of all ethnicities, most being of African-American descent, while a number of others were Hispanic, the majority of which were of Mexican-American descent and a smaller group of Puerto Rican heritage.

The Class I Yard was divided into sections; Perishable in the Reefer Boxes, Non-Perishables stored in the main yard as needed and grouped by product for issue on a rotational basis, the freshest product in, being the last to go out. That way there was a constant turnover of product, whereby an item would work its way from the rear (freshest) toward the front (oldest) for final issue. Condiments and other products, such as salt, sugar, flour, wheat, rice and such were stored in a large wooden warehouse (see photo gallery 1966-1967), as they were subject to rapid breakdown if left in the sun, or even more rapid breakdown if left in the rain. Condiments were issued on a rotational basis too. We also produced ice in fairly large ice-house which was next to the condiment warehouse (shed, as we called it). In addition, we also produced ice-cream, or put better; tried to produce ice-cream in the ice-cream plant. I have never met a crew of 2 who worked so hard as the two GI's assigned to make ice-cream. No matter how hard they tried to sterilize the equipment, keep it pristine clean, etc! they just could not produce a batch of ice-cream that did not have a very high bacteria count. For all their work, and all the product they produced, it could not be issued to the troops. They really tried.

The reasons I thought the ice-cream plant could never produce a quality bacteria free product is due to two factors. As all who served in Tay Ninh can remember the dirt is like fine powdered silt in the dry months. One truck or a convoy of any size goes by and it looked like the dust bowl of the 1930's. The second factor relates to the wet months during Monsoon season. The combination of high humidity along with the high heat is the ideal breeding ground for bacteria growth. One of the guys in the ice-cream plant was PFC Cassel from Detroit. A nice guy who was often frustrated at the "ass chewing" he and the other fellow had to endure because they continuously failed to produce a safe product. For the record, the ice-cream usually tasted pretty good...we just couldn't issue it.

The ice-house was a great place to be assigned. First, it was cold inside for obvious reasons. Second, you could always trade a few cans of beer for a block of ice. The ice-house produced 300 pound blocks of ice approximately 4 foot long, 1 foot wide and 2 feet high (see photo gallery 1966-1967 "b" of 5 ton truck with ice-block on conveyor provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker). The production of the ice-house was supplemented by 4 to 5 truckloads of ice blocks brought up from Saigon on a daily basis. The ice from these convoys was usually issued right off the trucks, and I don't recall any left over ice being stored in the ice-house, although some may have. As a side note, and with regard to the few cans of warm beer donated in trade for a block of ice, we used to roll the cans down the blocks of ice (off the record books) so that the beer cans were ice cold within minutes of rolling from one end to the other within 3 to 4 minutes. For Class I personnel, a "church key" was part of our required uniform.

The convoys of goods would would arrive anywhere from 1100 hours to 1300 hours each day. Traditionally around noon depending on what type of problems they might have encountered on Highway 13. When the trucks loaded with Class I materials came into the yard, the office staff would leave their desks and assist in the unloading of the convoy trucks. We (the staff) usually worked the perishable line, which included milk, fresh vegetables and frozen meat. The dry goods on pallets were off loaded by rough terrain forklifts. The idea was to offload all trucks ASAP, in order to get them turned around for the return trip to Long Binh. The dry goods were offloaded next to the trucks, and later in the afternoon be moved them to their storage location, or to the dry issue line. Perishables were off loaded directly into a cold storage reefer, while fresh vegetables were were offloaded under a covered area called the perishable issue line.

The perishable crew were probably the strongest GI's within Class I yard. They spent hours tossing 65 pound cases of meat into the reefers, then issuing out according to ration breakdown sheet to each company or organization. When we'd go out to help unload, the yard crew would have the reefer (refrigerated) trucks back into the appropriate reefer box, and then we'd put the roller skate wheeled conveyor ramps into the truck, with the other end supported by two cases of frozen meat boxes to form a downward angle into the reefer. We'd take turns at different positions alongside the conveyor ramp. This was done because being in the reefer or inside one of the refrigerated trucks were the two positions that were the most physically demanding. As the truck was being unloaded, more conveyor ramps were put into the truck. These trucks were approximately 28 to 32 feet in length. When each truck was unloaded, the manifest listings were collected to give to stock control record clerks. I can say in all honesty, that during my time in Class I, every Clerk did their very best to be as accurate as possible.

When we had finished unloading we'd all return to the Company mess-hall for lunch. I'm fairly sure it was the same for the guys in the beginning of the 228th (maybe not), but from about late March 1967, maybe April of 1967, the 228th mess-hall fed all types of un-assigned personnel throughout the day. This included the truck drivers on daily convoys, Military Police, and all types of other personnel. One of the more interesting things we'd see, is when Green Berets or other groups of special forces would wander in from God knows only where. We'd see some strange weapons and men who were really glad to get a hot meal. Later, on about July 1967 forward and after the original large group of 110 guys rotated, we'd have the Red Cross girls {aka: Donut Dolly's} show up and serve meals. I always enjoyed seeing them. They always had a great smile and upbeat attitude. But, I'd bet they couldn't wait to get out of Dodge (Tay Ninh), as they never stayed long.

Usually on the way back to Class I we'd check the Guard Duty roster posted on the Company Bulletin Board, and also check for mail. If any of us were assigned Guard Duty we'd leave Class I early and eat at 4PM {1600 hours}, put on our gear and report for Guard Mount around 5 to 6PM { 1700 to 1800 hours}. If we were not assigned Guard Duty, we'd return to Class I from lunch and continue with our job assignments. As stated earlier, my job was to do the 2969 report. This was done daily and consolidated at the end of the month. The consolidated report was sent by courier or I'd take it myself to 29th General Support Group. One copy went to the 29th with another going to some Army procurement department located in Chicago, and of course one copy was kept in Class I files. I'd perform the calculations and math for the 2969 report on a Friden hand crank adding machine. There was no tape, so if you made an error and the totals didn't jibe, then you'd have to do the whole calculation all over again, start to finish. This hand crank machine was a bitch when the number got large (which was always) because it was mechanical. Each time you pulled the crank, there were a lot of gears, levers, tumblers that turned over. What I would have given for a cheap present day $10 adding machine with a tape. The one thing I did learn early on, was;  figures never lie, but liars figure. My reports always balanced.....Thank you SP4 Gamble.

The routine in Class I was the same during the dry season, but during the monsoon season it changed. In the afternoon we'd go help the yard crew put tarps on the palletized rations. The rough terrain forklift would lift us up to the top of the pallets and we'd tarp the top and sides of the items stored in the yard. We had thousands of boxed and palletized C-rations (Combat rations), boxed cases of cereal, and other goods that needed to be kept dry. The large tarps were very heavy to begin with. Once they got wet they were two to three times heavier and very hard to move.

Transition Point June 1967 Forward:

Monsoon season had started and several changes occurred within the Company. By early June 1967 the bulk of original 228th personnel had rotated, so most of us in the Company were their replacements. The officers took over the wooden structure that had been built and lived in by the former Company Clerk, Assistant Company Clerk, Company Armorer, Captain White's driver, and Class I Clerk. SP4 (Ronald L. Fischer) who had worked in the Orderly Room was told to find other quarters and seemed to be on Guard Duty everyday until his orders arrived to rotate in mid June. Both Ted Fife and I are fairly positive that Captain (Jerry D.) White was the 228th Commanding Officer until early July 1967. One day he was there and the next day he wasn't. There was no change of command ceremony that others have talked about. Ted Fife and I also remember that the new Commanding Officer, a Captain (Gordan I.) Ozawa in the morning formation is where he told us (the company) that we weren't going to run him off like the other guy. On the way to Class I yard we were all wondering what the heck he was talking about because nobody knew. Later we asked other guys in the company if they knew what Captain Ozawa was talking about, and they didn't know either.

Sometime in this July - August time frame we were to be inspected by General Jones of 1st Log (Brigadier General M. McD. Jones Jr. - 1st Logistics Command - Commanding as of July 1967, who had replaced Major General, Stanley Lollis....ABN). We were out in the Class I yard till 2000- 2100 hours ( 8 - 9 PM) adjusting the tarps so they hung off the sides exactly 2 inches from the ground and that all tarps were dress right dress to the next one in line. Well, the next day General Jones drove through the yard at about 20 miles per hour and never stopped. Couldn't wait to get out of Dodge City (Tay Ninh) just like the Donut Dolly's.

It was also around this time period I got a call from an SFC E7 at the 45th Field Hospital who was in charge of food service. He kept complaining that the hospital was supposed to get ice-cream and other items that were specific to hospital needs. He also complained about the lack of Butter Milk. I tried to explain the issue with ice-cream having such a high bacteria count that we couldn't issue it, and he said he didn't care and that we should get it from Long Binh, Saigon or wherever. As to the Butter Milk issue, I told him we barely got reconstituted milk much less Butter Milk. Now, you have to realize that this SFC (Sergeant First Class) was both a southerner and a lifer (career NCO). Most of us were 20-25 years old and didn't give a ____ about Butter Milk. As a typical GI, I told him we'd look into the matter. It couldn't have been more than two weeks later when SFC Seviour our NCOIC tells me I'm to go and attend a food service meeting in Long Binh and that he was giving me an unofficial in country R&R (Rest and Recuperation) which would be a break from the day in and day out routine of crunching numbers.

Well, it was just my luck. I arrived in Long Binh and show up at the assigned place and time of the meeting when it begins. The meeting turns into a finger pointing free for all of who screwed up, who's responsible, who dropped the ball, and what's going to be done about it. It was one big witch hunt. Worse still, was that the SFC from the 45th Field Hospital was there and he points me out, saying how he doesn't get any support from the 228th. He doesn't get ice-cream and all the other stuff the AR's (Army Regulations) state that medical units are supposed to get. He goes on and on, and I'm feeling pretty low, because I know we are doing the best that we can with what we get. Actually, as far as I was concerned the Class I yard of the 228th was doing one hell of a job. For the record, the 228th was also pulling Guard Duty on the perimeter and I never once saw anyone from medical units pull guard duty...the point being, that they were needed if and when the ____ hit the fan. I'm not complaining, but the fact is, that all other organizations stationed in Tay Ninh not only performed their individual missions, but also provided security by pulling Guard Duty. His tirade went on for awhile when the Major in charge and running the meeting told that SFC to "Shut the ___ Up". I was one happy GI.

One other note, I should have mentioned earlier. I believe several of the guys who were in Class I, such as Weaver and Simonenko were originally with the 483rd Field Service Company and TDY (Temporary Duty) with the 228th. It seemed to me, that the 228th was somewhat predatory...meaning that if personnel came to the Company TDY, and the 228th could use them, then somehow arrangements were made and they got transferred into the 228th. I suppose this happened because we always seemed to be short-handed. From what I know now (thanks to this website and communications with the former Company Clerk of the time period) we should have had about 38 people in Class I, and we only had 18 to 20.

Another thing that happened in the July to August 1967 time frame was some sort of orders issued by the Base Command, that Tay Ninh needed reaction teams to dispel any hostile attacks which might be launched by the Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The theory, as explained to us, was to have 10-15 members of various support companies or units provide men, who during an attack could meet in a pre designated location and then be directed to the most vulnerable area of the attack for defense purposes. I, unfortunately was selected along with several other Class I members to take part in this nightly training. I know it was during Monsoon season because we'd stand in the heavy unending rain waiting for the Officer in charge (OIC) to decide what to do. We would usually end up just walking around and killing time. This concept was abandoned after awhile since most personnel assigned to the task were also being assigned to regular Guard Duty so when they'd try to form up the reaction force, there was no one to do it, as most of us were already out on the perimeter anyway.

Operation Yellowstone and Katum:  

On or about mid December 1967, I was told to get my gear ready as I was being sent to Katum to coordinate and make sure Turkeys were delivered in time for Christmas. My journey to Katum started at the 45th Medical Evacuation Chopper pad next to the 45th Field {Surgical} Hospital. I was waiting for a chopper to come in and drop off the wounded and (KIA) killed in action and then jump on board for the ride to Katum. Well, sure enough the Huey's came in, and the medics pulled the dead off the craft onto the ground and then got to the wounded and hustled them off to the hospital. Mamma-sans then jumped into the empty choppers and quickly washed the blood and debris out of the craft. While they were doing this chore, I told one of the medics that I thought it was pretty Chicken ____ to just throw the dead to the ground like that. He replied they are dead and there is nothing we can do for them... we need to focus on the living. I guess it made sense, but I still didn't like seeing it happen. I also knew that these guys in body bags on the ground were going to be processed by the 228th GR (Graves Registration) section who I talked about earlier. Still glad it wasn't my job.

The ride by chopper up country was uneventful. I loved flying around Nam. Aside from the war, I found the countryside to be pretty. I was amazed at all the bomb and shell craters poc-marking the landscape. As we were approaching the airstrip at Katum and adjacent to the runway, the door gunner of the chopper tells me and another guy to get ready to jump. I asked him why, and he said a C-130 was landing and the Huey pilot wasn't going to set down. We were hovering a foot or two off the ground, but to me it looked like miles. As we were still moving forward at a slow speed, the two of us jumped from the chopper, hit the ground rolling, and ended up in a ditch. No sooner had this happened when mortar shells started landing in the airstrip area. If the VC/NVA could hit a C-130 it could tie up the airfield for quite awhile. Well, the two of us just laid there until normal activity at Katum started up. We got up and each of us went looking for our respective companies. Finding the Class I area and what I assumed to be 228th guys was a real pain. Everywhere I went and asked  (1) nobody knew, or (2) everyone was so busy doing what they did, they didn't care if I found the 228th guys or not.

