History: 1967-68

Consecutive History and Stories

Task Force Merritt

567th History and Command Structure

** New or updated material will appear in the color “RED” within the Website. After a reasonable time period, the color will revert to standard black.


This history section is designed to capture information for the period May67-Jun68, using personal letters, After Action Reports, recollections of various Officers and Enlisted men, and information from various 25th Infantry Division websites. During this period of time the men of the 228th S & S Co participated in various activities at Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, Suoi Da, and the large 25th ID Operation Yellowstone.

Consecutive History and Stories


I will attempt to follow in the big footsteps of Officers and Enlisted, who have done a tremendous job in defining the history of the 228th S & S Co (DS), 1966-1967. The bulk of personnel belonging to the initial 228th had rotated by 1 June 1967, and I, Vincent Webb, Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) Platoon (aka: Class III) arrived at the 228th on 16 July 67. My information is gleaned from my personal letters, information found on various 25th Infantry Division websites, personal recollections, and input from various Officers and Enlisted of that time period. Please let me know if you find any errors or omission of information and I will make the necessary changes.

MAY 67

During this period Tay Ninh was a fairly quiet base camp, in that no significant attack by mortars,or enemy probes were reported in the 25th ID After Action Reports (AAR)

Camp security was provided by the 3rd Bg. of the 4th Infantry Division, OPCOM to the 25th ID, supplemented  by the various base camp units having their assigned AO. The 228th was assigned bunker and tower duty in the Ammo dump.

On 18May67, the 567th S & S Bn started the transfer from Danang to Tay Ninh as the superior command of the 228th.   Note- We know the 228th was awarded MUC for the period 5, Oct 66- 3, July 67 as an assigned unit of the 266th S & S Bn, per DOA Consolidated Orders of 1970. While this should indicate the 567th did not become the superior command until after 3, July 67 ,in reality probably due to the fact the majority of the officers and enlisted men of the 266th rotated stateside, the 567th became our superior command  between 15, May 67 and 29, May 67 (date TBD), with the advance party arriving 18, May 67.

Because the 567th Bn was located at Tay Ninh, there was a lot of interchange and transfer of Junior Officers and Senior Enlisted men between the units, especially the HHC Co/567th Bn and the 228th S & S Co. Where possible, I will note when these changes were made.

Update Note: Per Morning Reports actual assumption and change of Command from 266th S&S BN (DS) to 567th S&S BN (DS) occurred on or about 31, May 1967 and definitively by 1, June 1967. However, it should also be noted, that MR’s reviewed had all been retyped onto a newer DA Form 1 (effective date of 1, January 1967) which from 1, January 1967 through on or about late August or mid September 1967 had not been available for use in RVN. As such, it appears USARPC ordered that all Morning Reports 1, January 1967 – on or about September 1967 that had been submitted on older DA Form 1, be retyped onto newer DA Form 1 . This action as near as can be determined took place throughout I, II, III and IV Corps and affected all units stationed in RVN.

Go to section G for additional information about the 567th.

Note 1: All entries in blue and red (following) are added material 2011 per research performed by Vince Webb….on going. After a reasonable time period all updates will revert back to standard color.

On 15, May 67 1st SGTE8 Edward Meeker was assigned to the 228th, replacing SFCE7 Balbino Billamor

On 29, May 67 Capt. Jerry White “relieved” per Morning Report (really re-assigned) as commanding Officer via SO# 87 from HHC 266th S & S Bn. Capt Gordon Ozawa replaced Capt White. Capt Ozawa was originally a staff officer with the 567th S & S Bn.

Note 2: The term “relieved” anywhere, but especially in a War Zone would be the death knell for any officers career (unless AR’s changed by 27, May 1967 and new MR reporting procedures took place). The proper entry on the Morning Report should have read under “Gains”; Captain Gordan I. Ozawa from 567th S&S BN (DS) per SO #__ 567th S&S BN (DS) to duty as Commanding Officer (other special coding involved but not pertinent). Under “Losses”; Captain Jerry D. White from duty as General Officer TDY to 567th S&S BN (DS) from 266th S&S BN (DS), (referencing MR when it had occurred) to wherever his new posting would be. There is a partial confusion as to whom was “commanding” prior to 29 May 1967, as Morning Reports reviewed are signed by 1st Lt. Floyd C. Hughes, first as “Company Officer” and then “Commanding Officer”. On the 29th of May or prior, one would expect the MR to reflect Lt. Hughes being assigned (PDY or TDY) as “Commanding” and another MR when another Command change occurred. To date, such evidence has not surfaced.

A secondary consideration or oddity involved is the signing of Morning Reports beginning 27, May 1967 by Major Gordan I Ozawa; Commanding, without an entry on Morning Report explaining the change from 1st Lt. Floyd C. Hughes as no longer Commanding, or Captain Ozawa assuming Command. (See 1, June 1967). Note: This signature by “Major” Gordon I Ozawa on 27, May 1967, indicates that at some point after 1, June 1967 when the signature is clearly Captain Gordon I Ozawa is an example of Morning Report of 27, May 1967 being retyped and resubmitted at a later time period (on or about September 1967) when captain Ozawa had been promoted to Major.

On 30, May 67 2LT Tommy Bourlier & 2LT John Schneider were promoted to 1LT.


On 1, Jun 67 total accountable strength was 6 Off +210 EM + 57 attached

On 4, Jun 67 2LT James Cook assigned to the 228th from the 567th. 2LT Ronald Holcombe left the 228th for the 567th.

On 27, Jun 67 MAJ Jerry Ward, via SO#108 from HHC 266th S & S Bn, left effective 23, May 67. While Maj Ward was never attached to the 228th, he was quarted in our company area and represented the 15th Support Bge.

Note: Per Art Neighbor, CC 1966-1967, Major Jerry Ward was still quartered with Company as of 27, May 1967. It is fact, that Major Ward departed in late June 1967 for CONUS. This is known not only by orders and Morning Report entry, but personal knowledge that Major Ward had arranged for SP4 Grant E. Lowrey (his assistant and clerk typist TDY from 228th – Nov 66 through June 67) to be transferred to Major Ward’s stateside posting for Grant’s remaining five months of active two year service. Stateside (per Grant’s wife; widowed; Grant had no real duty assignment in CONUS and spent most of his time going to the movies, wandering about the post, and answerable to no one except Major Ward. A huge thank you from Major Ward for all the dedicated hard work performed by Grant in Tay Ninh.

Of further interest, is how the 266th S&S BN (DS) managed to gain control over Major Ward per Special Orders 108 dated 27, June 1967 and effective 23, May 1967….in particular at that time, as 15th Support Brigade was an equal of 29th General Support Group with the 29th “attached” to the 15th by its own reporting in late 1966 (29th being a direct superior of the 266th)….the 15th not deactivated until on or about November 1967. Perhaps pre deactivation of the 15th and after most original 228th personnel had rotated, Orders were issued by USASUPCOM, Saigon whereby 29th General Support Group became superior of 15th transferring Major Ward from the 15th to the 266th. As such, Major Ward had to be in a limbo of his own. He was neither assigned or attached to the 228th, nor the 567th S&S BN (DS) which officially assumed command of the 228th on or about 1, June 1967…..possibly sooner per change in Morning Report Header and signature of “Captain” Gordan I. Ozawa as “Commanding”, but no authority cited, and no entry of such change of command entered physically on MR….probable oversight somewhere in chain of command structure in place at the time (228th itself, 567th, 266th, 29th Group, or USASUPCOM)…difficult to determine, as someone somewhere dropped the ball, and/or there were no written Orders issued by any superior command. Even so, and assuming the Orders were vocal, an entry on Morning Report should have been made regarding any change of command with the annotation “pending written orders”.

It is suspected, that the following occurred:

Captain Jerry White was Commanding as of 27, May 1967, departed 228th on the 29th of May 1967. Newer Morning Reports arrive at some point after 29, May 1967 (probably sometime in late June, possibly July or early August 1967) with new reporting procedures of coding and counts. Since Captain White is no longer in Company with New MR having an effective date of 1 May 1967 {Actual newer MR stating “effective” 1, January 1967}….the 29th General Support Group or USASUPCOM kicks back all Morning Reports typed from 1, May 1967 to 26, May 1967 for re-typing and resubmission. Since 567th was not in Command of 228th during time period {1, May  1967 – 29, May 1967}, then 1st Lt. already assigned to 228th; 1st Lt. Floyd C. Hughes ordered to sign all re-typed Morning Reports (1, May 1967 – 26, May 1967) by 567th or a higher authority. By error, oversight no entry is made regarding the means or authority 1st Lt. Hughes assumes command. Nevertheless the MR’s first reflect he is a 228th “Company Officer” (14, May – 20, May) then “Commanding” (21, May – 26, May). Captain White could not sign re-typed MR’s as he had departed, possibly rotated. By 27 May 1967 “Major” Ozawa signs Morning Report as “Commanding” without an entry of Lt. Hughes being re-assigned or Captain/Major Ozawa assuming command, let alone by what authority. On 1, June 1967 the MR does reflect assumption of command of 228th by “Captain” Gordan I. Ozawa from 567th, where he continues to sign all Morning Reports until 13, July 1967 when he is promoted to “Major” where he remains until reassignment in September 1967 to 29th General Support Group. On 27, June 1967 Orders from 266th S&S BN (DS) arrive whereby Major Jerry Ward will rotate, but he has somehow now become a member of the 266th S&S BN (DS) “effective date: 23, May 1967”. As such, and as near as can be determined Major Jerry Ward was never carried on Morning Report of 228th prior to 27, May 1967 or after. He then suddenly appears on the 228th MR on the 27th of June for rotation by orders generated by the 266th S&S BN (DS). It is thought, that none of the preceding is the fault of 228th or 567th. It does reflect, or seems to reflect some sort of possible major mismanagement at the 29th Group. However, in fairness, it is possible that higher authority beyond the 29th Group might well be at fault….to what degree remains an unknown and will more than likely never be known…………ABN – March 2011

Sub Note and further clarification referencing preceding:

Per phone conversation 6 April 2011 with then and former; Lt. F. “Clair” Hughes…. As best he {F. “Clair” Hughes} can recollect the following applies: (1) Although junior in time and grade to both Lt. Tom Bourlier and John Schneider by weeks, with all three still 2nd Lt.’s in rank when the bulk of 228th personnel had rotated throughout May of 1967, he {now 1st Lt. Hughes} had been ordered by a full bird Col. {whose name and outfit he cannot recall – not 567th} into the Orderly Room to sign all paperwork and Morning Reports for retype and resubmission covering the month of May 1967. (2) At the time there was no Company Clerk he recalls, nor did a qualified person to handle said position arrive in company for a good month or more. (3) As best he recalls the 1st Shirt MSG Edward Meeker, or another were retyping the Morning Reports as required onto the newer DA Form 1, which required a newer code procedure and accounting of strength. (4) 1st Lt. Hughes recalls signing Morning Reports, first as “Company Officer” and later as “Commanding Officer” although no written Orders by any superior command had been issued regarding such authority. The Morning Reports indicate that he was a 1st Lt., rather than a 2nd Lt. (which he was in May). This is due to the fact, that at the time he was ordered into the Orderly Room he had been promoted to 1st Lt. some weeks (possible month or months) after both 2nd Lt.’s Bourlier and Schneider had been promoted to 1st Lt. on 30 late May 1967 (5) The reason he was signing retyped Morning Reports as ordered, was to reflect that in May 1967 {where original Morning Reports had been signed by Captain Jerry D. White on the older DA Form 1}, is due to the fact, that Captain White had been reassigned {possibly rotated} by 29 May 1967 and was not “in company” to resign anything….thus necessitating a signature of an assigned “in” Company Officer… the 567th S&S BN (DS) not officially assuming command of the 228th until on or about 1 June 1967, effective 31 May 1967…overlooking the Morning Report of 27 May 1967 signed by “Major” Ozawa, who had not been promoted to Major until 13 July 1967 (6) Then 1st Lt. Hughes did not understand MR per se, relied on expertise of 1st Shirt {MSG Meeker or other) that they were true and correct. Note: In fact they were not quite true and correct, as a review of such MR’s indicates a number of anomalies and errors. First; the names are correct, but SO #s issued by USASUPCOM are out of sequence by number and date of issue. Second; the EDCSA of nearly all personnel seems to range (or have been changed) to reflect a rotation date of all personnel to reflect 25-28 May, the bulk reflecting an EDCSA of 27 and 28 May, which did not occur. In fact, most personnel had rotated out (departed) Company prior to 25 May 1967. (7) All USASUPCOM orders reflected on the newer MR entries indicate that all personnel rotating (departing) were to report to Retention Center at APO 96307. This APO “96307” is Saigon and Tan Son Nhut, rather than Long Binh and Ben Hoa where it further proves that 90th Replacement Center was operating in both locations. (8) Lt. Hughes recalls with great relief Captain Gordan* I. Ozawa of the 567th S&S BN (DS) taking over as “Commanding” officially. This entry on Morning Report dated 1 June 1967 {referencing MR of 31 May, where Captain Ozawa is now “attached” but not indicated on any MR prior to the the 31st of May} This MR also a retyped and resubmitted MR, as the MR dated 28 May 1967, is signed by Captain Ozawa and reflecting a change of superior in Header from 266th S&S BN (DS) to 567th S&S BN (DS) – {26 May through 29 May} as the superior command of 228th S&S Co (DS). (9) Major Jerry Ward still quartered with the 228th {still neither assigned or attached by Morning Report} rotated in late June 1967 {27 June 1967 per MR} and was not involved in any of these varied changes, orders and other. In effect, Major Ward was just “there”. His orders as reflected on MR for rotation on 27 June 1967 do not reflect, that he was “assigned” to the 15th Support Brigade any longer {which he had been up to 27 May 1967}. Instead the orders and authority issued for rotation are generated by the 266th S&S BN (DS). (10) There are other anomalies related to personnel in these Morning reports. (a) EDCSA dates for some personnel reflect a rotation date {EDCSA} beyond 31 May 1967 and into mid June…these same personnel having departed prior to 25 May 1967. (b) Other personnel are entered as having departed the Company and in-transit, and then listed again as assigned losses two to three (or more) days later  (c) One person is entered as departing 25 May as an assigned loss on 27 May 1967, who in fact did not rotate (depart) until early to mid June 1967. Still another who had rotated prior to 25 May is shown with an EDCSA of June 1967 and is still being counted as assigned and present. The same is true for an Officer who had rotated prior to 25 May 1967 but shown as present for duty and rotating 28 May 1967 (d) The Strength Header accountability and totals of assigned and attached enlisted personnel do not add up properly. At times, the reported total is off by 1 to 17 persons, whereas at other times the totals are off by 20 to 30 or more individuals. How or why this occurred cannot be answered. (e) An oddity exists and with reference to typed name and signature of Captain Ozawa in terms of forename spelling. In some 29th General Support Group paperwork (at times) the spelling is “Gordan I. Ozawa” or “Gordon A. Ozawa” whereas the Morning Reports of 228th clearly indicates “Gordon I. Ozawa”…therefore, “Gordon I. Ozawa” is the correct spelling. One other oddity exists on the seemingly retyped Morning Report of 1 June 1967 (reflecting 31 May 1967), whereby “Gordon I. Ozawa, Captain” is removed from “attached and joined reference Morning Report 27 May 1967″… the oddity being, that  although he signed the MR of the 28th of May, reflecting the MR of the 27th, there is no entry reflecting his being “attached” to the 228th”. Worse still, the MR of 27 May 1967 is signed by a “Major” Gordon I. Ozawa….meaning this MR was a secondary retyping, as Captain Ozawa was not promoted to Major until 13 July 1967.  Nevertheless, Captain Ozawa {reflecting 31 May 1967} and MR dated 1 June 1967 changes his status to “assigned and joined the 228th for permanent duty from 567th S&S BN (DS)…to 228th Commanding.” All the preceding are little quirks and anomalies that must have some sort of valid explanation, either by newer reporting procedure requirements, and/or there being no clear guidance or person in Company having the capability to produce an accurate accounting as outlined by Army Regulations and procedures. It is suspected , that a good deal of this confusion cannot be attributed to either the 228th or 567th, but rather from 29th General Support Group and/or USASUPCOM, Saigon. One thing (and others) is seemingly clear. Orders previously issued by USASUPCOM, Saigon and acted upon during the month of May 1967 were changed, and as such, there had to be utter confusion within the Orderly Rooms of the 228th and 567th as to how to deal with and/or handle such matters… New DA Form 1 Morning Report, New Orders generated by USASUPCOM, Saigon covering previous orders already acted upon relative to rotation (departure) schedules, and difficulties encountered by not having a trained person familiar with proper Morning Report procedures and knowledge in place….either prior to rotation of previous Company Clerk, or afterwards for a time period encompassing well over one month, possibly two or three………..Subject to revision…..ABN  April 2011


Note 3: Summation of most Glaring Defects in Morning Reports of May 1967 definitively retyped and re-submitted


1) No entry appointing by orders (written or otherwise) of 1st Lt. F. Claire Hughes as Commanding who during May 1967 was a 2nd Lt., and not promoted to 1st Lt. until June or July (possibly later as there is no entry of his promotion on any MR in 1967)

2) No entry attaching Captain Jerry White to 567th S&S Bn (DS) prior to rotation or re-assignment of 29 May 1967 per orders issued by 266th S&S Bn (DS)

3) No entry of why Captain Gordon I. Ozawa signed Morning Report as “Major” Commanding on 27 May 1967 when clearly he does not assume command until Morning Report of 1 June 1967 and is a “Captain”. Also no entry in Special Events regarding change of Superior command from 266th S&S Bn (DS) to 567th S&S Bn (DS), and by what authority (The only clue of change indicated in Header of Morning Report)

4) No entry on Morning Report changing status of 2nd Lt. Ronald L. Holcombe from “attached” to “assigned” to 228th, subsequently re-assigned to 567th S&S Bn (DS)

5) No entry on Morning Report promoting 2nd Lt. F. C. Hughes to 1st Lt. in May 1967 (should appear in June or later, but does not)

6) Personnel head counts of attached, present, TDY, etc! do not add up correctly. On several they are correct. For the most part they are off-count ranging in number from 1 to 30 or more personnel.

7) In some cases the same personnel are indicated as departing on one date and within 2 to three days indicated as Assigned Losses. At the same time many personnel who had rotated a week prior to dates specified are counted as being present, and in company pending departure.

8) Major Jerry Ward (quartered with 228th, neither assigned or attached since late November 1966 from 15th Support Brigade) somehow receives orders to rotate on 27 June 1967 by written orders of 266th S&S Bn (DS) whereby such orders are entered on 228th Morning Report without reference to Major Ward ever being attached or assigned to the 228th.

9) As of 27, June 1967 there is still no entry regarding promotion of 2nd Lt. Hughes to 1st Lt.

10) As far out as September 1967, there are Morning Report entries covering apparent 228th assigned or attached personnel who are picked up and finally accounted for with “effective” dates of May 1967…a 4 month lag time.

The preceding are clear examples of problems encountered by the 228th and 567th Orderly Room and/or Chain of Command with boots on the ground in Tay Ninh West. It is suspected, that a good deal these annotated and assorted problems were generated by several factors beyond the control of either the 228th or 567th. And, more than likely were generated by superior command authorities to the rearward in Long Binh {29th General Support Group} and/or USASUPCOM, Saigon…………ABN


On 1, July total accountable strength was 5 Off + 229 EM + 62 attached

The 228th continued to support all stationary units, plus Special Forces, Philcag and various field units with all classes of supply.

From my personal letters:

“we are getting our trucks in shape to start back on convoy to DAU TIENG, so we can haul Avgas, Mogas, Diesel and JP-4 to this camp.Tay Ninh is the intermediate point between LONG BINH and DAU TIENG. We have a big yard full of drums, bladders and tanks of fuel. The responsibility for fuel distribution to DAU TIENG rests with us, after we receive from LONG BINH”

“Today I placed five fire extinguisher systems in the trucks. We are also rebuilding bunkers around the perimeter. I have been on guard duty every fifth night. Last night we had a lot of action at the ARVN camp, which is located about a mile from our camp. They were attacked by the VC, who also tried to cut some wire around our camp enclosure. Our guard responded.