A short while later I finally stumbled onto and found the Class I area. I got nothing but the cold shoulder from the troops and didn't see anyone I knew {These personnel were from the 758th Supply and Service Co. (DS),....see 1967 -1968 History of Task Force Merritt; Katum}. In their minds, they didn't have to answer to me, so I found an abandoned bunker and moved in. I put my duffle bag inside and then returned to see if I could be of any help. Well, it turns out that everything was in control and working smoothly. Stuff that was needed to be put away already was. Things that needed to be issued out were also in an orderly manner, and whenever an outfit would arrive the guys would get up and do their thing. It was an efficient setup and I saw nothing wrong with it. Note: Until I found this Website and came into contact with other 228th guys, I didn't have a clue, that other 228th folks were also in Katum with Task Force Merritt. In the 228th at Tay Ninh there was a lack of knowing what other platoons were doing. Class I members didn't mix or socialize with other platoons, just as other platoon members didn't mix or socialize with us. I think this might have been due to the exhausting work load each platoon had. When you had time off (which wasn't often) you just wanted to "veg -out".

{A Side Note: In Tay Ninh we in Class I did have a great working relationship with Class VI. We'd barter food for alcohol and cigarettes. That way we had no reason to go to the EM Club. We had all the cigarettes, beer, ice and food that we wanted. So we just hung out in our assigned living area unless we went to see an outdoor movie. Going to see a movie was an escape from the normal cycle of work and Guard Duty. I always get a huge memory laugh thinking of us sitting in our lounge chairs, drinking beer watching a movie one night, when a 3/4 ton truck came shooting down the company street spraying a white powder (which I believed was DDT) to kill mosquitos. The white powder enveloped us all from head to toe, so that we all looked like powdered donuts sitting in lounge chairs} 

Back to Katum: It seems that General Westmoreland mandated that every GI would have a turkey dinner for not only Thanksgiving, but Christmas as well. That order was all fine and good, but the problem for me was how to get the turkeys to Katum. Turkeys were not deemed combat essential at Long Binh or Saigon. So, I called back down to Tay Ninh and told them I was getting a lot of flack for not having turkeys in storage for Christmas as promised. I don't recall the MSG E8's name who I talked to, but he was a Ranger and a Korean War veteran. He was a no nonsense type guy and said he'd get it straightened out right away. Several days went by and I was still getting a lot of flack from the 25th ID outfits about the turkeys. I made another call to the MSG (Master Sergeant) and told him I was in the same situation...no turkeys and people were really getting pissed. He told me not to worry, that a convoy was coming in that afternoon. Well, not only did the convoy arrive, which we unloaded, but a planeload of turkeys was air-lifted in to Katum as well. I got a call from whomever ran the airstrip to come and get the turkeys in early evening. So I got some of the guys and off we drove to the airstrip. We offloaded the turkeys and by the time we finished it was nightfall and dark. At night the only lights we were allowed to use were the little ones with slits. I think they called them "blackout lights". This was a problem. I was in the lead truck and I couldn't see a darn thing, and the last thing I wanted to do was run over some of the Infantry guys who slept alongside the roadway. So, I had the brilliant idea of turning on the truck lights just for a second to get an idea of just where I was on the road. Big mistake! As soon as I turned them on, everyone was cursing, calling me names and I could hear the sound of bolts slamming shut on M16s into the lock and load position. That was the last time the lights were turned on at night. Eventually and at a very slow speed we inched our way back to the Class I area, where we kept the turkeys onboard the vehicles. The next day we handed out turkeys to anyone who wanted one.

Before Christmas day, I was recalled back to Tay Ninh. This time I convoyed down from Katum. Convoys were always a crap shoot as to how things would go. We had no action by any enemy forces. The bad news was, that it was a very rough ride, as I was riding atop a 5 Ton flatbed while sitting on top of a Conex container where I bounced around all over the place. Where the Huey from Tay Ninh to Katum had taken only 20 minutes, the convoy ride back took hours. All in all, I still enjoyed seeing the countryside. I also felt that the geography and setting of Tay Ninh Province was pretty and unique. I'm sure it must have been vastly different from what other parts of the country looked like.

The Home Stretch (aka: getting short):

Upon returning to the 228th in Tay Ninh, the first thing I did was go to bed. When I had left the month before for Katum the cots in the field tent were parallel to the sides of the hootch with our metal wall lockers between the cots. Up to that time (February -  mid December 1967) we had to clean our own quarters, shine our own boots and so on. When I had left, the mosquito netting over my cot had turned a dark brown and was almost solid from the fine dust kicked up in the dry season. I can't recall any of us ever washing the netting.

On return the day before Christmas, and as I walked into my newly assigned wooden hootch everything had changed. Cots were now perpendicular to the side walls. The floors were super clean, the mosquito netting was new and Army OD Green. The extra boots under my cot were shined and neatly placed under my cot. I mean what the heck was going on??? Well, the answer is hootch girls. I guess they had been hired during my short stay in Katum and they were like a NASCAR pit crew once they hit the hootch. Pretty Cool.

From reading what other guys have said and written by e-mail exchanges, I guess we had a new Commanding Officer, a Captain Jimmy Ellington who had replaced Captain Ozawa, who it appears was promoted to Major. But, neither Ted Fife or I recall those details.

By mid December 1967 I was also some 80 days short. The double digit midget. December was not much different than other months with the exception of my brief week or so at Katum. I don't want to sound negative but I couldn't get up much enthusiasm for Christmas. We had the mandatory turkey dinner and everyone was telling each other to have a Merry Christmas as if all were trying to get into the spirit. A lot of the guys were Catholic so I managed to attend a Christmas Mass at the Tay Ninh base Chapel. It was interesting from the standpoint of not being a Catholic and having the Mass said in Latin by a priest from the Philippines. What was also interesting was that all the Catholic guys knew what was going on, how to respond, when to respond and where to respond. We Protestants didn't have a clue so we just went with the flow. It's the thought that counts anyway.

New Years Eve day was a whole different story. We were celebrating and having a great time. I believe there wasn't a one of us who could have passed a sobriety test by mid afternoon. That night at Midnight (2400 hours) must have cost the US taxpayer a couple of million dollars in Tay Ninh alone. That night every artillery piece in the base camp was firing away, and the guys on Guard Duty lit up the perimeter berm with flares and rapid fire shooting. I'm sure the Officer of the Guard (OG) of every outfit must have caught hell for all the stuff that was going on. But, I guarantee that no one in Tay Ninh Base Camp was going to be attacked that night. I think it was just a matter of being proactive.

When you become short or a short-timer the monotony is under believable. Each day was the same as the one before and the one after. Same old - Same old. In Class I we continued to do our job. I don't recall a single one of us in our group who would soon be rotating taking time off or sloughing work. We continued to the same job as we always had. Why Not? It made the time move and that was the secret. Do your job, fill in another square on your short-timers calendar, putting you ever closer to the time you could finally go home.

January of 1968 was an interesting month. Unknown to me, or anyone else that I know of, was the importance of TET (Vietnamese New Years). The first part of the month was the same as any other month. But the latter part of January was when we started hearing rumors and stories about offensive battle measures taking place in various locations throughout Vietnam. For us (besides being in the middle of nowhere) the major concern was Saigon for obvious reasons. We were put on high alert during Guard Mount briefings, but there was no discernible change in activity on our outer perimeter. It was like any other time I had pulled Guard Duty, which was every other night. As we closed in on February the TET offensive was out in the open and common knowledge where we were really on the lookout for any sign of the bad guys. It was extremely calm in our area and throughout Tay Ninh. The only reason for this (and it's speculation, or Monday Morning quarterbacking and not based on any type of military intelligence, of which I had none) is that Tay Ninh's close proximity to the Cambodian border (approximately 6 miles) was a natural infiltration route for the VC and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) to approach Saigon. To stop and harass Tay Ninh would not have made sense. It wouldn't have mattered whether Tay Ninh was a major forward supply and support installation or not. There would be no political advantage whereas Saigon would be. Now, if Tay Ninh was screwed with when the VC/NVA were retreating back into Cambodia, that would be a whole different story. 

Rotation:

February 1968 finally arrived. I was really short now (just like Gamble and the original 228th guys in mid May of 1967). Orders arrived for Ted Fife and I to leave Vietnam. My last night in Tay Ninh and with the 228th, I slept on the east side of the bunker outside my hootch. It seems one of the Infantry units of the 25th ID? had moved in across the company road where the 548th Maintenance Company was and they had started a fire with left over wood from some newly built hootch's. The fire must have got out of control as it set off a small ammo dump the Infantry guys had in their area, and all night long there were munitions going off. The next morning we were told, that some of their guys had been killed in the initial explosion. An example, I guess of "Non Hostile - Friendly Fire".

With orders in hand, Ted and I were supposed to report to 90th Replacement Center in Long Binh. Once you signed out of the Company you were on your own.{Absolutely true. It's the way things worked in Vietnam while I was there...ABNRather than try and go by convoy, Ted and I decided to catch a ride by air. We waited around at the Tay Ninh airstrip building (pagoda...see photo gallery 1966-167 "b") and eventually there was a Caribou, that was going to Saigon. Arriving at Saigon, we found a 5 ton truck that was going to Long Binh and hopped aboard. The drive from Saigon to the 90th Replacement was nerve racking for two reasons; (1) We drove past the Cholon PX area which was one of the areas under major attack during TET, and (2) both Ted and I were unarmed as we had to turn our M14's into the 228th when we left Tay Ninh.

{Not nit picking here, and just trying to clarify, as the preceding is interesting. M14's were issued to George, Ted and others by the 29th Group w/o ammunition on their initial Convoy to Tay Ninh. If so, that means the M14's belonged to the 29th General Support Group, not the 228th (unless property transfer of some sort had occurred). In other words, the weapons should have been turned in to the 29th Group, not the 228th. On the other hand, once George was officially assigned into the 228th, it's possible that no one bothered, or worried about where an individual was issued his weapon, the key thing being, that the individual had one. Of interest also, is that photographs and independent knowledge substantiate, that a good number of vehicles and other equipment have 29th Group, 266th, 548th, 567th and other markings....none of which belonged (technically) to the 228th. Perhaps a "Property Officer" reading this can explain the matter. Another point of interest referenced by George, is the fact that once you signed out of the Company, you truly were on your own. No rifle for protection, and you had to find your own means of transportation {convoy, airlift} to get to 90th Replacement. I hitched a ride in a spotter plane with 2 Majors from the 196th. The pilot stopped in Cu Chi, then Bien Hoa, and finally Saigon where I disembarked. The sad part was, that I had left my Class A summer uniform aboard the aircraft, which had turned around immediately after my disembarking and was taxing down the short runway. As such, I was in fatigues with my orders, duffle bag and 201 File only. I had to scrounge, beg, and borrow a replacement shirt, pants, shoes, etc! at 90th replacement from other rotating guys to put together a passible uniform to board the World Airways Jetliner. You were not allowed to board without the proper uniform. So, I had shoes that were too small, pant legs that were too short, a shirt with the rank of PFC instead of SP4, an Army Green hat that was too large, a scuzzy tie, a beat up belt, and dented belt buckle. I bought the three Vietnam ribbons, paid for a new name tag, wore someones extra marksman's rifle badge instead of expert, and had signal corps insignia instead of supply...crazy stuff. Like George and Ted, I recall the entire planeload of personnel in unison giving one huge cheer on liftoff. We were all finally going home........ABN}

The only other problem we ran into was crossing the Saigon River, but a tank drove up and fired several rounds at the opposite banks of the river and the small convoy continued to cross the bridge.

We finally arrived in Long Binh and reported in to the 90th Replacement. The 90th was a big pain in the ass. Because of the TET offensive no new troops were being sent out, as all transportation was considered combat essential. Worse still, all the sleeping quarters were full and every cot was taken. So Ted and I ended up sleeping on the floor of a field tent. The next morning we caught a ride to Bien Hoa to pickup our personnel files, pay records, etc!{Note: At some point on or about mid June 1967, it appears that 90th Replacement Center, Personnel Records Center, and Finance Center were moved permanently to Bien Hoa from Saigon. In talking with 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker who rotated in mid February 1967, he too rotated from 90th Replacement Battalion in Long Binh and flew out of Bien Hoa.  SP4 Ronald Fischer who rotated in early June 1967, also states that he rotated from Long Binh and flew out of Bien Hoa. Interesting as those 90 or so who rotated in early to late May 1967, did so from Saigon and Tan Son Nhut...ABN} From there we caught another ride back to the 90th where we just killed time. That night about 0100 (1 AM) we were awakened and told to bring all our stuff as we were going to be flown to Cam Ranh Bay. By the time everyone rotating was loaded on the trucks and were driven out to Bien Hoa AFB it was about 0400 (4 AM) where we were told to just hang loose for a plane scheduled to pick us up at 0530 hours. By 1000 hours (10 PM) the whole lot of us were still standing on the side of the runway waiting for our flight. Around noon we boarded a C-130 and off we go. It was a good flight and I got to view a good deal of Vietnam I'd never seen, nor probably will see again. Landing at Cam Ranh Bay was a real experience compared to what Ted and I had seen during the previous year. As we waited for a bus to take us to the 22nd Replacement Center we watched all sorts of GI's in swimming trunks, carrying surf boards, and iced beer headed for the beach. What a racket. Not that we had it bad, but these guys had it made.

We finally arrived at the 22nd around 1400 hours (2 PM) where we had to attend a mandatory orientation which lasted for over an hour and a half. Basically it was a lot of stuff about nothing, and that we'd be there for a couple of days for some processing. Well, we were hungry, we were tired and so after the waste of time lecture, we were told to turn in and get some sleep, but be up by 1700 hours (5 PM) if we wanted to eat. Now, think about it. Here were two guys who had been stationed in Tay Ninh, worked in Class I and had all the food, drink and other at our fingertips for nearly a year. Now, here we were in a semi large beach resort, had not eaten since dinner of the previous day in Long Binh, had travelled by truck, plane, and bus to get to this resort, and they were telling us if we wanted to eat at all, we couldn't, until another two hours. That meant Ted and I had not eaten for 24 hours. I guess it was the Army way of welcoming us back to reality. 

Ted and I found the 22nd supply room, drew sheets and pillows, found some empty beds and started making up the beds. Nothing fancy or the way we did it in Tay Ninh. We just threw the sheets over the mattress and tried to sleep. We didn't get much sleep and 1700 hours was upon us in no time, so off we went to stand in the chow line. That way we'd at least have a full stomach and could sleep the rest of the night. We finished eating and then went to get some sleep. I swear that no sooner had we actually fallen asleep, when some guy shows up and tells Ted and I to get into our Class A uniforms, as we were both scheduled to catch a flight at 2000 hours (8 PM). We changed into our Class A uniforms and took the sheets and pillows back to the supply room. The PFC in the supply room tells us we have to fold the sheets neatly or he won't accept them. Ted and I looked at each other and just dropped the sheets and pillows on the floor, turned around and left.

Our Class A summer uniforms were extremely wrinkled from being jamb packed in our duffle bags for nearly a year, while other guys were wearing well starched, creased and very clean Class A uniforms....Saigon warriors that they were.

So Ted and I looking like a couple of "sad sacks" are standing on the runway waiting for a Northwest Orient 707 to arrive. It does arrive and boarding began. Prior to boarding I told Ted to get his field jacket from his duffle bag and put it on the top of his duffle bag rather than the bottom (the military way of packing). He thought I was nuts, but I explained that it was hot in Vietnam, but at McCord AFB (Air Force Base) in Washington it would be cold in February and possibly snowing, so he did it. We got the word to finally load up and board the plane. The tension of the moment was way to much, and difficult to explain. Like, let's get this ___ thing rolling and get the "H" out of here. Well it did, and when those wheels left the ground there were pure shouts of joy from everyone aboard. It was one big feeling of total relief by eneryone. Another thing that made it special, is that we had a lot of guys (wrinkled Class A uniforms too) from the 173rd Airborne who had recently been in a major firefight in a very "hot" LZ (landing zone) at Dak To (sp?) some 10 days prior. I know the huge relief Ted and I were feeling so I imagine that theirs was ten times greater. We were all going home.

We flew to Tokyo where we re-fueled and then we were off once again headed for McCord AFB. Just like every other place I had gotten to while in the Army it was early morning around 0100 (1 AM) when we landed. We went through customs, did put on our field jackets, and were not freezing like the others who had to dig them out from the bottom of their duffle bags. Just like Art Neighbor (1966-1967) described at Oakland Army Base, we were given a hot steak dinner with all the trimmings at McCord. While eating the Army had another crew of soldiers up at that ungodly hour who sewed appropriate insignia patches on our winter green dress uniforms. Finished with paperwork and all, we were driven to SEATAC, the main civilian airport in Seattle, Washington to catch flights home about 3 hours later. At the time it was 0430 hours (4:30 AM) and there was nothing open, so Ted and I just walked around or sat in an airport chair waiting for the ticket office to open. Within the hour, the ticket counter opened, we checked our duffle bags and purchased one way tickets to LAX (Los Angeles) the main civilian airport. Ted and I caught a 0600 hour flight on Western Airlines (one of the many airlines that don't exist any longer), and arrived at LAX. Ted went his way and I went mine. I caught a limo to Pasadena and from there took a cab to my mothers apartment.

My mother was home, and she had a large Welcome Home card taped to the front door that said "JUMP INTO MY ARMS". It's funny how you remember things like that. It's such a unique moment in time and it meant such a great deal to me, tired as I was. To be honest we talked and enjoyed the reunion for about a half an hour when I just couldn't keep my eyes open any longer and went to bed. I was exhausted both physically and mentally. I can't speak for all you other 228th fellows, but if you were like me, you pretty much experienced the same sort of thing. For the record I arrived home on Valentines Day February of 1968.

I had an additional 5 months of active duty to serve before I was discharged from active service in July of 1968. I served at Fort Irwin, California. What a Hole. But, it was only a 150 miles from home, so I guess someone in personnel was doing me a favor by keeping me somewhat close.

Side Note: I was a draftee, probably like most of the enlisted guys who served in the 228th. I wasn't excited about being in the Army, but I wasn't pissed off about it either. I felt it was my duty, just like most other guys whom I've met throughout the years. Looking back now, it was one hell of an adventure. For a guy who grew up in a small southwestern desert town of Tucson Arizona, and being grouped with just about every social class we have in this country, it was one eye opening event of a lifetime. I look back on my two years in the Army, but especially my time in Vietnam with the 228th. Here were a bunch of guys drafted or regular army from every conceivable background one can think of, forming into a unit with a common purpose and building an esprit de corp. As I've said previously, I don't know what each platoon did exactly, but I know we did it well. In my mind  (for the most part) we had good Officers, good NCO's and terrific enlisted, drafted or not. In the 1970's and 80's the civilian company I worked with used to conduct "team" building exercises, and I often thought to myself..."it's because so many of you never served your country or have been in the Military"

Because of my time in the Army, I feel as if I have stood shoulder to shoulder with all others who served in the armed forces of the United States of America. Personally, I am convinced the draft or something like it should be re-instated. It never will be of course, due to constitutional issues and a seemingly endless steam of politicians who know it would (or might) be political suicide.

Final Thoughts:

One last add on to my time in Tay Ninh. Ted Fife and I have discussed this on many occasions. We did not have the same mortar or rocket attacks as prior 228th and later 228th folks had, for two reasons; (1) All the operations (little or large) carried out by the 25th Infantry Division in and around Tay Ninh Base Camp, and (2) We think the VC/NVA were so intent on sneaking into the Saigon area to attack during TET, that they didn't want to draw any additional attention to their infiltration routes.

I also have to state for the record, that at no time did I ever have any negative comments made to me about being in military service. Nor was I ever verbally, physically attacked, spat on, called baby killer, or anything else after I retuned stateside.

Like a number of others who have served in the 228th, I simply went on with my life. Because of what I learned in the Army, I have the military and other good folks I served with, to thank for all the things I learned in Class I. As such, and like a number of you what I learned became a lifetime career....mine being in the Food Services Industry."

Submitted By:

Then SP4 E4 George W. Savore - 2nd Class I Clerk - 228th - February 1967 - February 1968.....21 June 2010

............................................................................................................................................................

I) Class III - Petroleum Oil and Lubricants Platoon

Although the many Class areas of supply and support functions are critical to the operations of a Direct Support Company on many levels, there is one Platoon of individuals whose song generally goes unsung. These personnel are members of the Company who deal in the transport, handling, storage, distribution, transfer, and delivery of all manner of lubricants, oil and in particular "petroleum" (fuel) products. 

As has been shown time and time again throughout modern day history, there are six things the average GI must have to be a viable and operational entity in a combat zone. The first is rations, the second is adequate clothing, the third is munitions (ammunition), the fourth is a form of shelter. The fifth is a from of transport. It is the sixth element that is quite critical, that being various fuel products needed for transportation, mobility, and delivery of goods via vehicles and aircraft.

An individual soldier can go for awhile without adequate rations, water, proper clothing, quarters, showers, paperwork for sure, and a number of other comforts or items, which although unpleasant do not make him ineffective.  A soldier without munitions or fueling products for any length of time in a combat zone renders the mission and the soldiers involved on the cusp of being ineffective. Nearly everything would grind to a halt. Without fuel, there would be no mobility, no travel, no convoys, airlifts, or delivery of all manner of foodstuffs, parts, munitions supplies and the like.

It is the unsung heros of those officers and enlisted who on a daily basis insure, that all motorized craft within the air, on the sea, or on the ground, keep these motorized craft and vehicles moving night and day, through all manner of obstacles and conditions. Without the proper fuel supplies, oil and lubricants a modern day military force grinds to a screeching halt.

Further, these individuals are in a sense placed in a position of double jeopardy. Not only are they subject to the normal hazards of warfare (exclusive of the Infantry) they are also subject to the extreme volatile hazard of dealing with highly flammable and explosive materials in all phases of transport and handling procedures.

Especial hazard was endured by those Heavy Duty Vehicle Drivers and their "shotgun" persons driving single and double tanker vehicles on convoys daily throughout Vietnam. In effect, these personnel were driving rolling stock that could only be considered as traveling time bombs on wheels. One hit from hostile fire, a small spark, a phosphorous bullet, or other could precipitate an explosion of catastrophic proportion(s), as not just one tanker would be affected, but more than likely several if not more. Very dangerous work.

In a reduced strength Direct Support Company consisting of 233 individuals in combat and non-combat conditions, the POL Platoon was allotted  a mere 24 individuals per TO&E 10-107D, dated 19 October 1960. Under the COSTAR DIRECTIVE of 20 July 1966, this number allotted changed (exact number not known) to nearly double, or between 40 to 45 individuals. This number is from memory as Company Clerk of the 228th, and should not be considered more than 85 to 90% accurate.

A Direct Support Company was designed to handle POL products that could provide the needs of 16,000 troops with a fuel storage capacity of all necessary fuels approaching 125,000 gallons (see TO&E coverage in Miscellaneous Data section}. The understrength 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) in the Province of Tay Ninh by late November 1966 forward was handling well over 340,000 to 437,000 gallons (see Miscellaneous Data section} of fuel product {excluding tanker trucks, 50 gallon fuel drums and 500 gallon roll up bladders}. Convoys (including 228th tanker/heavy duty truck drivers) were arriving on a daily basis to the Tay Ninh Base Camp. In addition airlifts of fuel products were also arriving on a consistent basis from Saigon, Long Binh, Cu Chi and other major rearward supply based infrastructures.

The reason all this activity occurred was to support four (4) on going battlefield operations in War Zone C, from the time the 228th arrived in Tay Ninh (7 October 1966) through early March 1967. The operations supported were; Attleboro, Gadsden, Cedar Falls and Junction City, of which there is a good deal of reference data online

A POL Yard per Army Field Manuel 29-3 {Courtesy of 1st Lt. Paul B. walker in 2010}, Department of the Army dated May 1965 states the following regarding the setup and design of a POL entity:

Extracts:

"The effective use of the transportation available for the distribution of the product is the critical area in petroleum supply. For this reason controls over its use must be exercised  at the command level. The objective is not to allocate or delimit quantities of product, but rather to have available information and data on which to base decisions effecting diversions, locations, schedule changes, or other adjustments necessary to satisfy product requirements with {associated} transport capabilities".

"The system at the direct support level is informal. Supported units transmit to the support point forecasts for both bulk and packaged petroleum products. These forecasts are transmitted daily or periodically (2, 3, 4, or 5 days for example) as directed by proper authority. The supply point transmits its forecasts in like manner to the organization specified by the direct support group, or higher authority. Unless specific conditions dictate otherwise, the support brigade HQ are specified organizations to which the forecasts are transmitted."

"Direct support units in the army service area are replenished by shipments from the quartermaster petroleum product battalions in the rear support brigade or area."

"The Class III supply point, like other elements of the supply and service company, should be located as close to supported units as tactical situation, dispersion factors, and other considerations permit. The site should have easy access to transportation nets and signal communications. Important communications and population centers vulnerable to enemy action should be avoided." Note: the 228th Class III supply point was located less than 1/4 mile south of the Company area of quarters. Later, product was located in several (three) different locations, to avoid concentration of product, and allow for continued operation in the event one or more facilities became damaged, inoperable, or incapacitated due to hostile or accidental disaster."