“The weather is lousy. Around 90-95 during the day and 70 at night. It has been raining a lot, and we are working all day in the rain. I went on convoy Friday to DAU TIENG as a shotgun. The country is beautiful with an old Vietnamese fort on the way, which has curved towers and ornamental fences.”

On 5, Jul 67 1SGT Edward Meeker assigned to the 567th from the 228th. Based upon research I believe SFCE7 Leo Conway bacame the 1stSGT

On 20, Jul 67 1Lt Stanley Smith assigned to the 228th from the 567th.

On 13, Jul 67, Capt Gordon Ozawa was promoted to Major via SO#137 from HQ Dept of the Army Washington, DC. He started signing MR’s as Major Ozawa on 29, Jul 67. This order was noted on the MR on 29, Aug 67.

During the month a number of men from the 81st QM Platoon (Laundry) were transferred to the 228th


On 1, Aug 67 total accountable strength was 6 Off + 217 EM + 53 attached

The 228th continued to support all stationary units, plus Special Forces, Philcag and various field units with all classes of supply.

Sometime during Aug or Sept, the men of the 228th and other 567th units went to the firing range, located near the base of the mountain at a 2-12th Infantry PB

From my personal letters:

“Thanks for the KOOL-AID. I am getting tired of the taste of the water and will use KOOL-AID and Nestea, received from Mom, to kill the taste.”

“The VC hit the Special Forces camp near us. (Note- probably BEN SOI, East of TAY NINH base). We are on alert and expect the VC to hit us at any time. We have our teams formed to go to the perimeter. Out of the 70+ Vietnamese who work on the base, only 11 showed up for work today. They all said the VC were in town. We continue to work on sandbagging until I am so tired from our long work days. We had an alert and messed around half the night trying to figure out where to go, because our officers mess things up so bad.”

On 25, Aug 67 1Lt Edward Motley assigned to the 228th from the 567th.  1LT James Cook assigned to the 567th from the 228th.



On 1, Sep 67 total accountable strength was 6 Off + 203 EM + 0 attached

The 228th continued its support of all units on base and in the field.

From my personal letters:

“Some of the fiercest fighting of the war has happened around here, and will continue as long as we have the mountain(NUI BA DEN) within sight of us. We are supposed to start a new operation next month. The last I heard is half the company is going to the field.

We just got back from DAU TIENG today. We hauled a load of Diesel fuel. I slept on the hood of my tractor and my buddy,( Chuck Snellenbarger from Michigan) slept on the top. (Note- We slept this way a lot. the top was canvas and we slept good because we were so tired)

On 10, Sep 67 Maj  Gordon Ozawa, CO of the 228th, was transferred to 29th Group Hq as Civil Affairs Officer and replaced by Capt Jimmy Ellington Via SO#180 from 29th General Support Group (29th GP). Capt Ellington assumes command via Unit Order #71, dated 13, Sep 67.

On 13, Sep 67 SFCE7 Eugenio Rodrigues was assigned to the 228th from 29th GP.( Sgt Rodrigues was later first shirt for TF Merritt at Katum and was later First Shirt for the 228th).

On 26, Sep 67 41-EM  from the 75th Fortification & Construction Platoon were attached for Rat/Qtr/Admin under GO #1 from Hq 567th effective 30, May 67. This unit was attached to help rebuild perimeter line bunkers, repair/replace fortifications in the company area & general building support.


On 1, Oct 67 total accountable strength was 6 Off + 193 Em + 0 attached

The 228th continued to support all units on base and in the field.

From my personal letters:

“I went on convoy to DAU TIENG for four straight days. The big Operation has not started. We are supposed to have two Infantry Brigades move here, one from the 4th and one from the 25th. (Note- By this time the 4th changed insigna to the 25th. while a Brigade of the 25th in PLEIKU changed to the 4th). I hauled lumber to DAU TIENG to make pads for the big artillery guns. The big guns here are firing a lot, and jets bombed suspected enemy positions about a mile from our camp. We hear there are two VC regiments around the mountain.”

On 3, Oct 67 1LT Tommy Bourlier & 1LT John Schneider left the 228th.

On 11, Oct 67 1stSGT Leo Conway transferred to the 758th S & S Co in Phu Loi. At that time I believe SFCE7 Eugenio Rodrigues bacame the 1st SGT for the period of time it took for 1stSGT Willie Dunlap to arrive and join. On 15, Oct 67 a notation to the Morning Report indicated he was assigned not joined, pending EDCSA. On the 30, Nov 67 Morning Report 1stSGT Dunlap officially joined from Hq USASUP CMD Saigon, effective 25, Nov 67

On 12, Oct 67 2LT James Talley assigned to the 228th from HHC USASUP Cmd Saigon.

On 21, Oct 67 1LT Elzey Arledge assigned to 228th from the 758th S & S Co in Phu Loi.

On 29, Oct 67 1LT James Kellinger attached to 228th

During the month 20 men were transferred between the 228th and 758th. (Note- I’ve talked to two NCO from the 758th who indicated the 567th S & S Bn must have a lot of pull in that the 228th sent their problems to the 758th and got good men in return)


On 1, Nov 67 total accountable strength was 6 Off + 180 EM + 3 attached

The 228th continued to support all units on base and in the field.

Activities started increasing on 16Nov67 when the 4th of the 9th Infantry (Manchus) left CU CHI base camp to establish a permanent base at TAY NINH. On or about 23Nov67, the 228th supported the Logistics effort, at FRENCH FORT by moving 8″ artillery to this FSB on TL-4, approximately halfway to KATUM.

From my personal letters:

“I am on night duty in the POL yard. It’s a quiet time and allows me to catch up on my letter writing. The long awaited operation is about to begin. The 25th ID has been moving into TAY NINH for the past week. A combined effort is being made to set up a Forward Supply Area (FSA) about one mile from the Cambodian border” (KATUM).

“Last night I had guard duty. Very quiet. We are overdue for an attack. Every place around has been hit except TAY NINH.”

On 4, Nov 67 1LT Floyd Hughes, Jr. and 1LT Edward Motley left the 228th to return to CONUS.

On 4, Nov 67 SSG William Tews was assigned to the 228th.

On 6, Nov 67 1LT James Kellinger was transferred from HHC 567th to the 228th

On 15, Nov 67 SFC Donald Freiss reenlisted and on 24, Nov 67 was promoted to MSG. He was transferred to the 506th Field Depot in Dec.

On 22, Nov 67, 2LT Dan Hilliard was transferred from HHC/567th to the 228th and 2LT James Talley was transferred from the 228th to HHC/567th.

On 24, Nov 67 SFC Elmer McKinney was assigned to the 228th from the 61st Maintenance Co.

On 25, Nov 67 1stSGT Willie Dunlap arrived and replaced SFCE7 Eugenio Rodrigues, who was assigned as 1stSGT for Task Force Merritt, part of Operation Yellowstone, to establish a Forward Support Activity at Katum

On 27, Nov SSG George Henry reenlisted.

On or around 25, Nov 67, four men from the 228th were sent to SUOI DA to build and operate a forward refueling area. These men were:

Vincent Webb, Arthur Newell, Ronald Brown and Jerrel McCall. (Note- Suoi Da was on the other side of the moutain in the vicinity of TL-243 and LTL13.(Note- This was an abandoned Special Forces camp, which was set up to be the main base for the 3rd of the 17th Air Cavalry, OPCOM to the 25th ID).

On 29, Nov 67 Orders from Hq USARPAC reorganized the 228th under M/TOB 29-217F PAC 5/66. Authorizes strength 6-officers, 0-WO & 227-EM

Note: This entry on Morning Report (per Art Neighbor) is an oddity. Per COSTAR Directive of Reorganization USARPAC 1966, which this entry references to May of 1966, there has been no change in authorized number of Officers and Enlisted (6 Officers, 227 Enlisted for a Direct Support Company).

As such it begs the question as to what Organizational Structure the 228th was operating under, or changed to when 567th S&S BN (DS) assumed command on 1 June 1967, effective 31 May 1967. Especially since the 228th when activated on 20 July 1966 had been activated and operating under the COSTAR Directive from the very beginning of activation up to and including rotation of most personnel prior to 31, May 1967. One must assume, that the 567th either created its own Organizational structure or was operating under an older unauthorized Structure. It couldn’t have been a newer organizational structure as there is no entry on the Morning Report before or after 1, June 1967 stating as much. Nor was there an entry on Morning Report prior to 29 November 1967.

Perhaps it was a “reminder” by USARPAC {United States Army Pacific}, to the 228th and 567th that they could not intertwine personnel of both units and that both entities had to operate as separate entities onto themselves per authorized TOB {Tactical Order of Battle} and COSTAR Directive issued by USARPAC in May 1966 which went into effect 20 July of 1966 throughout Vietnam. This matter would of course present a dilemma for the 567th whose main body had been returned to CONUS and deactivated some months earlier. As such, it is suspected, that this same dilemma led to the eventual reorganization of the 567th into the TN-LSA {Tay Ninh Logistics Supply Activity} in early 1968, effective in 22, December 1967. It is further suspected, that USARPAC was also reminding 29th General Support Group (Long Binh) and USASUPCOM, Saigon, that a Forward Supply entity under their immediate direct supervision was not in compliance with COSTAR Directive and Tactical Order of Battle issued well over a year and a half earlier…..ABN


On 1, Dec 67 total accountable strength was 5 Off + 170 EM + 1 attached

Operation Yellowstone started with a batallion task force, named after Maj. Sylvester (Les) Merritt, tasked with setting up a forward logistical activity at Katum. (Note- A separate section relating to activities associated with TF Merritt at Katum and other activities involving 228th personnel will follow  this history section)

In addition to our normal activity level needed to support all stationary units, plus Special Forces, Philcag and various field units with all classes of supply, the 228th provided 20 men for OPERATION  YELLOWSTONE ( Task Force Merritt at Katum). The remaining men of the 228th  had the responsibility of providing all classes of supply, plus providing transportation support for convoy operations.

On or about 18, Dec 67 responsibility for  the helicopter refueling point at SUOI DA was transferred to the 758th S & S Co, out of Phu Loi. The four men from the 228th were sent to KATUM to build and  operate a forward refueling point for helicopters.