"The site must be large enough to allow for two or more storage areas with balanced stocks in each. Sites must be kept to a minimum to reduce handling, and arranged to avoid offering attractive targets." Note: In Tay Ninh, and by the very nature of the ground terrain (it being flat) everything and every unit of operation was a "prime target". As such, Tay Ninh Base Camp became known throughout Vietnam by the nickname; "Rocket City" due to the consistent ongoing artillery and/or mortar attacks. These attacks were not concentrated on or against any particular unit such as the 228th. But, nearly all assigned and attached units within the Base Camp were either attacked directly, and/or affected by such attacks in one form or another. Luck was with the 228th 1966-967, in that neither POL or munitions pads were ever hit by incoming hostile fire....ABN

Supply Point Operations Class III - POL:

Extracts:

"The Class III supply point(s) performs two functions - storage and distribution - and these two activities must be integrated into one effective operation. The petroleum platoon leader must therefore make certain that the supply point(s) is/are equipped at least with the following:

Note: There was a third function performed by the 228th, not alluded to in the preceding, that being the "Hauling and Delivery" of product not only from rearward storage facilities, but delivery to forward supply areas....although the term "distribution" could be considered as an expanded word to describe this particular function....ABN

(1) A list by quantity of stock to be handled. (2) A list of units to be supported. (3) An overlay of the entire supply point, indicating the location of supply and operational areas. (4) A simple layout of facilities to expedite issues. (5) Forms, records and reports required for inventory purposes. (6) Adequate communications between operating areas and supply point headquarters. (7) An issue schedule for supported units.

"Effective and flexible utilization of equipment is as important as the development of sound operating procedures."

(1) Packaged greases and lubricants should be delivered with fuels. (2) Organic tank trucks and semitrailers may be used for any of several operations, including transfer of product from the supply point to using units, bulk storage at the supply point and convoy refueling. Operating procedures for this equipment must, therefore be adaptable to the demands of the situation. (3) As the supply point may be required to move in support of using units, the section must develop, maintain, and rehearse procedures for drying up and loading collapsible tanks {bladders} at one location and beginning immediate supply operations at another. (4) The standard fuel system assembly includes six (6) 10,000 gallon collapsible (fabric) storage tanks {bladders}.... {Note: The 228th in 1966 -1967 Tay Ninh Base Camp owned and operated fourteen (14) 10,000 gallon bladders with an additional number (exact quantity unknown) of 10,000 gallon bladders (best guess, approximately 8 to 10} in not only Trai Bi, but other forward and mobile supply areas.}...along with trailer mounted pumps, filter separators, and 6-nozzle hose-header systems for direct refueling of vehicles and limited decanting operations. (5) The 500 gallon collapsible drum (bladder) is used primarily for air or ground delivery of bulk fuel and for storage of product {see History section Addendum by then Capt. B.A.Kuster} The standard 21/2 ton cargo vehicle can carry 2 full drums (bladders) plus dispensing equipment, providing a bulk fuel delivery capacity of approximately 1,000 gallons. For short hauls over improved roads 3 full drums and dispensing equipment can be carried. Additionally, the drums (bladders} can be delivered by fixed wing aircraft, sling carried by helicopter, or by airdrop. A primary advantage of the collapsible fuel drum (bladder) over the rigid container is that vehicles can be utilized for handling dry cargo or personnel when not in use for transporting fuel." {Note: The number of 500 gallon fuel bladders owned and operated by the 228th is an unknown. It is known (see miscellaneous data) that in addition to the fourteen (14) 10,000 gallon collapsible fuel bladders operated by the 228th along with an additional 8 to 10 set up elsewhere, there were seven (7) 3,000 gallon collapsible fuel bladders within Tay Ninh Base Camp, with two (2) 100,000 to 150,000 rigid storage tanks, and hundreds of 50 gallon drums of fuel product {MOGAS- AVGAS- JP4} available for use (see photo section 1966-1967 and TO&E data in miscellaneous data section}.

"Stationary filling station service when employed, is normally located on main supply routes for convoy refueling, or where there is a regular demand for unit vehicle refueling by large consumers. This service will use permanent-type fixtures and equipment when available; otherwise collapsible tanks, dispensing units, and hose header systems organic to the section (unit) may be used."

Submitted By:

SP4 A.B.Neighbor from "extracts" of FM 29-3 provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker.......10 July 2010

............................................................................................................................................................

J) Laundry and Bath Platoon:

The Laundry and Bath Platoon was for the most part a misnomer (misnamed). The section should have been named the Laundry and Shower Platoon, as it was (and is) common knowledge, that there was no function dedicated to any type of "Bath" facility in any Direct Support unit of the time era.

A Direct Support Company as with other Direct Support entities is exactly what the name implies. Although true, that Direct Support entities were for the most part rearward from actual combat conditions, there where Direct Support units (such as the 228th) who were located, operating and functioning in the most forward areas at or near combat zones. As such, providing troops in the field as well as the base camp with Laundry and Hot Shower facilities in a forward area of military operations was another prime function engaged in by the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support).

The following are extracts of material per FM 29-3, dated 1965 Department of Army (provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker) related to the working function and setup of a direct support company whether rearward or forward.

Extracts:

General:

"The primary laundry mission is to provide weekly bulk laundry service for supported units. Support of bath (shower) points by provision of clean clothing for exchange and reclamation laundry service in support of maintenance activities performed by direct support maintenance units are also platoon missions. The flow of work in the laundry sections should be on a bulk basis."

"Operating locations are selected in conformity with considerations applicable to military operating sites generally. Specific sites for section operations are governed primarily by the service of water, the source of the items to be laundered, and the location of the facilities from which laundry is to be received. The laundry sections may operate separately when administration, mess, and operating supplies are provided. Each section operates on two 10-hour shifts."

Equipment:

"Each laundry section is provided with either single trailer-mounted laundry units or two washer-extractor trailers and three dryer-generator trailers. The washer-extractor trailer includes a washer pump and a water heater."

Paraphrased: "Transportation required to pickup and return laundry to supported units shall be employed where practicable. Shower points (hot) shall also be provided by the laundry section where practicable, with the use of the same transport utilized in laundry operations."

The 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) as of early October 1966 owned and operated one (1) Hot Shower point adjacent to the Tay Ninh Airstrip in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, it's associated and assigned subordinate units, as well as other entities including special forces, elements of the 25th Infantry Division, 45th Field Hospital, 45th Medical Evacuation, and all other Tay Ninh Base Camp units, including the 228th itself. In addition, the 228th Laundry and Bath Platoon as of 7 July 1966 (then Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion) had been immediately assigned as an "attached" unit to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion of the 25th Infantry Division stationed in Cu Chi.

On 20 July 1966 Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) was inactivated. On the same date the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) was activated. As such, the personnel formerly of Company B, 266th were now assigned to the 228th S&S Co (DS) and remained in TDY (temporary duty) capacity with the 25th S&T Battalion in Cu Chi. In Cu Chi, the Platoon supported the 25th ID Field Hospital, by providing Laundry services for the consistent and constant flow of hospital clothing and material (bedsheets, pillow cases, etc!) soiled by usage and/or resulting from blood soaked materials from operating procedures and other. This section and Platoon remained in Cu Chi with the 25th ID from early July 1966 until rotation in mid May through June 1967. However, it should be noted, that personnel were rotated between Cu Chi to Tay Ninh, Trai Bi, Quon Loi and other forward and Base Camp areas, to set up, run and operate varied laundry and or hot and cold shower points for troops in the field of battle, or otherwise.

Being limited in both personnel and equipment (the Laundry and Bath Platoon of the 228th also operating at understrength capacity), a good deal of improvising took place, in order that troops in various locations had the ability to obtain clean clothing and/or shower points.

The Table of Organization of a "reduced strength" direct support company of 233 in non-combat and combat conditions was designed to support 16,000 personnel. The 228th, being an understrength company was supporting an average of 28,000 troops and more in four (4) different known locations through four (4) battlefield operations.

As such, the Laundry and Bath Platoon was stretched thin, but able to accomplish its mission(s). The Platoon was authorized (at reduced strength - see TO&E section in Miscellaneous Data) a total of 57 personnel. The L&B Platoon of the 228th 1966-1967 had a unit personnel strength of twenty two  (22) stationed in Cu Chi, with another five (5) in Tay Ninh. Still others were stationed in Quon Loi or Trai Bi, which varied in number from one (1) to six (6) personnel, but were drawn from the the total number physically assigned the Platoon as a whole.... twenty seven (27) out of an authorized fifty seven (57). The reason this occurred, is that of the 57 allocated and assigned on arrival in RVN and subsequently Long Binh, approximately 30 L&B personnel had been reassigned to other units within and outside of Long Binh. Thus, and within the first week of July 1966 the Platoon sent TDY to Cu Chi was understrength to begin with.

Of interest regarding the above are two issues of many regarding the seemingly ineffective role of our superior command {266th S&S BN (DS)} to supply adequate numbers of personnel to not only the various other Platoons of the 228th, but the L&B Platoon itself.

Example 1:

Per table of organization a "reduced" strength company of 233 was allocated 57 personnel to its Laundry section and Bath section of the Platoon. In this allocation, there would be one (1) Officer in Charge (OIC) a Lt. and two (2) section chiefs with a rank of SFC E6. The OIC was responsible for both the Laundry and Bath (shower) functions. The Laundry section was overseen by an NCOIC (non commissioned officer) with the rank of Sergeant First Class, as was the Bath (shower) section. The understrength 228th had one (1) OIC, with the next highest rank for both sections (Laundry and Bath) an NCOIC holding the rank of Buck Sergeant E5....that's it. As such the responsibilities belonging to two (2) SFC E6 and five (5) SP 5 E5 personnel were being carried out by Specialist E4's in three of the four locations of L&B activity from early July 1966 through rotation prior to 1 June 1967.

Example 2:

In late December 1966, HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) stationed rearward some 50 to 60 miles in Long Binh, issued orders re-assigning the twenty two (22) personnel TDY from the 228th to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion in Cu Chi handling Laundry operations for the 25th ID Field Hospital....to TDY "attached" from 25th S&T BN located in Cu Chi, to "attached" TDY from the 25th S&T to "attached" to the 61st Maintenance Company... at the time being formed and located in Long Binh. In addition other personnel of the L&B Platoon physically in Tay Ninh and/or elsewhere, where also re-assigned as attached to the 61st Maintenance.

OK, the 228th Roster was changed to reflect said orders. At the same time a 3 page Morning Report was generated to reflect the change of status. In effect, the L&B Platoon of the 228th supporting the 25th ID in Cu Chi, and three other locations during ongoing battlefield conditions was being withdrawn from all four areas, recalled rearward some 50 miles...leaving Tay Ninh Base Camp, Quon Loi, Trai Bi and Cu Chi without Laundry and Bath personnel, equipment or facilities...the 228th being the only outfit physically operating in the areas mentioned.

So what happens? Besides all the inordinate paperwork generated at the Battalion level, Company level, 25th S&T BN level, and other locations to cover these new orders, some 5 days later the orders are revoked by the 266th. This action in turn generates ever more paperwork, as all entities who had removed said personnel from their rosters ,records and Morning Reports, now had to pick them all back up and account for each and every person, as not all personnel (several) had their orders revoked.

Example 3:

Since superior entities never saw fit to provide a full compliment of authorized personnel for nearly a year, it should also be mentioned that the 228th was also short of equipment. Since the bulk of equipment for Laundry was being used full time in Cu Chi, there was no laundry equipment available to satisfy the needs of Tay Ninh Base Camp, let alone outlying areas. As such, laundry operations outside of Cu Chi were contracted out to the local Vietnamese population. This in turn generated additional problems. Laundry going out was clearly marked with the name and unit of the individual. It did not return that way. For the most part, a portion or none of a persons clothing would return. If it did, up to one half belonged to someone else...whom, one never knew, unless their name was stenciled on the particular laundry bag. As a personal aside, I lost three loads of laundry in this manner. The laundry I did get back, although folded, ironed and seemingly cleaned, smelled as if it had been washed in something beyond dog leavings....to be charitable most of us figured everyones laundry was being washed over and over in some large pond, that also served as a cesspool for the locals. As such, and being enterprising, a good deal of 228th personnel requested family and friends to send laundry detergent such as Tide, and we simply performed our own laundry functions individually. At a minimum, our clothing smelled decent. At worst, it was un-ironed....but such a matter was unimportant to the average GI, its officers and enlisted. 

Note 1:  For those who are not inclined to read TO&E data in Miscellaneous Data section, the following is offered regarding Laundry and Bath Platoon. Per TO&E 10-107D dated 19 October 1960, a "Full" strength direct support company under combat conditions was allocated a total of seventy three (73) personnel for L&B operations. One OIC (Lt.), (4) section chiefs, and (69) enlisted below the rank of a three striped Buck Sergeant. At some point in time and prior to August of 1965 this allocation must have been tweaked by the Department of Defense and/or Army. Thus, the (73) personnel authorized under combat conditions was changed to (56) personnel under combat or non-combat conditions. This number seems to have remained stable after the COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966. However, it should be noted, that the 228th from inception to time of rotation was never at "fully" authorized unit strength in any area, section or Platoon of operation. As such, the L&B Platoon was performing their operations in more than four different locations with a mere (27) at some points (30) personnel. In other words (and the same applies to all sections and Platoons of the 228th), the unit was operating and performing its mission at between 55% to 80% of its authorized unit strength.