On 20, Dec 67 under section Record of Unit Actions/Events the WIC/MRK was changed from W-DMK-AA-A to W-DMK-TO-A

On  21, Dec 67 1LT Theodore Cady was transferred from the 40th Ord. Co to the 228th.

Effective 22, Dec 67( although the order was not typed until 19Jan68), the 567th S & S Bn was disbanded and the Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity was established as the command structure for the 228th. See section G for additional information.


On 1, Jan 68 accounted strength was 6 Off + 177 EM

On 6, Jan 68, Captain Frank Shehulski was transferred from HHC Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (Prov) aka TNLSA and was  appointed CO of the 228th.

On 6, Jan 68 Captain Jimmy Ellington was transferred to to PDY Petrol Officer for the Tay Ninh LSA (Prov). 


On 1, Feb 68 total accountable strength was 12 Off + 2 WO + 265 EM, reflecting the addition of the HHC 567th S & S Bn headcount. The 567th was deactivated and reestablished as the Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (Prov). Their headcount reporting was added to the 228th.

On 8, Feb 68 the TAY NINH Ammo Dump was hit by a friendly shot. One 60 mm mortar round hit the camp of the 1/5th Infantry “Bobcats” area.

On or about 10, Feb 68  TF Merritt at KATUM ended and those remaining  were returned to the 228th. (Note- From my personal recollections, the men running the helicopter refueling area remained at KATUM until  completion and manning of the newly built Special Forces Camp, on or about 22, Feb 68)

On 16, Feb 68 a rocket attack hit the 45th Surgical Hospital with one Doctor KIA. The 45th was very close to both the 228th abd the 567th company areas. A number of soldiers remember this attack.

Around 24, Feb 68, a group of men in the 228th POL platoon, were assigned to the 25th S & T Co (Prov) at DAU TIENG. Our mission was to haul fuel between LONG BINH and DAU TIENG.


On 1, Mar 68 total accountable strength was 12 Off + 3 WO + 247 EM

Supply activities continued in support of all units in our AO.

On 6, Mar 68 Tay Ninh base camp received 22 round of 82 mm mortars vic. XT-147518. 1-US KIA, 35-US WIA, 8-buildings damaged. (This area is just north of the ammo dump, close to the main road).


On 1, Apr 68 total accountable strength was 14 Off + 3 WO + 234 EM

Supply activities continued in support of our AO.

MAY 68

On 13, May 68 the communications relay complex on the top of Nui Ba Den was attacked by enemy sapper forces. The enemy was successful in destroying the communication facilities with mortar and satchel charges. Engineers and infantry units were sent to rebuild the facility. For the next 2-3 months, the men of the 228th supported the rebuilding via aerial resupply from our Class V yard.

On 15, May 68, Specialist Dorris Clark was killed during a mortar attack into our company area. Sgt Vernon Ollis sent the following note concerning our fallen brother. “The morning Dorris was killed, I was talking to him about a minute before the round came in. He and I always had breakfast together after I finished my night shift, when I had Sgt of the guard. This particular morning I was late, as we had fired M-60 rounds that night and I was doing a report as to what happened. I went to the Mess hall after completing my report and found out Dorris had gone to his hooch to shave. I went to his hooch and talked to him and he said he would meet me at the Mess hall when he was finished, and we would eat . I walked back to the mess hall and had my hand on the door when the round hit. He was killed instantly. You know he had a baby girl he never got to see. He had just came back from Hawaii, but his wife had not brought his baby daughter, coming by herself”.

On 19, May 68 the Philcag base next to the TAY NINH camp received 5-82mm mortars and 2-122 mm rockets outside their perimeter.

On 22, May 68 at 0500, sappers attacked and overrun four gun positions of the 2/82nd Artillery, with US 6-KIA

On 30, May 68  D Troop 3/17th Air Cavalry foiled a convoy ambush just N of the Trang Bang cutoff on LTL-22 near the village of Ben Muong (Grid coordinates XT335345). The 228th had personnel hauling supplies on this convoy.


On 25, June 68, a C-130 was hit at take off from Katum. The AF crew managed to keep the plane aloft and diverted to TAY NINH to land.

The plane came in on fire, veered to the right on landing, and destroyed one building and landed toward the POL area. We evacuated to the other side of the camp due to hot rounds cooking off because of the heat. The AF has a website detailing the heroric story of this crew called”Kaboom at Katum”.

During the May-Jul68 timeframe a recommendation was made by 25th ID  that Division ASP ( Army Supply Point) become the function of the 1st Logistical Command and that personnel with the requisite skills be provided the division as an augmentation.  No doubt the success of TF Merritt during Operation Yellowstone, and the continued support of Division personnel at the various Fire Support bases plus Tay Ninh, by the men of the 228th, made this feasible.

I left TAY NINH  in early JULY and returned to the states in time to attend a family reunion near St Louis, MO

Submitted By: SP4 Vince Webb – 228th S&S CO (DS) – July 1967 – July 1968 – POL Platoon…..25 June 2010 & updated April 2011.

E) MSG EDWARD MEEKER- Running for Shelter

MSG Meeker was part of the 567th Supply and Service Bn and due to his duties, interfaced with many of the 228th S & S Co soldiers, as they completed their assignments at Tay Ninh. I remember MSG Meeker and would have laughed at this story and glad handed the soldier who extracted this act of revenge. (V Webb)

The following story from LTC Les Merritt is a comical story about MSG Meeker and some unknown soldiers acts of revenge.

This happened in the fall of 1967 at Tay Ninh.

When I was part of the 567th S & S Bn at Tay Ninh, I was the Operations Officer in the fall of 1967. This section provided oversight and control of all the supplies that were issued, stored, and requisitioned for the troops in our area of responsibility. The section was supervised by a Master Sergeant, MSG Edward Meeker, who tended at times to be a little rough on the personnel under his command. Needless to say the clerks and specialists were not too friendly with their section chief.

We worked in a wooden building during the day, but at night we lived in tents. Large community tents for the junior soldiers and small individual tents for the senior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO). These tents were surrounded by sandbag berms (walls) built waist high in order to protect us if we were shelled while sleeping. In several strategic areas we also had protective bunkers that included overhead cover so that if the mortar or rocket shells started coming in on us, night or day, we could run or crawl to the nearest protective bunker for security.

The section chief did not use these protective bunkers at night because, according to him, they were just a tad to far away for his quick use. Rather, he used the rain drainage ditch, which was located just outside his tent. He got an extra air mattress, blew it up and placed in in the bottom of the drainage ditch where it woud be ready to cushion him as he dove into the ditch once in-coming enemy fire started. Everything apparently worked fine. One day though, as he was telling me of his perfect bomb shelter, some other personnel heard this conversation also.

Well, in the next couple of days we had a rocket attack alert. in the morning I went to the wood building for work as usual. The section chief was not there, and he usually was the first one present for duty. About an hour later, he came into the office limping, moving slowly, and grouchy as hell. He told all within hearing, with appropriate cuss words for emphais, that if he ever caught the SOB who let the air out of his mattress, that he would pay dearly. He would pay very, very dearly. Obviously one of the staff had overheard the story about the use of the air mattress in the drainage ditch and had secretely gone over at night and pulled the plug on the air mattress.

It looks like the ole Master Sergeant woke up during a rocket alert, ran the short distance to his drainage ditch and jumped in as usual. This time, however, he did not land on a soft cushy air layer. No, this time when he hit the bottom, going full speed, his body continued on, hitting the hard bottom of the ditch with full force. Crunch! Smack! Bang!


From my personal recollection:

In late 1967 fuel was received from LONG BINH, off loaded in TAY NINH, and then hauled by the men of the 228th to DAU TIENG on an as needed basis.

Sometime in early 1968 fuel was hauled directly to DAU TIENG from LONG BINH, bypassing the unloading at TAY NINH.

After OPERATION YELLOWSTONE ended, some of the men who had been at KATUM, were sent on convoy to haul fuel and other supplies to DAU TIENG. We augmented the existing group of men who had started this direct resupply, before our group returned from KATUM.

While we lived in the 25th Supply and Trans. Company (Prov) tents at DAU TIENG, we do not know if we were assigned or attached to this unit. We knew our mission was to haul fuel and other supplies directly to DAU TIENG from LONG BINH.

I remember some of the men from the 228th talking about a mortar attack at DAU TIENG, where several were wounded, during the mid to late February timeframe.

We would muster in LONG BINH @ 0400 hours. Most days we left on time and drove through Saigon until we stopped at the SE end of the TAN SON NHUT runways. We would reform the convoy and proceed up HWY LTL-1, through HOC MON, and then stopped at CU CHI city.If all was clear we would proceed through TRANG BANG to GO DAU HA, then turn North on LTL-22. From LTL-22 we would hurry through the rubber plantation, pass brick making operations, and proceed to TAY NINH. Some days we stayed overnight at the TAY NINH BASE CAMP, if it was dark, or the roads were to dangerous to proceed. Most days we would turn into the city onto LTL-13.

We would proceed on LTL-13 until we turned SW onto LTL-26. We would hurry down “Ambush Alley”, through the CAU KHOI rubber plantation. We would turn due West on TL-239 and proceed through the BEN CUI rubber plantation, cross the DAU TIENG bridge, proceed into DAU TIENG city and then onto the base camp. Many days we would arrive in time to eat, shower and go on guard duty. We had guard duty more in DAU TIENG than TAY NINH.

On several occasions the VC would pop mortars while we were in the shower or eating. Two instances  I remember are as follow:

One evening while in the shower,  mortars were popped into the camp. We were ordered to the perimeter line. Here was 10-15 naked men, in their helmet, flak vest, untied boots, rifle, and nothing else running to the perimeter line.

One morning we had finished breakfast and had a few minutes to kill before mustering for the return convoy. Jim White, who became one of my best friends and R&R (Rest & Relaxation) buddy, heard an enemy rocket leave the launcher. He yelled “Incoming” and we were in our bunker before they hit the camp. He had really great hearing and heard incoming on at least two other occasions during our time in country.

I verified DAU TIENG received incoming rounds on the following dates:

29 Feb 68@2333- 10-20 rounds 60mm mortars. 2- US WIA and 10 vehicles damaged.

01, Mar 68- 10 rounds of 60 mm mortars.

03, Mar 68- When convoy passed XT 352420 it received RPG and Claymore fire resulting in 4- US WIA.

09, Mar 68 @1812- 6 mortar rounds

10, Mar 68 -5rounds 82mm mortars. 500 gal MOGAS and 20 barrels of Prem-A-Prim destroyed.

18, Mar 68 @ 0645- 40 rounds 82mm mortars. US-9 KIA

19, Mar 68- @1705- 7-rounds 122 mm rockets.

19, Mar 68 @1231- 10 rounds 82mm mortars

26, Mar 68 @1800- 12 rounds 82mm mortars with damage to 2-5 ton trucks. US 2-KIA

Being typical enlisted men, we always managed to have a good supply of “the beverage” available on convoy. We had one guy who would jump from trailer to tractor to deliver “the beverage” when needed. We would run up on the bumper of the truck in front and he would jump and catch the ladder, climb the cat walk and deliver the goods.

Another time we failed to gas up in DAU TIENG for the return trip to LONG BINH. We ran out of gas in the BEN CUI rubber plantation. Needless to say the convoy officer was not at all happy with us. We solved the problem by taking our steel pots and removed the residual fuel from our tanker and poured in our gas tank. We had 6-7 guys stop to help. We managed to load enough fuel to catch the tail end of the convoy.Needless to say, we stopped in TAY NINH to refuel.

I stopped driving in late June68 and retrurned to the US in early July68.

Submitted By: SP4 Vince Webb – 228th S&S Co (DS) – POL {CLASS III} Platoon…..28 June 2010

Task Force Merritt


Task Force Merritt, named after and led by Major Sylvester (“Les”) A. Merritt, was a force of nearly 100 men from various !st Log units, tasked with setting up a Forward Support Activity (FSA) at KATUM,in support of the 1st and 3rd Brigade of the 25th ID  on Operation Yellowstone.

Task Force Merritt consisted and was composed of personnel assigned from the following units:

HQ, 567th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)  {subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 75th F&C* Platoon {part of 567th} – 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) {subordinate of 567th} – 758th Supply and Service Company (DS) {Main Company stationed in Phu Loi, subordinate of 610th Maintenance Battalion, 610th a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 576th Ordnance Company {subordinate of 3rd Ordnance Battalion, the 3rd, a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 54th Ordnance Company {subordinate of 3rd Ordnance Battalion, the 3rd, a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} –  551st Ordnance Detachment {subordinate of 3rd Ordnance Battalion, the 3rd, a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 40th Ordnance Company {subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 60th Ordnance Company {subordinate of 60th Ordnance Battalion, predecessor of 29th General Support Group, 60th Ordnance Battalion stationed in Raidang} – 94th Maintenance Company {subordinate of 185th Maintenance Battalion, the 185th a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 548th Maintenance Company {subordinate of  567th, the 567th a subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – HMSC* 610th Maintenance Battalion {subordinate of 29th General Support Group} – 297th Signal Detachment {attached to 29th General Support Group} – 3rd Maintenance Company {subordinate of  610th Maintenance Battalion, the 610th a subordinate of 29th General Support Group}

*  F&C = Fortification and Construction  HMSC = Headquarters Maintenance and Supply Company 

The roster of personnel from the above named units as of 10 December 1967 totaled 97. Between 10 December 1967 and 22 February 1968 the number varied somewhat depending on various factors and manpower needs. For the most part the FSB/FSA (Forward Supply Base/Forward Supply Area) remained fairly stable, although there might be a change in number of personnel per unit listed by a factor of 2 to 3 persons plus or minus. For example, the FSB might lose 2 to 3 individuals from the 758th, but gain 3 or 4 from the 228th, and/or vice versa. This occurred within all units listed. Although no Morning Report was typed or issued, a constant updated Roster of personnel was employed on a daily basis, with any changes reported to superior command and specific units involved.


The 2nd-14th Infantry Bn. website has the following description of the first days at KATUM.

“On 8, Dec 67 Operation Yellowstone, which consisted of the 25th Divisions First and Third Brigades operating in War Zone “C”, was launched. The mission of the 2nd-14th Infantry was to establish the forward supply base at KATUM, located 50 kilometers noth of TAY NINH, near the Cambodian border. On 7, Dec 67 the unit established a perimeter and began the monumental task of clearing fields of fire in the triple canopy jungle, constructing bunkers and firing positions and building a First Brigade camp and forward supply area. From the first day the camp was subjected to heavy mortar attacks, resulting in local patrols and companywide sweeps in order to locate and eliminate the enemy units”.

The following information, from After Action Report 29, (AAR) found on the 25th Aviation website, describes the supply situation within the 25th ID AO.

Facility information in preparation for OPERATION YELLOWSTONE:

  • TAY NINH- facility consists of steel storage tanks for 252,000 gal of JP-4 and 20,000 gal of Avgas, with 16 operational refuel points. Berms and bunkers are built for storage and issue of ammunition and pyrotechnics.
  • DAU TIENG-Facility has 24 operational refueling points with JP-4 capacity of 70,000 gals and Avgas with capacity of 12,000 gals. Bunkers and berms are provided for storage and issue of ammunition and pyrotechnics.
  • KATUM- Facility opened for Yellowstone for providing ammunition and pyrotechnics for operations in the area. Bunkers have been built for protection.

During Yellowstone the 25th S & T Bn was tasked with the mission of providing both personnel and equipment to assist in the timely flow of supplies and equipment through the four established DISCOM Forward Elements.

  • DISCOM Forward TAY NINH was the focal point for supply activities for the entire operation.
  • DISCOM Forward KATUM was initially responsible for the close monitoring and coordination of requisitions submitted and supplies handled through the 1st Logistics Command FSA (TF MERRITT). This facility was the most forward supply point for all operations in WAR ZONE “C”. All classes of supply were handled with initial resupply convoys augmenting the aircraft resupply effort. It was a function of the 25th S & T Bn. personnel to insure that these resupply efforts were expediously handled and prompt discharge performed. In addition, continuous liaison was effected and up to date records and status reports were maintained on all supply actions- (Note-All personnel necessary to support the TF was providede by 1st Log, with the 228th providing 20 men for this activity. The TF handled all records and the 228th provided men to bring in supplies by convoy from TAY NINH)
  • The 25th S & T Company (Provisional) at DAU TIENG under the operational control of DISCOM Forward DAU TIENG, was responsible for the close and continuous processing of requisitions and providing all supplies and services requested by units operating in its area of responsibility.
  • DISCOM Forward SUOI DA included an FSE organized, manned, stocked, and operated by the 25th S & T Bn., in conjunction with OPERATION YELLOWSTONE. Complete storage facilities were established for all classes of supply, MHE services provided, refrigerated storage and van services provided for perishable Class I supplies and a bath point provided. (Note- The 228th provided men to bring supplies in by convoy plus four men to set up and run the helicopter refueling area).



Suoi Da was an abandoned Special Forces Camp NW of TAY NINH on LTL-13, near the intersection of TL-243. The camp was used during the Spring 67 operations, and was to be reopened for YELLOWSTONE.

Please note there is no reference to a POL facility at KATUM. From discussions with LTC Merritt, there was a POL facility at KATUM for land vehicles, established near the entrance to the base camp. This function was manned by the men of the 758th S & S Co, who moved from PHU LOI.

Originally SUOI DA was set up with a Helicopter refueling facility in support of the 1st Brigade 25th ID and attached units operating along the Cambodian border.

Yellowstone started on 7, Dec 67 with a move of the 3rd-17th Air Calvary (minus C Trp) into SUOI DA from DI AN. We (A Newell, R Brown, J McCall and V Webb from the 228th arrived 7-10 days before this date to set up a POL section. I remember how happy we were to see them arrive as we had been eating rations since our arrival. We were tired of ham and lima beans . On their first day, they set up a field mess with hot food!

D Troop 3rd-17th AC provided base security, which I believe would indicate they were the primary force at the FSB. In addition the other Troops of the 3-17th used this camp as their base. Research indicated both the 4-9th Infantry (Manchus) and the 1-5th Inf (Bobcats) moved to Suoi Da at the start of YELLOWSTONE.

We left this base camp on or around 18 Dec67, when the powers to be realized this was not a good place to support operations along the Cambodian border. We immediately moved to KATUM to set up a helicopter refueling point. After a review of aerial pictures of the base camp, I am not sure if we were inside the old SF camp or across the road next to the airstrip. Note- Suoi Da continued to operate the different classes of service until 7Jan68, when the camp was abandoned. During this time men of the 758th S & S Company operated the remaining POL facility. When the facility was closed, the powers to be elected to burn down everything in place including bladders and  bunkers.(Confirmed by SP-4 J. White and SGT D. Wortman).

Some of the reasons SUOI DA was not deemed to be a good place for support are as follows, taken from the 3-17th AC AAR for YELLOWSTONE.

  • “As enemy mortar attacks increased in the vicinity of KATUM, the squadron was tasked to perform night counter- mortar security for the FSB. This situation was hampered by the lack of a secure landing area at or near the FSB”
  • “at 0445 hours on 14Dec67, following nightly probes and harassing fire, FSB SUOI DA was attacked with small arms and RPGs. This resulted in 2-US WIA, 2-aircraft damaged and 1-destroyed. Fire was returned immediately and a sweep at first light revealed one VC  KIA, 2-RPG rounds and 1-RPG launcher captured”. Helicopters in place overnight were vulnerable to enemy attack.

From a personal viewpoint, we were very close to the perimeter and with a lights out requirement, no work could be done on the helicopters at night. (Note- The 3-17th AC moved their repair facility to TAY NINH on 10Dec67).

If you look at the location of SUOI DA on a map, it made no sense for this FSB to be the main Helicopter refueling point, and provide support to those units operating along the Cambodian border.

On 2, Jan 68 the camp received 11 incoming mortar rounds.

The 3-17th Air Cav After Action Report indicated that Class III support was outstanding throughout the operational area.


When we (Brown, Newell, McCall and Webb) arrived at KATUM there was a lot of land clearing operations  underway at the NE end of the runway, where we set up the POL helicopter refueling area. Henry Ivey transferred from Laundry to become part of the POL group. We set up rubber bladders for JP-4, a 12-point refueling station, and Avgas capabilities via 55 gal drums. At a later date we would de-drum Avgas into bladders.