Note 2: The Laundry and Bath personnel of the 228th rotated (for the most part) back and fourth between Cu Chi and Tay Ninh. An irony that befell some of these personnel was the fact, that the 25th ID, its assigned and attached units were awarded an MUC on or about March of 1967. As such, those personnel of the 228th attached to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion (an assigned unit of the 25th ID) in Cu Chi were awarded the same MUC physically, while those on rotation and back in Tay Ninh were not. This was an irritant to those personnel who had been in Cu Chi and rightly so. However, and for clarifications sake, it can be clearly stated, that all L&B personnel of the 228th who had been assigned TDY and attached to the 25th S&T BN at anytime during the time period of award to the 25th ID would be entitled to such award. This is so, as the time period covered is August 1966 through February 1967. The same holds true for the 228th Bakery section which had been attached to the 25th ID from 7 July 1966 through late June of 1967. General Orders # 38, Department of the Army, dated 20 July 1970 is a listing of "confirmed" MUC award as amended. In said orders personnel of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS)...Laundry and Bath Section and Bakery Section are acknowledged. The orders are signed by General Westmoreland. Therefore, all L&B personnel who served in Cu Chi between August 1966 through February 1967 would be entitled to this MUC, in addition to the MUC awarded the 228th as a whole, for time period 1 October 1966 through 3 July 1967.

Note 3: Technically, the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) had no allocated slots for Corporal in either Class I, Class II & IV, Graves Registration, Bakery or Laundry and Bath Platoons. All ranks were "Specialist" E4, PFC, PVT E2 and PVT E1. This proved to be a difficulty for the 228th in three areas. The difficulty arose from Specialists having to deal with Infantry folks who did wear the rank of Corporal E4, as a Corporal technically outranked a Specialist E4. To solve this problem in three areas, the 228th issued orders whereby the NCOIC of L&B operations in Cu Chi was made an "Acting Corporal" thus obviating the dilemma encountered when dealing with Infantry. The same was accomplished in the Graves Registration Platoon, as was the Company Supply Clerk both in Tay Ninh. All three had to deal with personnel from the Infantry on a daily basis. As a "Specialist" all three were not given the respect and credit due their positions. If department of the Army ever reads this, or makes use of this Website, it is hoped that the problems encountered by the 228th in these areas shall be considered, i.e.; any Specialist in a position of authority (Company Clerk, Supply Clerk, Class I, Class II & IV, Class III, Graves Registration, Laundry and Bath, Bakery or other should be wearing "stripes" rather than "Specialist" insignia in rank....in particular if they are a Direct Support entity in a forward or rearward area of a combat zone, and working daily with Infantry units in particular.

Submitted By:

SP4 A.B. Neighbor based on personal experience and Field Manuel Data supplied by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker........10 July 2010

Note

Further data (additions, corrections, elucidations, illuminations) regarding L&B Platoon and its varied activity pending receipt by OIC of the time period (1966 - 1967).....1st Lt. William I. Eckhart.......a work in progress

 

 

ADDENDUM - Laundry and Bath Platoon - 1st Lt. William I. Eckhart

 

 

"As OIC of Laundry and Bath Platoon; Fort Lewis Washington, Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support), later 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) in Republic of Vietnam; Long Binh; first week of July 1966, one can imagine my surprise when I was directed by our superior Headquarters (266th) that I and my entire Platoon along with Company B Bakery Section were to pack up our goods and all equipment for TDY (Temporary Duty) with the 25th Infantry Division then stationed in Cu Chi some 30 miles northwest.

 

Following orders and having only been in country for approximately 8 days approximately 50 individuals comprised of L&B Platoon and Bakery section joined in convoy to Cu Chi arriving around mid afternoon. The Laundry and Bath Platoon were to be stationed and quartered with the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, while the Bakery Section, having no OIC (Officer in Charge) were directed elsewhere to join and be a part of 25th ID. I hate to state it, but I had no idea where the Bakers ended up or were quartered, as they were not a part of my Platoon nor my responsibility once we had arrived in Cu Chi.

 

I won't go over old ground by repeating the overview preceding this Addendum as written by our reliable Company Clerk. Instead I would offer the following regarding several particulars that might be of interest to the reader.

 

First: On arrival at Cu Chi we were assigned our quarters by 25th S&T BN, moved our belongings into standard Field Tents, and after dinner were simply sitting around and adjusting to the very sudden changes, when our very first greeting of the evening was a full bore mortar attack. Not bad in and of itself, but our quarters were adjacent and across the road from the POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) yard, and worse still, adjacent to the many very full fuel bladders. To add to the surprise, we found we had no bunkers for shelter, or anyplace to shield ourselves from the attack.

 

The one lone bunker that did exist was a heavily sand-bagged communications point which could only hold three to four persons maximum. It would be impossible to explain the utter dumbfounded thoughts going through my mind as well as my Platoon as this attack ensued. Since no one had briefed me or a single one of us about mortar attacks and where to go in the event one occurred, we had little choice but to simply watch and hear it as it happened before our very eyes.

 

In effect it was a poor fireworks display. Whatever rounds the bad guys were using were of poor quality and/or light weight mortars, as the explosions were not very spectacular. Although not funny, it still was, in that several of the mortar rounds must have been duds, or so lightweight, that when they did hit the fuel bladders they just bounced off them, somewhat akin to bouncing a tennis ball on a paved street. I suppose they were "duds" as even after bouncing off the bladders they didn't explode. As a result, neither I nor a single member of my Platoon was injured during this fairly brief attack of about tenminutes duration.

 

Second: The 25th Supply and Transport Battalion we were attached to were a very decent Battalion of Officers and Enlisted, almost like night and day when compared to what I (we) had been used to for nearly a year at Fort Lewis. I cannot remember his name, but the Battalion Commander was a Lt. Col and a somewhat crusty older man who was quite fair and hardly bothered us about anything. He was promoted to full Col. on or about Christmas 1966 and a party of congratulations was thrown to celebrate the event.

 

And rightly so. The man had a  sense of humor, and to be quite honest he definitely was not what one expected to find in an Infantry Supply and Transport command. He wasn't "CS" about anything and pretty much followed the Battalion motto of… 'DO IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME'. A group of us liking the motto had a sign painted up which we hung over the Officers Latrine (see photo gallery 1966-1967). The Col. must have been amused by it, as he never asked or ordered that it be taken down.

 

But, I get ahead of myself in terms of months of elapsed time. As stated, we went to Cu Chi the first week of July as Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) as did the Bakery Section of Company B. Some 3 weeks later, Company B no longer existed, as it had been 'inactivated', the bulk of remaining personnel being transferred into the newly activated 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support). I guess this is as good a time as any to state, that technically my Platoon should have had 54 to 57 personnel per Table of Organization under non combat conditions, whereas I only had approximately 30 in combat conditions. The reason for this situation is due to our higher headquarters seemingly picking off personnel from Company B….later the 228th in order to make whole other units stationed in Long Binh, while leaving the 228th in an understrength position. One would think, that if a Platoon were to be sent TDY to a more forward base unit of operations, the Platoon would be at full strength rather than close to half strength. Worse still, I had no senior NCOIC's (Non Commissioned Officers in Charge) above the rank of SGT E5 of which, I had but one, where I should have had three. As such,, and I say this with all the upmost respect and admiration, I had several SP4 E4 personnel (draftees) who stepped up to the plate with ease and handled operations normally associated with a person of higher rank and a good deal of longer time in service. As an aside, a Direct Support Supply and Service Company Table of Organization did not allow for SP4 E4 to wear 'Stripes' in that pay grade, whereas in the Infantry the same PMOS would. This instantly created a problem for my most trusted and competent SP4 E4's in relations between the Infantry and our unit. Solution: Without written orders or otherwise, I verbally authorized two of my SP4 E4's  to wear Corporal Stripes instead of Specialist insignia. Problem solved.

 

We settled into an everyday routine. Our job function was not particularly one of glory on the battlefield. Instead,we had the dubious honor of cleaning bloody sheets, bedding, scrubs, etc! of the 25th ID Medical facility on a daily basis. Technically we also had the charge of providing laundry services, and hot shower facilities designed to support up to 16,000 troops. Being at nearly half strength under combat conditions, it was all we could do, to keep up with providing laundry services to the 25th ID Medical facility. Therefore, all laundry services beyond what we were performing, were contracted out by the various units of the 25th ID, while shower facilities were also left to individual units within Cu Chi Base Camp. We were swamped as it was.

 

Everything went fine until September of 1966, when I received orders from 266th HQ that our Platoon was going to be transferred TDY in Cu Chi to TDY with a new outfit being formed in Long Binh called the 61st Maintenance. As we began preparing for this move back to Long Binh, and were nearly ready to leave, new orders arrived some 4 days later revoking the original orders. Without seeming negative, this was perfect example of our Battalion Headquarters in action relative to one of its most forward subordinate units; the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) and the 228th's other assigned and attached personnel of varied Platoons TDY in numerous locations.

 

In October of 1966 the 228th (still at or near a 50 to 55% unit strength in Long Binh) was ordered to Tay Ninh Province of War Zone C, III Corps near the Cambodian border to support the Base Camp of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and other units in the area such as Special Forces. This is discussed in other parts of History section, so I won't go into major detail.

 

I do want to discuss how this move affected and effected my Platoon in Cu Chi. Remembering I only had 30 personnel when I should have had 54 to 57, I now received orders to send one half of my Platoon to Tay Ninh (15 personnel)  to set up a Hot Shower Point for the 196th and other units near the airstrip of Tay Ninh. In addition, we were expected to support the 45th Field Surgical Hospital (Mobile) that had arrived in Tay Ninh within days of the 228th.

 

To make a long story short, we were able to set up, operate and run a Hot Shower point. We attempted service to the 45th Surgical, but were overwhelmed as we neither had the personnel or equipment to handle such matters…our equipment tied up and operating 24/7 in Cu Chi. Thus, all laundry services were soon cut short and contracted out to the locals of Tay Ninh City.

 

I should also note, that our equipment was not modern in any sense of the word. What we had was post World War II equipment which was constantly breaking down with parts failure. Fix one part and another would fail. Fortunately, I had a cadre (mostly draftees) who were dedicated, adept, and without complaint managed to quickly locate parts and or other (jury rig at times) our limited equipment and keep it running.

 

At this same time period Operation Attleboro had begun (Phase II) in Tay Ninh, whereby something on the order of 23,000 plus combat troops were in the field of battle in and about Tay Ninh Base Camp. I honestly do not know how the main Company of the  228th managed to support these troops in the field along with the entire base camp of Tay Ninh with a mere 116 personnel….but they did it.

 

In effect the 228th  designed to support 16,000 at full strength was doing the work of a Battalion (or larger)... Amazing! 

 

With reference to Cu Chi, I rotated my Platoon between Tay Ninh and Cu Chi…at least those that were assigned to the 228th, which brings me to another anomaly I experienced with both our HQ of the 266th and the 25th ID.

 

For whatever reason(s) the 266th found it convenient to send me a number of ne’er do wells for rehabilitation (I guess) in a manner or form, that was not quite on the books. They were not assigned or attached to the 228th. They just showed up and were there. The 25th ID did the same thing. In effect, I seemed to become a dumping ground for troops who were a problem within other units. I found early on, that it was useless to try and integrate these personnel into my core Platoon. They were the type who were not interested in doing much of anything, and had little concern about the overall mission at hand.

 

The long and the short of it, was that I did not come to the point where an Article 15 proceeding was necessary. The one time I would've done so with one of these troopers. related to a felow who had disappeared and taken off from Cu Chi and gone 'missing' or AWOL. Since I had no clue as to what outfit he belonged to, I notified our Battalion 266th HQ, dumping the matter back into their laps. Some months later I learned that this individual had been found in the Bien Hoa/Long Binh area wearing civilian clothes, riding a motor scooter with his Vietnamese girlfriend. I do not know what became of him.

 

 

Note: Under Army Regulations and Uniform Code of Military Justice the particular person would have been carried as AWOL (Absent without leave) on the Morning Report of unit assigned to. AWOL status would within (cannot remember exactly) 3 to 5 days changed to Desertion. At a minimum an Article 15, fine, reduction in rank, and possible extra (not fun) duty would have been imposed. It would be my suspicion, that Desertion in a War Zone would warrant a Court Martial proceeding, all of the Article 15 procedures imposed, possible confinement for an extended period of time followed by likely separation from service with a Dishonorable Discharge. The severest penalty could be life at hard labor, and possible death penalty depending on severity and number of charges brought and found guilty of by the Court….ABN

 

With the arrival in Tay Ninh of some 500 attached 'all purpose' troops to the 228th through December 1966 a short time after the conclusion of Operation Attleboro Phase II, a large weight was lifted from the Company and its ongoing support activity through 3 more major battlefield operations from late December 1966 through March 1967.

 

As stated our main Platoon operations were not concerned with much in the way of uniforms and various unit laundry. Nor were we involved with 'Decontamination' processes due to biological or chemical attack which our Table of Organization called for. Had we been faced with chemical and biological warfare, the Platoon was ill equipped, understaffed, and would have been unable to deal with such matters at all.

 

For the most part our concentration focused on servicing and supporting Field Hospitals, in particular Cu Chi and 25th ID. We tried to support the 45th Surgical Field Hospital in Tay Ninh, but again we were so understaffed, ill equipped, and unable to handle the immense workloads required at two locations let alone one.

 

Our secondary mission of providing Shower Points was more successful, although still difficult.

 

As stated previously we did have a Hot Shower point set up and operating in Tay Ninh. Secondary cold shower points were operating and set up by the 228th in Quan Loi, Trai Bai, and other locations occupied by the either the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and/or other elements of the 25th ID at French Fort and so forth.