Just South of our area the Engineers were building the new SF camp, A-322.

On 15, Dec 67 at 0540, KATUM received 35-40 60mm mortar rounds.

On 26, Dec 67 we had high ranking visitors. From information supplied by Les Merritt-“The Commanding General and his accompanying troops came for a visit. He wanted a photo op showing him pinning medals on a couple of men in TF Merritt.He asked me who they should be and I told him who I thought  they should be. I chose the bulldozer driver (forgot his name) for a Bronze Star, and the Corporal in charge of the laundry and bath unit (Cpl Cade of the 228th S & S Co), for a Commendation medal.

On 29, Dec 67 the camp had a helicopter accident, described by L. Mitchell of B-4-9th Infantry. “There was a refuel- rearm point across from where our assembly area was . There were choppers everywhere and I did not know who was going to lift us in.At the rearm-refuel point, two Huey helicopters banged into each other and burst into flames. It took a long time to get the situation under control, so the helicopters could refuel and the guns be rearmed”.

On 11, Jan 68 at 1815. the camp received 10 rounds of 82mm mortars, and 15 rounds of 60 mm mortars, while Arther Newell and I (Vincent Webb), were de-drumming Avgas into bladders. We saw the first mortar hit across the runway about 75 yards from our position. By the time another hit, we were hauling butt to our “protection hole”, between the Avgas area and our first storage bladder. In the hole was Major Merritt. We had two mortars hit fairly close to the hole. Major Merritt was able to take a picture of some incoming round, which may have been at this time.

We had at least two instances where a Chinook load was either dropped or the chopper did not have enough power for take-off.

On 11, Feb 68 the camp received 31 rounds of 82mm mortars. Some of the rounds contained “gas”, which incapicated 10 individuals. ( From 25th Aviation website)

We provided around the clock service to all units supporting the Infantry and Artillery units during the attack on FSB BURT on 01-02Jan68.

According to Les Merritt, the majority of the TF left KATUM on or about 10Feb68. My recollection is the helo refueling unit stayed until the SF camp was manned and most of the other units had left the camp. I remember Arthur Newell taking the large lift and using it to lift up the logs and “Air Force pallets” we had used to build us a “home”. We tore down the refueling points and used the Chinooks to haul the bladders to TAY NINH. The perimeter was reduced to the area around the SF camp and the runway. The 4-9 Infantry “Manchus” indicated on their website that they completed breaking down bunkers and closed out the camp on 23Feb68.

Since the five of us manning the helo refuel unit were located at the NE end of the runway, we did not interface on a routine basis with the other members of the TF. On a few occasions we would take our lift truck and have drag races down the runway. Other fun activities was to sit on our bunker and see how many rats we could kill. We would remove the bullet portion of the round, leave the powder and stuff with cigarette filter paper, and burn their butt every chance we found.


Class I-Supply point consisting of 3000 cu ft of refrigeration, dry components, condiments, C-rations and ice point. This unit was manned by the 758th S & S Co

Class II and IV- Expendable items generally.This unit was manned by the 758th S & S Co

Class IV Engr- Fortification materials for both hasty and deliberate fortifications.

Class III-  POL points consisting of below:

  1. 70,000 gal JP-4 storage, with 11 point helo refueling facility. Manned by 228th personnel
  2. 10,000 gal Avgas storage, with 2 point refueling facility. Manned by 228th personnel
  3. 20,000 gal Mogas storage with bulk and individual dispensing facilities. Manned by 758th personnel
  4. 30,000 gal DF-2 storage with bulk and individual dispensing facilities. Manned by 758th personnel.
  5. Package fuel and lubricant storage area. Manned by 758th personnel.

Class V- ASP consisting of 10 storage berms, 1- unserviceable storage area and captured ammunition storage.

L&B Facility- Consisting of two 4-head showers, receiving and sorting tent, shipping tent, and laundry equipment work area.Manned jointly by  228th and 758th personnel.

GR- Battlefield processing of remains for evacuation to TAY NINH. Manned by 228th and 758th personnel.


Unloading of convoys in minimum time as to preclude overnight stay. Record was 106 trucks, 5-ton and under, in 3-hours.

FSA designated “Reaction Force” for KATUM base camp.

Provided over 33% of personnel for bunker guards for two week period, 1Jan-15Jan68.

Provided DA maintenance to non-divisional units and backup divisional contact team for all divisional units.

Sustained 9-casualties due to enemy mortar attack.

Comment by Sergeant Major of 1st Log Command, that the L&B facility was the second best in Vietnam.


This was an operation supported by the 2nd and 3rd Brigade of the 25th ID, at the same time as Operation Yellowstone. The operation was conducted due to the unexpected presence of the 101st NVA Regiment in the AO.

The 228th Service and Supply Bn- DAU TIENG was referenced as a supporting agency.

Submitted by: SP4 Vince Webb – 228th – With Contextual Data Provided by then MAJ. Sylvester “Les” Merritt 567th, Tay Ninh LSA, Commander: Task Force Merritt, Katum FSA {COL. US Army, ret.} – Other Website Research After Action Reportage of Various Units Named – Personal and other Eyewitness data and information collated from online research – Written Data, Orders, Rosters Supplied by Officers and Enlisted of 567th, 228th, etc!…………27 June 2010


The following narrative was written by then Major Sylvester ( Les )Merritt, now LTC Les Merritt (ret), who was Commanding Officer of Task Force Merritt. I had the privilege of serving under this fine officer as a member of the 228th POL ( Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant), helicopter refueling section. (PFC Vincent L Webb)

This is how it all began. Around October 1967 I was planning my R & R to Hawaii to meet my wife. When I was in Saigon looking for supplies with our Materials Readiness Expeditor (MRE) I set up the air and hotel plans for the trip. We were going to meet in November. I applied for R & R.

Next thing I know I am informed that I am going on an operation in November and if I wanted an R & R I had better take it immediately-now. Called my wife, changed plans, got my R & R approved and headed south to Cam Rahn Bay for further air transport to Hawaii. When I landed I went to the hotel where I had made reservations. I asked for my  wife’s room number. Not here! What? I was really low at this point. Finally a desk clerk stated that he had sent several people to another hotel a couple of blocks away. Found my wife and had a wonderful week. We had a great first honeymoon (never got to have a first one) and a great time. She was to leave Hawaii first.  At the airport she wouldn’t get on the airplane. Finally, all was well. I shipped out later that evening.

I am back in VN and find out the details of Operation Yellowstone from the 29th General Support Group boys in Long Binh. They told me the scope of the support operation. I told them that Tay Ninh did not have the personnel or the equipment to support something like this. Don’t worry. They will get me the people and stuff.

Back at the ranch, Tay Ninh, I started to gather my thoughts, coordinate with the 25th Infantry Division, started getting equipment from the eight points of the globe and personnel started reporting in from units I did not know existed. We were going to be called Task Force Merritt and provide a Forward Support Area (FSA) under the guidance of the 567th S & S Battalion (Tay Ninh), the 29th General Support Group (Long Binh), the Saigon Support Command ( Saigon), and the 1st Logistical Command (Long Binh).

We parked the equipment as it arrived along the roads of Tay Ninh base camp, feed and house the incoming personnel in the 567th area. We organized our work units, i.e Headquarters, Class I through V, Direct Maintenance Support and Graves Regristration, etc, appointed leaders and assistants. Operation Yellowstone kicked off. The first part was for the Infantry to clear a onetime convoy route to Katum. The infantry did this. The next part was to move the support troops in convoy to Katum and establish our support area in the Katum base camp. It was a day’s trip. Not bad scenery. There were lots of jungles but also lots of open area as we continued north. In my jeep, I had Sp5 Robert Trotter as my jeep driver and operations clerk. He had been with me since we formed the unit back at Fort Lee in 1966. I also had the mess sergeant, Sp 5 Robert Battapaglia in our jeep. We ate well as we proceeded north.

While we were enroute nothing happened. We had helicopter gun-ships overhead and infantry armored personnel carriers on our flanks. A few times we heard gunfire and the convoy stopped for a while before proceeding. Once we had to cross a swollen stream over which engineers had placed a scissors bridge. However the stream was wider than the bridge was long. They would hook a tow cable to the front of the vehicle and pull it across some water and mud onto the bridge and then do the same thing on the other side. There were a couple of near mishaps but nothing that didn’t get fixed quickly. Those engineeers were in mud up to their necks but they did their job well.

On arrival in the perimeter, holes were dug immediately in order to afford us some protection during our first night’s sleep. The next morning, we mapped out our areas for operations almost right out of the book. We had our own bulldozer so after putting the finishing touches on the holes for personnel shelters we started to build our distribution points and roads. Everything turned out just right. The amazing part  of all this was that our unit of many colors, shapes and sizes came together so quickly. We worked well together. We got the extra jobs done without any wining or protest and had started to build an espirit-de-corps second to none. For example,after an organizational pow-wow the section leaders scouted their respective support areas and the next thing I knew we had a textbook forward support area ready to do business. We had perfect berms for POL( Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant) and ammunition protection, once -in-a-lifetime laundry and bath area, good storage locations for ‘refeers’ (refrigeration units) and dry goods and traffic flow routes that would not get congested.

Credit for our success goes to every last one of the members assigned and attached to Task Force Merritt. I had good people to help me and they had good people under them. The other officers, besides myself, were 2Lt James Chappel who was my second in command, 2Lt Richard Herman who was in charge of Class V  and WO1 Dale Oliphant who was the maintenance officer. Sergeant James Booker ran the Class I area beautifully. One time during a mortar and rocket attack we found ourselves inside the same reefer hugging the rations cases together. Sp5 Richard Kozak ran our Class II and IV area. CPL Leroy Cade, whom I will mention again later, ran a great laundry and bath area. Where else in VN could one turn in dirty clothes, take a nice hot shower and then put on his clean clothes again all within a 30 to 40 minute period. All the troops loved this service area.

Our POL area was split between aviation fuel and vehicle fuel. Men of the 228th handled aviation fuel while men of the 758th S & S Co, led by Sgt Shadred Wilbanks pumped the gas station type products. It was amazing watching the C-130’s bring in petroleum products. First, they started with 55 gallon drums but these containers just didn’t provide what we needed to support our customers. Then we started to get 250 gallon bladders. This was much better. The best however, was when the whole airplane was one big 1000 gallon fuel bladder. We sucked the fuel directly from the plane to our storage containers. This was a great way to stay ahead of the demand for fuel.