 

I suppose the best way to state it, is that the personnel of the Laundry and Bath Platoon…all 30 of them, performed magnificently under most trying circumstances, especially in a number of Forward battlefield operational sites which varied on a week by week basis for over 5 months. Improvising became a normal mode of operation. We would use fuel bladders, metal pod tanks, or anything that could hold a good amount of water to erect and supply cold shower points. Additional help from the nearly 500 attached all purpose troopers to the 228th during these months were an invaluable aid in accomplishing these matters. We only had equipment to operate one (1) Hot shower point, and that was set up and operating in Tay Ninh near the airstrip. Requests for additional equipment and personnel from higher headquarters went unanswered or were ignored. For a time I thought it was just my requests that were being ignored. In reading the History of the unit, it is clear that rearward higher headquarters reacted the same way towards other needs of the 228th and its various Platoons and Sections.

 

In March of 1967 the 25th ID was awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation. As such, the 228th L&B Platoon attached to the 25th S&T Battalion were also awarded the citation. At the time, there was a good deal of excitement and MUC ribbons were being handed out throughout all of Cu Chi Base Camp. There was an article on the event written in The Army Times Newsletter as well. I didn't know it at the time, but our Bakery Section of Company B who had convoyed to Cu Chi back in July were also awarded an MUC and the orders clearly state they were 'Bakery Section' of 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) as verified by Army General Orders #38 amended and dated 1970 as confirmed (see Awards section on Homepage). This MUC award appears on my individual DD214

 

During Junction City I was ordered back to Tay Ninh where I participated in various capacities of OIC and/or other 228th functions necessary to accomplishing the missions at hand. On occasion I would visit Cu Chi, or Quan Loi to insure L&B operations were functioning well. In effect, they were and each one was being handled by my gifted enlisted SGT E5 and Corporals in charge. I was a two year Officer and the bulk of my crew (Platoon) were 2 year Draftees. To this day I find it amazing to think of how much these men accomplished without complaint. They pulled Guard Duty right alongside their 25th ID counterparts. They pulled KP, rode shotgun on convoys, transported equipment, set up shower points in numerous locations, and were simply put, magnificent individuals.

 

As another aside, I also wish to discuss a few other matters that are out of sequence, but interesting. Quan Loi featured a beautiful club for the French rubber plantation owners owned by the French Terre Rouge Corporation. Adjacent to the beautifully manicured grounds and club building there was a beautiful if not spectacular swimming pool (see miscellaneous photos 1966-1967). In review of later photographs on other Websites, I noted that on or about late 1967, possibly in 1968 or in early 1969 that the pool had been drained and was 'off limits' to the troops. In late 1969 it seems apparent that the Commanding General of the 1st ID ordered that the pool be refilled and opened for use by the troops. So once again there was a beautiful small oasis in the midst of an ongoing War.

 

Also, Bob Hope came to Cu Chi on Christmas of 1966. With him were a bevy of beauties including Chris Noel whom I believe was a Playboy Playmate. Phyllis Diller was there also. Everyone agreed that it was the best and most welcomed show they had seen. Bob Hope was a great Patriot for all the years that he gave of his time to entertain and bring a little taste of home to the troops.

 

There is a good deal more I'd like to state, but for the most part anything more I have to say has been said by others in this Website in one form or another. After the conclusion of Operation Junction City and with April and May of 1967 approaching, there was a brief two to three months of respite in Tay Ninh Base Camp. There were approximately 110 of us in the 228th who had started the journey in Fort Lewis as Company B, 266th and had remained together for nearly a year in Vietnam. Art Neighbor reminded me, that of all the Officers beginning at Fort Lewis, I was the only Officer who had not been shuffled around and reassigned to and from different units and/or Companies or Battalion. In other words, I like a 109 others had remained together (assigned with the same personnel and 2 companies) from start to finish for nearly two years.

 

I'm not sure how I managed the feat. Art and I joke about the matter every so often. He claims I stole one of his Company Clerk methods of subterfuge by simply walking about with a clipboard and pad of paper looking like I was actually doing something important. He might be right, as I did indeed pick up on and noticed a few of his methods, and I can state for the record it worked quite well.

 

On or about early to mid April 1967, I with my Platoon were ordered back to Tay Ninh from Cu Chi. We loaded up all our equipment, and left Cu Chi by convoy. I do not know what unit or who replaced our Laundry operations in Cu Chi. Beginning on or about mid May 1967 (as best I recall) the approximate 110 troopers who had started the adventure as Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battlion (DS) in Fort Lewis, began rotating out of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS).

 

I rotated and separated from service near the end of May 1967

 

 

Last:

 

 

I align myself fully with the commentary by our first Commanding Officer; then Capt. Bernard A. Kuster as well as other statements on this Website posted by my fellow Officers about the quality and dedication of all those troopers assigned and attached to the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) 1966-1967."

 

 

Submitted By:

 

 

Then 1st Lt. William I. Eckhart - Laundry and Bath OIC - Fort Lewis, Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) 1965-1966; 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) RVN 1966-1967……............15 January 2011

 

......................................................................................................................................................

K) General Supply Platoon - Bien Hoa AFB and Class I - Tay Ninh

Submitted by SP4 A.B.Neighbor as remembered.

The General Supply Platoon consisted of a Supply Platoon Headquarters and Supply Section. Combined and at "full strength", the platoon would be composed of 52 individuals led by 2 OIC, 2 NCOIC, and 46 enlisted of E5 to E1. On arrival in RVN the platoon remained for the most part intact, but operating under a "reduced strength" TO&E, which allowed for 1 OIC (Officer in Charge), 2 (Non Commissioned Officers) and 33 enlisted of E5 to E1, for a total of 36 individuals.

Upon arrival in Long Binh RVN approximately 11 enlisted personnel were transferred to either the 506th or 624th Quartermaster Companies (DS). By 20 July 1966 and under the COSTAR directive the Supply Platoon, its 1 OIC and no NCOIC along with the 24 enlisted remaining (total of 25) were assigned TDY to Bien Hoa Air Force Base. Two Field Tents were set up adjacent to the eastern side of the main runway from the entry gate and within 50 feet of the F105 jet maintenance area for the testing and repair of F105 jet engines.

Day and night the roar of jet engines either being tested and/or lifting off were in constant evidence, so much so, that the two field tents would shake and the sound generated was nearly deafening. A good number of the troops of the 228th borrowed ear plugs from Air Force personnel while a few did not. The OIC; 1st Lt. Ralph R. Meshon remained quartered in Long Binh as did (for the most part) his assistant SP4 Dawson M. Gamble. Each morning the two would drive to Bien Hoa and each evening return.

At Bien Hoa, the Platoon was charged with checking off manifest records of all air lifted supplies destined for Long Binh and its various supply points. The platoon after signing off on cargo would then load product onto waiting trucks driven and supplied by personnel of the 506th and 624th Supply and Service Companies (DS) who would deliver same to various supply points operating within Long Binh. 

The cargo planes consisted of both Army and Air Force entities. For the most part C123, C130, and Air Force C5 transport planes were the type arriving with supply product. Some flights were short range from Ton San Nhut in Saigon, while others were arriving from Guam, Hawaii, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia and other longer range Army and Air Force supply and re-fueling points.

A good deal of product was concerned with perishable and non perishable food product destined for Class I supply point in Long Binh, for re-distribution to forward supply points, and/or units stationed in and about the Long Binh area. The drive to Long Binh from Bien Hoa was no longer than approximately 20 minutes. In between Long Binh and Bien Hoa AFB was an off-limits town called Tan Hiep. Tan Hiep for the most part was home to a good number of ARVN soldiers and their families. The area was considered to be "off-limits" for several reasons. First it was unsecured by US Army forces. Second, there had been hostile attacks originating from the area (so we were told). Third, at the time there was a high incidence of STDs' (supposedly) among the populace, and Fourth, personnel were told that a number of deaths had occurred to personnel who had not heeded the "off-limits" warnings. Note: The writer can neither confirm or deny the preceding, and is simply relaying what what we were told by higher authority within the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS).

The enlisted remained quartered at Bien Hoa AFB in field tents until 5 October 1966, at which time all but 5 of the 24 returned to Long Binh in preparation for move to Tay Ninh which took place 7 October 1966 by convoy. The remaining 5 personnel arrived in Tay Ninh by separate convoy on 10 October 1966.

In Tay Ninh these same personnel were charged with helping set up the Company Field Tents and equipment during off duty hours. During duty hours (generally from 0600 - 1800 hours or longer) these personnel were engaged in setting up (with the help of 175th Engineers of 196th Light Infantry Brigade) a Class I supply point, and recieving air lift and convoy product arriving daily in support of Operation Attleboro. As such, this understrength platoon was handling ration product exceeding that of a normal Battalion. At full strength (56 individuals) the platoon was designed to support 16,000 troops under combat conditions. At reduced strength (45) the platoon was designed to support 16,000 troops under "non-combat" conditions.

In addition to Class I (or as part of same) the 228th General Supply Platoon had several assigned Chemical Specialists. Their job function was to treat non-potable water, such that same became potable. Treatment occurred by testing water, treating same of various units water tankers (usually 2 per Company) until potable before release....(see photo gallery for typical potable water tanks near Company Mess Hall).

In fact, this platoon of (26) was supporting nearly 18,000 to 28,000 troops under "combat" conditions, and did so through four battlefield operations; Attleboro I and II, Gadsden, Cedar Falls and Junction City. Note: The Class I supply point (see photo section "a" of early Tay Ninh) was one of the most critical alongside POL (Class III) and other Classes of supply within a Direct Support supply and service unit. "An Army without food does not last long". Note: The number of Class I personnel increased at every opportunity provided by allotment of assigned personnel by the 266th Battalion in Long Binh, which was quite slow in responding to the immediate and critical needs of personnel in all sections of the 228th. By December of 1966 and up through the beginning of February 1967, the Class I Platoon operated at a level of between 50% to 75% of authorized unit "reduced" strength....such that, by 1 February 1967 the 228th Class I Platoon was operating with 1 OIC,  1 NCO, and 32 enlisted, for a total of 34 personnel....short some 15 personnel (total of 45 authorized) for a "reduced strength" company under "non- combat" conditions.

The reader is invited to view Photo Section "a", Miscellaneous Data section discussing TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) as well as a short descriptive regarding "After Action Report #54" by 25th ID in "Anomaly #6" following descriptive of Battalion Organization for Supply and Service Support.

In short, the General Supply Platoon, as with all other sections and platoons of the 228th in Tay Ninh performed well beyond their intended design purpose.

Submitted by:

SP4 A.B. Neighbor 1 August 2010 based on personal experience and eye witness to events described (Long Binh and Tay Ninh, RVN)

Addendum:

 

L) Bakery Section:

The Bakery Section is a somewhat confusing situation regarding the 228th. As Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) in Fort Lewis and on arrival in RVN, the Bakery section at reduced strength TO&E consisted of 20 personnel assigned to the Bakery Section. There was one section Chief (SFC E-6), 8 Bakers, 4 Bakers helpers, 1 Bakery Equipment Mechanic, a Mixer operator, Oven operator, a quartermaster supply specialist, and 1 each Heavy and Light Duty Truck Driver.

On 20 July 1966 under COSTAR directive, inactivation of Company B and activation of the 228th, the entire Bakery Section (excluding two Bakers) was not allocated to a Direct Support Company. Instead, the Bakery Section was allocated to (as best that can recalled) to Battalion HHC of the 266th. The same event occurred with the 506th and 624th when they were reconstituted as Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) entities.

Both the 506th and 624th Bakery Sections were assigned to the 569th Provisional under the oversight of the 266th S&S Bn (DS) in Long Binh, thus allowing the 266th the capability of providing a minimum of 16,000 pounds of fresh bread daily and support a minimum of 32,000 troops based on a ration of 1/2 loaf of bread per day.

The complication arises regarding the 228th is as follows: Upon arrival in Long Binh on or about 1 July 1966 and within the week, the entire Bakery Platoon (excluding two bakers) were assigned TDY from Company B, 266th to the 25th ID in Cu Chi.

As stated on 20 July 1966 under COSTAR directive, Company B was "inactivated", and with the activation of the 228th, the Company no longer had a Bakery section. The two Bakers assigned to the 228th were TDY with the 266th and remained so for his entire tour of duty. When the 228th was re-assigned to Tay Ninh Province on 4 October 1966 (arriving 7 October 1966), the two Bakers assigned, remained TDY with the 266th as far as the 228th was concerned. However, soon after the Mortar attack of 4 November 1966 SP4 E4 Terry R. Shipp was sent to Tay Ninh for a period of three to four weeks, while the other assigned Baker TDY with 266th (PFC Douglas S. Kenyon) was stationed TDY in Cu Chi instead of with the 266th in Long Binh.

This was not discovered until the year 2010 via contact with Terry R. Shipp, orders and pay vouchers in his possession etc! which compared to other orders generated by the 266th per then 1st Lt. William Eckhart showed that HHC 266th never bothered to notify the 228th in Tay Ninh of such transfers.

The problem being, that for the entire tour of duty both Shipp and Kenyon were carried as "assigned to the 228th, TDY with 266th" when in fact and without orders received by the 228th, both had been transferred and assigned to HHC 266th in September 1966.