On the second day we started to get airlifted supplies. We were in business. The airlift of supplies lasted for some ten days. Once the engineers got the road to Katum serviceable and the supply convoys started to roll we were really going strong. We provided support to all units involved in Operation Yellowstone and one time even gassed up a CIA aircraft headed to an unknown location.

I had a couple of communications personnel with a radio unit assigned to me. I made a report to LTC Robert Wagers (CO 567th S & S Bn) every night. I reported on personnel changes and replacements so the 567th could keep track of everyone. They informed the respective units on what was happening to their personnel. I did not keep a morning report. Just a list of people we had on board. If someone got sick I would send him back to his unit and another replacement would show up in a couple of days. I reported our supply needs to LTC Wagers and he forwarded them to the 29th General Support Group. What I ordered today would show up some two-three days later. If something down south happened that I needed to know LTC Wagers would call me during the day and the radio folks would hunt me down so I could call back.

The S-4 of the 1st Infantry Brigade  was our contact with the Infantry troops. I did not attend their briefings. If the S-4 had something of interest to us he would drive over and give me the news. At Christmas time he came over and told me that I had two slots for people to attend the Bob Hope show. He could not tell me when and where for security reasons but to be prepared to send my folks to him on a moments notice. Several days later, after Christmas, I asked what had happened. He stated that thay had cancelled the flight. Sure, I believe that! But what about the helicopters and C-130’s landing all day long on our airstrip?

We did not have many visitors. Once we got established and things started clicking we did get some infrequent visits from members of the 29th General Support Group staff. Once the Commanding General of the Saigon Support Command came and gave a Bronze Star to our bulldozer driver (can’t remember his name) and an Army Commendation Medal to our Laundry and Bath NCOIC. Corporal Leroy Cade Jr. from the 228th S & S Company. The General and his Sargeant Major were most impressed with our operation. A couple of days later I asked where the citations were. Heck, I figured the General gave out the medals so the 29th General Support Group or the Saigon Support Command staff would write up the citations. Wrong! You guessed it, I wrote them and sent them down to headquarters for their distribution.

One time I did get in trouble with the CG of the 25th Infantry Division. This incident happened as they were terminating our air supply operations and were ready to start getting our supplies via convoy. I did not know this was about to happen. As I stated before I did not attend their briefings.

The S-4 came and got me. He stated that the Corp Commander was being briefed by the CG of the 25th Infantry Division and they wanted me to come. I did. By the time I got there, the briefing was over and the generals were walking toward the airstrip. I was following behind them. The CO of the 25th ID was telling the Corp Commander that “the route to Katum was secure and safe and whenever MERRITT got his convoy rolling they could stop the airlifts” I kept walking behind them. Again the same type of words were used to infer that I had to get the convoys rolling. At this time, I stated that I did not have any convoys. The generals continued talking and walking. Again, a reference to getting my convoys moving as the road was secure now. By now I had the jest of the conversation. He was saying that his folks had done their job and now the supply people needed to get off their duff and start supplying his units via convoy. I boiled over at this point. I told the generals that I had four jeeps, five 3/4 ton trucks, and ten “deuce and a halfs”. I would use them for supply operations any time we wanted. Nothing. No comments. Later that night, I got a call from LTC Wagers wanting to know what happened. I told him. The CG of the 25th ID wanted my hide but in a couple of days the incident passed.(Note- The 228th provided men to haul the various classes of supply to Katum during this time. VLW)

Task Force Merritt was an independent, composite and non-divisional unit supporting the combat and combat support units of the 25th infantry Division as they conducted military operations in the Katum area during Operation Yellowstone in  late 1967 and early 1968. The chain of command for me was the 567th S & S Battalion. I did not have to deal with the other logistical type commands above the 567th directly. Still, they performed their behind-the-scene support duties well and thus contributed to our overall success because I never asked for anything that was not forthcoming within a short period of time. We never lacked for supplies. We never lacked for people. We never lacked for support from higher commands. Thus our success was their success also.

F) TASK FORCE MERRITT – After Action Report


Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (Prov)

APO US Forces 96216

SUBJECT:   After Action Report, Task Force Merritt,

                  Forward Support Activity, Katum, RVN

  • THRU:        Commanding Officer
  •                   Tay Ninh LSA (Prov)
  •                   APO US Forces 96216
  •                   Commanding Officer
  •                   29th General Support Group
  •                   APO US Forces 96491
  • TO:           Commanding General
  •                  USASUPCOM,Saigon
  •                  ATTN: AFCA SGW GO
  •                  APO US Forces 96491

1. References

   a. Letter, Headquarters, Saigon Support Command, subject Combat Operations dated 26 July 1967

   b. 29th General Support Group Regulation 210-7 subject: Establishment and Operation of Forward Support Areas (FSA) dated 9 Aug 1967.

   c. OPORD, 25th Infantry Division, code name “Operation Yellowstone”

2. Nature of the operation:

Search and destroy missions conducted by elements of the 25th infantry Division in northern part of Area A, III Corps Tactical Zone, Vicinity of Katum,RVN

3. Units Supported:

     HQ,1st Brigade                    2 Bn 77 Arty

     HQ, 2nd Brigade                  7 Bn 11 Arty   

     2 Bn 14 Inf                           3 Bn 13 Arty

     4 Bn 9 Inf                             65 Engr Bn

     3 Bn 22 Inf                           588 Engr Bn

     2 Bn 12 Inf                           B Co 25th Med Bn

     2 Bn 22 Mech                       1 Bn 49 Inf (ARVN)

     1 Bn 5 Mech                         FSA, Katum

4. Length of FSA Support:

14-17, Dec 1967 was spent in setting up operational areas. FSA provided support from 17, Dec 1967 through 6, Feb 1968. 7-10, Feb,1968 was used for backhauling ofc supplies, equipment and personnel.

5. Problem Areas:

     a. Arrival of Equipment: Convoys were initailly limited to only 5 ton vehicles and under without trailers. This required the majority of FSA equipment to be scheduled for airlift. Delay in acceptance of airfield by Air Force Inspection Team resulted in four days being lost in setting up equipment for operations in various areas. During period when equipment was not available personnel built protective bunkers and the bulldozer was used to build berms for Cl III (POL) and Cl V (Ammo) storage, road network for supply areas, and cleared jungle from perimeter of base camp.

    b. Stocking Objectives: Stockage objectives received thru initial coordination with 25th Inf Div Supply and Transportation Battalion were used as basis for planning and selecting equipment to operate FSA. One day prior to operation, stockage objectives received thru 29th GS Gp determined by 1st Log Command were different in Class III area.Later changes to stocking objectives were made by G-4 25th Inf Div to FSA, Katum for Cl III & V. These were not accepted since changes to stockage objectives were retained by 1st Log Cmd. These changes submitted were relayed through 29th General Support Group as recommended changes. At one time Cl III stockage objectives maintained by various headquarters is listed below.

                                   FSA Katum                     25th Inf Div                     1st Log Cmd

  •      JP-4                    65,000                             35,000                             45,000
  •      Avgas                    6,000                               6,000                               6,000
  •      Mogas                 15,000                              15,000                            12,000
  •      DF-2                   15,000                              35,000                            24,000

    c. Resupply by Airlift: After initail period of air lifting equipment and some supplies to Katum, air lift of supplies decreased rapidly. Periods of six days without receiving any supplies by aircraft were experienced due to diversion of aircraft to other critical areas and while this initailly hindered the FSA, once land LOC were used for resupply no further problems existed.

6. Lessons learned:

    a. That FSA’s should be controlled at the lowest possible level of command, ie. the logistical base nearest the location of the FSA.

    b. The land LOC is the only way to properly resupply an FSA. Air LOC is to undependable.

    c. The necessary transportation must be attached to the controlling headquarters of the FSA so that the commander not only controls the supplies, but also the means on getting them to the FSA.

7. Statistical Data

  Class I

  •       Rations                “A” 144,088 meals; “C”65,356; Sundry packs 1,330.           96Tons
  •       Ice                            50 Tons

    Class II

       90 line items          26 tons

    Class III

  •       JP-4                       340,500 gals
  •       Avgas                     18,000 gals
  •      Mogas                     167,700 gals
  •      Diesel                      232,800 gals
  •      Total                       759,000 gals

    Package products

      10 line items                 45 tons

Class IV

  •       Peneprine                433 drums
  •       Lumber                   180,600 bd. ft.
  •       Matting                    45 bundles
  •       Concertina               33 sleeves
  •       Tar Paper                 150 rolls
  •        Barbed Wire            50 rolls
  •       Pickets                      7000

   Total in tons                1,780.75 tons

Class V

      185 line items           4081.336 tons

Grand Total Tonnage all Classes    5043.5 S/T

  • Laundry                            116,360 lbs
  • Bath                                  21,570 showers
  • Graves Registration        33 US & 3 ARVN processed

Transport used to move the above listed supplies.

  •     10 Air Lift sorties 
  •     66 Tankers
  •     381 Cargo trucks, 2 1/2 & 5 Ton
  •     10 Vans
  •      83 S & P trailer

8. Task Force Organization:

             Section                                              Officers                    WO              EM

  • Command & Control………………………..2                           0                 9
  • Class I…………………………………………….0                           0                 9 
  • Class II & IV……………………………………0                           0                 4
  • Class III………………………………………….0                           0                13  
  • Class V……………………………………………1                            0                21
  • Laundry & Bath ………………………………0                           0                11
  • DS Maintenance………………………………0                           1                 13           
  • Graves Registration………………………….0                           0                 3
  • Transportation Squad ( Prov)………….. 0                           0                 4

Total                                                                        3                           1                87

A map (Layout of the FSA can be found in the 1967-1968 Memorabilia Section

A detailed roster of the men who were assigned to TF Merritt can be found in the 1967-68 Memorabila Section

by: Sylvester A Merritt Jr


FSA Commander

The above information was provided by LTC (retired) Les Merritt, Commanding Officer of TF Merritt. SP-4 Vince Webb extrapolated the data for ease of formatting.