So where is the glitch? Per Department of Army General Orders #38 (amended in 1968) a confirmed MUC was awarded the "228th Supply and Service Company - Laundry and Bath Section" and the "228th Supply and Service Bakery Section" for time period July 1966 - March 1967 while both were TDY with the 25th ID in Cu Chi.

As the former Company Clerk of the 228th during the time period, I cannot explain this matter. The Laundry and Bath Section is clearly explainable, as they were indeed assigned to the 228th and TDY on a rotational basis from the 228th to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion of the 25th ID, performing Laundry service for the 25th Medical Hospital.

So how is it, that per "confirmed" MUC awards generated in 1970 by Department of the Army and signed by General Westmoreland acknowledges the 228th as having a Bakery Section TDY in Cu Chi ? This writer honestly does not know. From a speculative standpoint, the only viable explanation that seems to hold water, consists of the following:

My words only...corrections welcomed. It is my thought, that in some manner and in someway HHC 266th either didn't post or change the status of the Bakery Section personnel on 20 July 1966 under COSTAR directive by either their own generated orders or last Morning Report submitted by Company B when inactivated, or new Morning Report submitted by the 228th 20 July forward. It's the only possible answer.

This speculation can be somewhat bolstered by the fact, that at one point in time Orders were generated by the 266th to the 228th re-assigning all Laundry and Bath personnel TDY in Cu Chi, as re-assigned to 61st Maintenance being formed in Long Binh in late 1966. Three days later the orders were revoked.

Of interest is that within those same orders generated by the 266th are a number of Bakers of former Company B, as well as the two Bakers assigned the 228th and TDY to the 266th. All are shown as assigned to the 266th at the time, when clearly that was not the case, by either Morning Report, Rosters, Orders or otherwise regarding at least two of the Bakers. Without seeming to be negative, the 228th on a constant basis performed battle with the 266th regarding personnel matters regarding whom was assigned to whom and where by conflicting orders generated by the 266th. It was if the 266th hadn't a clue as to whom was assigned to whom. It was also a clear indication, that the 266th did not follow through on their own generated orders or keep up with Morning Reports of the 228th, which simply reflected orders received from the 266th.

I have checked with Officers of the 228th who acted in the capacity of Payroll Officer to see if they remember paying any personnel beyond the 228th Laundry and Bath Section in Cu Chi. All responded in the negative. They do remember paying our one Baker TDY with the 266th in Long Binh. Someone had to pay the Bakers of former Company B stationed TDY in Cu Chi. If not the 266th Payroll Officer, then possibly by the 569th Payroll Officer. No one seems to know....but it is suspected it was HHC 266th.

Note: As of December 2010 it is now known, that Bakers in Cu Chi were paid by HHC 266th. This means that the person paid in Long Binh was most likely SP4 Ralph Heatlie; TDY to 64th Petroleum Battalion from the 228th in Tay Ninh.

Which brings us back to the question of how the Department of Army per amended orders 1968 regarding MUC awarded in March 1967 to the 228th Bakery Section TDY in Cu Chi occurred.

It is my thought, that a review by the Department of the Army, as ordered by General Westmoreland for "confirmed" MUCs' 1966-1970 created consternation and puzzlement as to how to handle the particular Bakery Section TDY in Cu Chi. A review of their records would clearly show that these personnel were at one time assigned to Company B, 266th QM BN (DS) a unit that had been "inactivated" 20 July 1966.

So to whom did they belong? It is seemingly obvious, that this review board knew that the bulk of personnel from Company B were re-assigned to the newly activated 228th Supply and Service Company (DS), including the Laundry and Bath Platoon. That being the case, and not desirous of digging through piles of HHC 266th orders and paperwork, morning reports, rosters and other, it is my suspicion, that the review board to save time and effort, simply decided that the Bakery Section TDY in Cu Chi must also belong to the 228th as well. Given the afore mentioned conclusion a decision was made and the review board moved on to more pressing matters.

I can't prove it. I do suspect the afore mentioned in some shape, manner or form took place. Last, and during the review process, I would suspect that the review board became so confused with the 266th product of constant changes in orders, and shifting of personnel, that they became hopelessly lost, and therefore decided it was easiest to simply state that the MUC was awarded the 228th Bakery Section...whose paper trail was easily discerned.

Other theories welcomed.

Note 1: Per communication with SP4 Terry R. Shipp former Baker Company B, 266th QM BN (DS) Fort Lewis, Long Binh, and 228th S&S Co (DS) the following is what happened to him relative to above. He agrees that Bakery section was sent to Cu Chi in first week of July 1966. He also agrees and can prove by saved Pay Vouchers that he was assigned to the 228th S&S Co (DS) but TDY with HHC 266th QM BN (DS) in Long Binh up to 1 September 1966. His next Pay Voucher for time period 1-30 September 1966 indicates he was transferred from 228th to HHC 266th. {Orders for this transfer were never received by 228th and as of February 1967 up to May 1967 Terry was carried as "assigned" to the 228th and "TDY" with the 266th by Morning Report and Company Roster}. In October the 228th was re-assigned to Tay Ninh. Within days of Mortar attack of 4 November 1966, Terry was sent to Tay Ninh as one of several replacements for 1 KIA and 2 seriously wounded and evacuated. He remained in Tay Ninh for a minimum of three to four weeks, possibly longer, and was then verbally re-assigned to Bakers section of Cu Chi by Christmas of 1966. He was in Cu Chi for a short period of time, went on R&R and re-assigned verbally back to Long Binh. At some point he was also sent TDY to Saigon (possibly with 277th S&S BN (DS), but again returned to Long Binh. {On or about 17 September or  1966, Terry was promoted to SP4 - E4 as a member of the 228th S&S Co (DS) Morning Report and Company Roster, but his Pay Voucher indicates he was definitively assigned to HHC 266th S&S BN (DS) 1-30 December 1966}. Of interest, is that most of the Bakers in Cu Chi all thought they were assigned to Company B, 266th, until various orders began appearing stating they were assigned to the 228th and/or HHC 266th. Proof once again, that something interesting (or somewhat goofy) was going on in HHC 266th personnel section stationed in Long Binh.

 

Submitted By:

SP4 A.B. Neighbor based on pure conjecture and speculation.....3 September 2010...Based on fact, per Pay Vouchers, Orders and other December 2010, as provided by SP4 Terry Shipp, 1st Lt. William I Eckhart dated 4 January 1967, and Personnel Roster of 228th dated 1 February 1967 along with personal knowledge of Company Clerk and others assigned to the 228th (Officers and Enlisted).

.......................................................................................................................

 

M) Maintenance and Equipment Platoon:

The Maintenance and Repair Platoon originally consisted of three sections; Maintenance Platoon Section, Equipment Section and Fabric and Leather repair Section. On arrival in Vietnam, as stated in History 100 personnel of the 234 {235 authorized} assigned to Company B, 266th QM BN (DS) were stripped from the Company by USASUPCOM, Saigon. Those re-assigned to other units mostly consisted of Light and Heavy Duty Vehicle Drivers, most of our light and heavy duty Motor Pool Mechanics, and the entire Fabric and Repair Section.

As a result, the Company not only lost personnel, but the associated equipment and vehicles associated with these personnel to other units. Initially the Maintenance Platoon Section, Equipment Repair Section and Fabric and Leather Repair Section (at reduced strength) consisted of personnel totaling 43 individuals.

Upon arrival in Long Binh one week later the preceding number of individuals left from the 43 personnel totaled approximately 3 light and heavy duty mechanics.

Under the COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966, the allocation for a Fabric and Leather Repair Section no longer existed in a Direct Support Supply and Service Company and the allocated number of 235 Officers and Enlisted was cut to 233.

As stated previously in other portions of this History, one always had the sense that Company B, 266th QM BN (DS)....The 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) as of 20 July 1966 was utilized as a Company from which other units could pick off personnel and equipment. Part of this was due to orders generated by USASUPCOM, another portion by 29th General Support Group, and finally the 266th itself. Another reason was the COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966 which subtracted 2 enlisted personnel from the allocated personnel of a Direct Support Company.

In effect, the Maintenance Platoon Section and the Equipment Section were merged into the General Supply Platoon.

When orders were received by the 228th for re-assignment to Tay Ninh 4 October 1966, the Company only had 85 individuals with boots on the ground in Long Binh to make the trip by Convoy. Another 30 individuals of the L&B Platoon were stationed in Cu Chi with the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion. Another 5 individuals remained in Bien Hoa but joined the 228th in Tay Ninh 1 week later. The POL Class III Platoon (at 50% allocation) was part of the 85 individuals on convoy. The lone Baker of the 228th remained in Long Binh, TDY to the 266th. 3 POL personnel remained in Long Binh, TDY to the 64th Petroleum Battalion.

Thus, on 7 October 1966, 85 individuals arrived in Tay Ninh. Within the week, 5 more from Bien Hoa arrived, 2 from Long Binh, 10 from Cu Chi arrived, and already in Tay Ninh since September our CO and his driver. In addition 6 more arrived (formerly Company B personnel) 2 from the 506th and 4 from the 624th Supply and Service Companies (DS) for a grand total of 110 (authorized 233).

In effect, the Company Motor Pool had but 3 mechanics to repair light and heavy duty vehicles. Not that it was initially essential, as nearly all the allocated vehicles belonging to the Company had been parceled out by the 266th to other units in Long Binh.

The Company found itself in the position of being short manpower, equipment and operating at less than half of its authorized unit strength with a mission of setting up it's own cantonment area, various supply points, and supporting not only the entire Tay Ninh Base Camp including 1st PHILCAGV, Special Forces, but Operation Attleboro Phase I (probing mission of 196th and 25th ID) soon to be Phase II (contact and battlefield conditions) in Tay Ninh War Zone C.

The long and the short of the matter meant the 228th personnel were hard pressed to meet its mission. Personnel wore many hats, worked 24/7 on continuous 12 to 15 hour shifts, withstood two in company mortar attacks 4 November and 14 November, but did indeed accomplish its mission objectives by supporting 23,000 combat troops in the field, and another 5,000 to 8,000 within the Base Camp and/or its surroundings.

Near the end of November 1966 the 228th had 500 attached personnel provided by the 29th General Support Group (see listings provided in History Part A). As such, and with reference to in Company Equipment repair, the Company had a small motor pool, motor pool repair parts shed only. As such, and being understrength repairs were limited to oil changes, engine repairs and basic vehicle maintenance. All other equipment repair was performed by personnel attached from 29th General Support Group; i.e. ; the 140th Heavy Equipment Company attached and quartered with the 228th.

As to actual vehicles and other equipment the 228th had very little it could call its own. Most vehicles and equipment belonged to the 266th S&S BN (DS) and 29th General Support Group. The reason for this condition was due the early on appropriation of Company B, 266th (later 228th) equipment and vehicles in July of 1966.

By the end of tour of duty (May to June 1967) the 228th remained in short supply of many vehicles and equipment, nearly all attached personnel having returned to their respective units in Long Binh by late March 1967. Replacement personnel arriving in bits and spurts beginning in April 1967 through May 1967 would have found vehicles and equipment in short supply, and in some cases in need of maintenance. Replacements would have also found, that a good deal of equipment belonged to the 266th S&S BN (DS) and 29th General Support Group for the same reason.

Requisition of vehicles and other necessary equipment to operate (additional reefer units for GR being one since November of 1966) were not fulfilled by higher authority despite constant effort to do so by the 228th. Class III needs were not only met, but expanded by higher authority, as were Class I, Class II&IV. Class V (munitions) ceased to be handled by the 228th at the conclusion of Operation Junction City, and when attached personnel of the 551st Ordnance Detachment (part of 29th General Support Group) returned to Long Binh.

As an offshoot of attached personnel returning to their individual units, the 228th acquired much needed additional vehicles. As a result many of the markings on vehicles and trailers a number bore identification markings of both the 266th BN and 29th GP. Several had 624 S&S, 483rd F&S, 75th S&H. As a result, the 228th finally had its allocated vehicles plus some additional trailers. Note: If one looks closely in photo gallery of 1966-1967 as well as 1967-1968 such markings are clearly visible...especially in 1967 on or about mid to late July 1967 when the 567th S&S BN (DS) assumed command of the 228th. In one photo a deuce and a half is being filled by 228th personnel for trip to firing range on the Company Street, with the vehicle clearly marked..."266th S&S", who as of 3 July 1967 were no longer the superior command of the 228th. 

Submitted By:

SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor based on personal knowledge and contextual data provided by then; Cpt. Bernard A. Kuster (other comments, additions, corrections, etc! welcomed by personnel of Company Motor Pool or those involved in equipment repair section of the time period).............. 4 September 2010

..................................................................................................................

 

N) 29th General Support Group Quarterly Reports - Selected Extracts - 1966 - 1967:

Quarterly Report for time period ending 31 October 1966, as submitted to USASUPCOM, Saigon, 1st Logistics Command, USARPAC

*Underlines, Notes: (in bold) and annotations following quoted portions are those of the submitter and not contained in the declassified documents.

Extract Quarter ending 31 October 1966 - 29th GS Group:

1) "The 29th GS Group OPLAN #1-66 was issued on 29 July 1966, in the support of "Operation Bluejay" and Operation "Oahu". The groups mission was to establish a forward supply area at Tay Ninh for the purpose of providing all classes of supply and services including maintenance in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade during its staging operation."

2) "The 29th GS Group OPLAN #2-66 was issued on 29 August 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade at Tay Ninh. The groups mission was to establish and operate an Engineer Class V Supply Point at Tay Ninh (west) until further notice." 

3) " The 29th GS Group OPLAN #3-66 was issued on 30 August 1966. This OPLAN was published in support of operation "Wren". The groups mission was to provide or arrange for all logistical support required by the Philippine Civic Action Group to stage into Tay Ninh.

Note: Unit referenced is 1st PHILCAGV (1st Phillipine Civic Action Group Vietnam) whose forward command structure had arrived in Tay Ninh September 1966, and whose main force was due to arrive in early October 1966....ABN

4) "The 29th GS Group OPORD #1-66 was published on 15 August 1966 stating the groups mission. Generally it is to provide supply, service, and maintenance support to US Forces and Third Country Forces Class III, Engineer Class IV, TC Aviation, and medical as directed by CO USASUPCOM, Saigon. In addition it assigns missions to attached battalions, covers intelligence situation in III Corps area, troop list; a security plan; and a damage control plan."

5) "The 29th GS Group OPORD #2-66 was published on 30 September 1966 establishing a supply point within the 196th Infantry Brigade Base Camp to support all US and free world forces located in the vicinity of Tay Ninh." 

6) "On 4 October 1966 the 228th Supply and Service Company relocated (from Long Binh) to Tay Ninh for the purpose of operating a forward supply area in the support of that complex."

Note: Actual relocation and arrival occurred 7 October 1966 based on the Orders  dated 4 October 1966......ABN

7) "The organization of the group at the end of reporting period {31 October 1966} was as follows:

HHC, 29th General Support Group,

HHC, 3rd Ordinance Battalion (Ammo), 54th Ordnance Company (Ammo) - (DS-GS), 78th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Renov), 550th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Support), 551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Support), 576th Ordnance Company (Ammo)- (DS -GS), Detachment P, 212th Military Police Company (Sentry Dog)

HHC 185th Maintenance Battalion (DS), 19th Light Maintenance Company (DS), 94th Maintenance Company (DS) (DIV), 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (DS), 218th Collection, Classification and Salvage Company, 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS), 548th Light Maintence Company (D), 349th Signal Detachment (Radar Repair)

HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS),  228th Supply and Service Company (DS), 506th Supply and Service Company (DS), 624th Supply and Service Company (DS), 75th Heavy Material Supply Company Note: The 75th Heavy Material Supply Company is conducting unit training. It did not complete this phase of training while in CONUS."

8) "The 266th Supply and Service Battalion operated laundry facilities at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, Phouc Vinh, Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Xuan Loc, Bearcat and Long Binh. A total of 307,587 bundles of laundry were processed during the reporting period. These units also administered 202,214 hot showers"

Note: Underlined Cu Chi and Tay Ninh were operated by 228th S&S Co (DS)......ABN

9) "The bakery at Long Binh baked 829,828 pounds of baked bread. A second bakery is being erected at Cu Chi, but is not operational at the present."

Note: This cannot be correct. The Bakery Section of the 228th {formerly Company B, 266th} had been TDY in Cu Chi since the first week of July 1966 with the 25th ID. Per SP4 Terry R. Shipp {228th, later 266th} the section were baking bread from the moment of arrival. Perhaps the report of 31 October 1966 is referencing a new facility being built that was not operational, whereas the facility of the 25th ID was indeed operational, but not under the control of the 266th, or 29th Group. ?....ABN

10) " The 266th Supply and Service Battalion operates a graves registration collection point at Long Binh. An additional collection point is located in Tay Ninh. Three {other} graves registration points are located at Quon Loi, Lai Khe and Xuan Loc. A fourth team is stationed with the 173rd Airborne Brigade." 

Note: The collection point in Tay Ninh was operated by the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS).....ABN

11) "General Supply, Class I, 266th Supply and Service Battalion: Total strength supported at Long Binh Supply Point increased during the last quarter from 21,500 with 41 unit breaks to 35,000 for non-perishables with 90 unit breaks. Additional Class I Supply Points have been established at Tay Ninh and Xuan Loc."

Note: The Class I supply points established at Tay Ninh and Xuan Loc were done so by the 228th S&S Co (DS) and 506th S&S Co (DS)* respectively. The 266th {physically} never set foot in either area. What's more, is that in Tay Ninh the understrength 228th was supporting an average of 28,000 troops and more through four battlefield operations conducted by 196th Light Infantry Brigade and 25th Infantry Division..... Apologize for tone of this note. It's frustrating that our superior command (266th) and its superior command (29th Group) failed at every turn to recognize that which the 228th (and other subordinate units) were accomplishing (perhaps because neither ever visited these forward supply point areas in 1966)..............ABN

*Xuan Loc a little south of Long Giao, aka: Blackhorse in support of 11th Armored operating in the area.....ABN/per PBW

12) Class II & IV by the 266th is given the same treatment. In effect the Long Binh area is discussed in detail. The one small blurb attributed to Tay Ninh (228th not mentioned) is ..... " Class II and IV construction material storage and issue yard was added to the Tay Ninh Forward Supply Area." The report then continues with the following; " Presently 80,000 troops are being supported thru 190 "AT or YT" accounts in the Class II & IV supplies. Approximately 2/3 of our II and IV supplies have been relocated to provide for engineer effort to improve site conditions." The report fails to recognize, that in Tay Ninh an average of well over 50 short tons and upwards of 90 short tons of Class II & IV product were being handled.

13) POL, Class III operations are also ignored in Tay Ninh and other FSA's. There is one brief mention that six, 1,200 gallon and nine 5,000 tank trucks are organic to a supply and service company. The total of the afore mentioned gallons amounts to 52,000 gallons of varied fuel products.

Note: In Tay Ninh the 228th had a storage capacity of well over 425,000 gallons which the 228th owned and operated....ABN

14) "For the reporting period, the 29th GS Group engaged in combat support operations for 92 days".

Note: Fair enough. That covers August, September and October 1966. From 7 October 1966 - 31 October 1966, the 228th in Tay Ninh began supporting the largest counteroffensive in Vietnam ever launched in Vietnam {Operation Attleboro Phase I and Phase II}, but one would never know it per 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) and 29th General Support Group Report ending 31 October 1966...ABN

Part 2: 29th General Support Group Report ending 31 January 1967 {November, December 1966 and January 1967}:

Extracts:

1) " On 4 November 1966, the base camp of the 196th Lt Inf Bde (SUP) sustained a mortar attack. The 228th S&S Co (DS) which operates the Tay Ninh Forward Supply Point suffered 1 KIA and 14 WIA."

Note: There were two other seriously wounded, evacuated and subsequently returned to CONUS....ABN

2) " On 1 December 1966 the 29th Group was attached to the 15th Support Brigade. The 29th GS Group OPLAN #6-66 was issued on 5 November 1966 in the support of 'Operation Attleboro" {Tay Ninh}. The mission of the group was to establish Forward Supply Areas {228th assigned and attached all purpose and specific purpose personnel} for the purpose of providing logistical support to all units involved in the operation."

Note: No mention that the 228th S&S Co (DS) was already in Tay Ninh and up to its eyeballs supporting Operation Attleboro Phase II. Also accounts for arrival of Major Jerry D. Ward from 15th Support Brigade in late November 1966, who quartered with 228th, but was neither assigned or attached.

3) "The 29th GS Group OPORD # 1-67 was published on 1 January 1967. This was done to revise and update OPORD # 1-66. The mission of the group is to provide supply and service, and maintenance support to US Forces, Free Military Assistance Forces and Third Country Forces in the Third Tactical Zone (III Corps). This is for all classes of supply less wholesale class III Engineer, Class IV TC Aviation and medical supplies. Operation Attleboro: From 1 November 1966 to 7 December 1966 the 29th GS Group provided Class I, II, III, IV and V support, laundry and bath, and graves registration to all units engaged in the operation. FSA's {Forward Supply Areas} were established at Tay Ninh {228th} Dau Tieng, and Sui Da for the duration of the operation."

Operation Cedar Falls: same wording, excepting an "FSA was established by 29th GS Group at Phu Loi and an ASP at Lai Khe for the duration of the operation." No mention is made of 228th supporting Operation Cedar Falls from Tay Ninh, which it did.

4) "On 18 January 1967 the 506th S&S Co (DS) relocated to Xuan Loc for the purpose of operating a Forward Supply Point at the Xuan Loc Base Camp."

5) "On 19 January 1967 the 551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo) relocated to Tay Ninh for the purpose of operating an Ammunition Supply Point there." - "During the reporting period an ammunition Supply Point was constructed at Tay Ninh. The ASP consists of 24 pads capable of storing 8,000 tons of ammunition."

Note: The 551st Ordnance Detachment was "attached" to the 228th and quartered in 228th Company Area. In addition, these Class V munitions pads near the perimeter were guarded by the 228th assigned and attached personnel....ABN

6) Supply: "At the beginning of Operation Attleboro a Logistical Operations Control Center was activated expressly for the coordination of support to combat operations. This LOCC, operated by staff of 6 Officers and 2 EM coordinated the selection, loading, and transport of all Class items necessary to support operations."

Note 1: Not knowing the standard operating procedures (SOP) employed or required by higher authority, the submitter of these quoted extracts admits freely, that the preceding seems to be utter nonsense. First: Operation Attleboro {instituted by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade} started before the 228th had arrived in Tay Ninh. Second: The 228th and Commanding Officer; Captain Bernard A. Kuster had been designated as "Command and Control Center representing, 266th and 1st Logistics Command" by orders. Third: the representitive of 15th Support Brigade {Maj. Jerry Ward and a Maj. Chamberlin} did not arrive in Tay Ninh until early December 1966 when Operation Attleboro {Phase I and II} had already concluded. Further, Major Chamberlin was only in Tay Ninh for several days. No other Officers or Enlisted from the 15th Support Brigade (a missing 4 Officers and 2 Enlisted) were ever seen. Major Ward was physically in Tay Ninh and remained quartered with the 228th until mid June 1967. His one clerk, was SP4 Grant Lowerey (Clerk Typist) assigned to the 228th, TDY w/Major Ward. Both quartered in Field Tent directly across the Company Street from Orderly Room....ABN

Note 2: Once again the 228th S&S Co (DS) is not mentioned by the 29th GS Group. One would suppose, that these 6 Officers and 2 Enlisted of the 29th General Support Group somehow performed all selection, loading and transport of all supply necessary to support well over 28,000 - 35,000 troops in and about Tay Ninh, not to mention offloading, storage, distribution and record keeping......a true miracle.....ABN

7) Services: "Problems revolved around deadlined laundry, bakery, and bath equipment. Equipment presently in operation within the command is of WWII vintage. Laundry, bakery and bath equipment processed and maintaining repair parts at maintenance facilities has been delayed as much as 120 days due to requisition down time for repair parts. Deadline reporting and transportation of laundry, bakery and bath equipment has been delayed as much as 48 hours due to interrupted lines of communication. During this period there were 10 laundries, 2 bakery and bath sites operational in III Corps Tactical Zone. Monthly Average production, laundry 262,259 pounds, bakery 373-895 pounds and 94,807 baths {hot shower points, excluding cold shower points}."

Note: Once again the mention of Laundry and Bath Platoon of 228th operating in Cu Chi and Tay Ninh is excluded. In addition, the bakery section operating in Cu Chi is excluded. However, it is now known that personnel assigned to the 228th and bakery section were indeed transferred to control of HHC 266th on or about September 1966. The 266th just never bothered to inform the 228th via orders or otherwise...ABN

8) "There were two (2) permenent graves registration points and two (2) collection points in operation, locations as follows: Tay Ninh with refrigeration; 228th S&S Co (DS), Long Binh with refrigeration; 483rd Field Service Co, Bien Hoa without refrigeration; 506th S&S Co (DS), and Xuan Loc without refrigeration"

Note: First time actual subordinate units (228th S&S Co (DS), 483rd Field Service Company and 506th S&S Co) of 266th and 29th Group are recognized fully in a report....ABN

Note 2: The collection point in Long Binh (unit not mentioned) is thought to be 624th S&S Co (DS).

All of the preceding is an accurate transcription of reporting accomplished by 29th General Support Group and are in quotes as extracted from from said declassified reports. To say the least, such reporting is somewhat perplexing when in specified extracts, proper and due credit is not given to the subordinate units involved. Such reporting runs counter to all known data and other as witnessed and known by personnel (officers and enlisted) of the 228th S&S Co (DS) its assigned and attached personnel of the time period.......Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Class I, II, III, IV, Laundry and Bath, Graves Registration Officers in Charge, NCOIC'S, Company Clerk and all other assigned and attached personnel {total of nearly 700} who were physically in Tay Ninh, boots on the ground, and performing all preceding functions on a daily basis.

Submitted By:

SP4 A. B. Neighbor - (Company Clerk, 228th S&S Co (DS) - 20 July 1966 - 27 May 1967).............16 March 2011

..............................................................................................................................................

O) Pending