567th History and Command Structure


The following information details the history of the 567th Supply & Service Bn and its successor organization the Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (Prov).

**Activated at Ft Lee, VA approximately May 1966. Bn. used as a training headquarters for other units for approximately one year.

**Bn left for Vietnam in Mar/Apr 66 (exact time TBD) Equipment, vehicles and four enlisted men departed by train to Calif. for furthr shipment to VN. Main force left Richmond, VA airport by contract aircraft to Oakland, CA, then to VN. Advance party (10 officers + EM) left Newport News, VA combat loaded on USAF C-130 in early Apr 67.

**Bn initially stationed at Danang, VN as part of the Danang Area Support Command. Units assigned were:

   Headquarters Company; Ammo Company; Heavy Maintenance Co; Truck Transportation Co, and a Supply & Service Co (DS)

**Bn started transfer to Tay Ninh, on 18May67. The Bn arrived with an attached Ammo; Bakery;  attached Laundry & Decontamination platoon, various EM + staff officers. The 266th S & S Bn transfered responsibility  for the 548th Light Maintenance Co (DS); 75th Fortification & Construction Platoon; and the 228th Supply & Service Co (DS) to the 567th.

On 18, May 67 HHC 567th prepared for deployment to Tay Ninh with an advance party of 5-Officers and 1-EM sent to Tay Ninh.

On 19, May,67  the 567th releived from  assigned and reassigned 16 EM to the 863rg Trans. Co in Danang

On 22, May 67 the Bakery platoon (1-Off + 33 EM) departed Chu Lai aboard Navy LST 623 for Danang. At Danang the balance of HHC joined and left @1810. Arrived Saigon @ 1100 on 23, May 67 Total manpower 9-Off & 89 EM.

On 26, May 67 HHC  departed Saigon @ 0520 via convoy. Arrived TN @1105 with 9-OFF + 87 EM. Two EM remained at Saigon hospital due to severe sunburn (G. Dorman &  T. Joyce).

From 28-31, May 67 the unit engaged in setting up camp. There is a belief that the 567th moved into the vacated quarters of the 175th Engineer Co.

Officers of the 567th were as follows:

LTC Edward Grandoville- Battalion Commander                       MAJ Joseph Falls- XO

MAJ Sylvester (Les) Merritt- Operations Officer                         CPT Teddy Blizard- CO of HHC

CPT Gerald Weigand- Trans. Officer                                          CPT William Crawford

CPT Harvey Hawken                                                                CPT Gordon Ozawa

CPT Thomas Falsoi                                                                   CPT James Thompson

1LT Carl Schaefer- Decon Officer                                             2LT Stanley Smith-81st QM Plt (Ldry), part of 567th

2LT James Cook

On 1, Jun 67 CPT Gordon Ozawa assigned from 567th to the 228th as CO.

On 4, Jun 67 2LT James Cook assigned to 228th from 567th.

On 5, Jun 67 2LT Ronald Holcombe assigned from 228th to 567th.

On 15, Jun 67 1LT Edward Motley assigned to 567th from 483rd Field Svc. Co

On 15, Jun 67 CPT William R Crawford assigned from 567th to USASUP Cmd, Saigon.

On 19, Jun 67 CPT Harvey Hawken assigned from 567th to HHC 266th S & S Bn.

On 21, Jun 67  1-WO + 39EM from the 551st Ord. Detach. were attached for rations, quarters + admin. Effective 28, May 67

On 21, Jun 67 1-Off + 106 EM from the 81st QM Platoon (Ldry) attached for quarters, rations + admin. Effective 28, May 67

On 23, Jun 67 29EM from 40th Ord Co; 1-EM 576th Ord Co; & 1-EM60th Ord Co attached for rations and quarters only.

On 30, Jun 67, in addition to the 9-Off + 1-WO +96 EM in HHC 567th, there was 1-Off + 1-WO +179 EM attached to the unit.

On 5, Jul 67 1st Sgt Edward Meeker assigned from the 228th to the 567th.

On 8, Jul 67 CPT Thomas Falsoi assigned from 567th to 29th Gp.

On 10, Jul 67 SGM Edward Knoll promoted from MSGE8

On 20, Jul 67 1LT Stanley Smith assigned to 228th (POL) from the 567th (Bkry Plt)

On 23, Jul 67 the 551st Ord Detach. departed after almost two months at TN. We believe this unit was replaced by the 2nd Magazine Platoon (Reinforced), who operated the Tay Ninh Ammo Supply Point (ASP)

On 6, Aug 67 MAJ Charles Sorrell assigned from HHC 266th S & S Bn to the 567th

On 6, Aug 67 MAJ Joseph Falls assigned to HHC 266th from the 567th.

On 12, Aug 67 27EM from the Bakery Plt left to 567th for Cu Chi .

On 23, Aug 67 17EM from Detach. “I” 212th MP Co (Sentry Dogs) attached for indefinite period.

On 25, Aug 67 1LT James Cook assigned to the 567th from the 228th.

On 25, Aug 67 1LT Edward Motley assigned to the 228th from the 567th.

On 1, Sep 67 1-OFF + 106-EM from the 81st QM Plt (Ldry) departed effective 28, Aug 67

On 11, Sep 67 1LT Ronald Holcombe returned to CONUS.

On 18, Sep 67 1LT Carl Schaefer assumes command of HHC from CPT Teddy Blizard

On 18, Sep 67 a Change of Control ceremony was conducted where LTC Robert Wagers assumed command of the 567th Bn from LTC Edward Grandoville.

On 19, Sep 67 LTC Edward Grandoville departs for Hq 1st Logistical Cmd.

On 21, Sep 67 Crt Teddy Blizard departd for Hq 9th Infantry Div.

On 21, Sep 67 CPT Frank Shehulski assigned from 18th PIO 9th Admin Co.

On 10, Oct 67 35-EM from Bakery Plt. attached to the 758th S & S Co. in Phu Loi.

On 26, Oct 67 CPT Von McCranine arrives from Hq II Field Forces.

On 30, Oct 67 CPT Gerald Weigand departs for Hq 25th Infantry Div.

On 30, Oct 67 MAJ Charles Sorrell departs for CONUS.

**On 17, Oct 67 HQ USArmy Pacific Cmd issued Special Order 198 inactivating Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment 567th Supply & Service Bn.

**On 22, Dec 67 HQ USArmy Support Command Saigon (USASUP SGN) issued Special Orders 353,354,355 &364 assigning all officers and EM in HHC 567th S & S Bn to the 228th S & S Co (DS), attached for duty/w the Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (Prov) (TNLSA). 89-EM, 7-Officers & 2-Warrent officers were transferred. The 228th added these soldiers to their headcount on 7, Jan 68.

**On 19, Jan 68 Hq TNLSA issued  Special Orders #10 appointing their command structure.

   LTC Robert Wagers- Commanding                 MAJ Sylvester (Les) Merritt- EXO

   CPT James Thompson- Adjutant                    CPT Von McCranie- Ord Supply Officer

   CPT Jimmy Ellington- Petrol Officer                1LT Theodore Cady- Motor Officer

   2LT James Talley- QM Supply Officer              CW2 Leroy Droddy- Unit Sup Tech

   CW2 Floyd Woodford- Auto Maint Tech

In addition CPT Frank Shehulski  was appointed CO of the 228th S & S Co replacing CPT Jimmy Ellington.

Note– It took over two months for the 29th Group, parent of the 567th to initiate the necessary orders to complete the inactivation of the 567th. 

**In late Nov67 the 567th S & S Bn was tasked with establishing a forward support activity (FSA), for Operation Yellowstone, a multi-brigade operation  to find the headquarters of the Viet Cong (COSVN) and interdict inflitration from Cambodia into Vietnam. The task force, named after MAJ Merritt (TF Merritt) conswisted of approximately 90 men who manned all classes of supply. Reference sections concerning TF Merritt and Katum for furthur information.

**On 22, Dec 67 Morning report the following changes for soldiers attached to the 567th were made:

      17EM from the 212th MP Sentry Dog Co. were returned to their unit per General Order #61 from the 18th MP Bge

     11EM from the 758th S & S Co were retuned to thsir unit in Phu Loi

     8EM from the 228th S & S Co were returned to their unit.

    35EM attached to the 758th S & S Co were returned to HHC 567th S & S Bn aka Tay Ninh LSA. This was the bakery platoon.

Effective 22, Dec 67 the 567th became the Tay Ninh Logistical Support Activity (TNLSA) and continued to function as a Battalion support function for the Tay Ninh base camp and other locations in its area of operation.

On 19, Mar 68 LTC Robert Wagers, CO of the TNLSA, was transferred to 29th Group Headquarters as Logistics Officer.

On 26, Apr 68 the 2nd Magazine Platoon (Reinforced) was replaced by the 41st APU to operate the ASP.

In April 68 a large majority of the original HHC 567th S & S Bn, including almost every staff officer, returned to CONUS.

(Information provided by LTC Les Merritt & SP4 Vincent Webb from copies of orders, Morning Reports and remembrances.)

H) Command Structure 567th S&S BN (DS) 31 October 1967 – Tay Ninh

1) Per 1st Logistical Command Quarterly Report dated 15, November 1967 covering Quarter ending 31, October 1967 the following is annotated regarding the 567th S&S BN (DS) Command Structure in Tay Ninh:

1st Logistics Command; superior of HQ USASUPCOM, Saigon; superior of 29th General Support Group {Long Binh}*, superior of:

567th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support) – Tay Ninh*

75th Heavy Material Support Company (POC)….{hard to make out – might be P&C)* | 81st Quartermaster Platoon (Laundry) | 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) | 548th Light Maintenance Company (Direct Support) | 2nd Engineer Platoon, 40th Ordnance Company

{Note: See previous section (G) near end of section “effective 22 December 1967, the 567th S&S BN (DS) became the TNLSA” (Tay Ninh Logistical Supply Area), the 567th no longer existing as an entity within RVN. The Command stucture then remaining as the TNLSA until on or about very late 1968 to early 1969, when the 277th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) relocated from Long Binh to Tay Ninh and assumed command of the TNLSA … see 228th History 1969 -1970}

2) Within the same Flow chart, same date, same quarterly report the former superior of 228th  (July 1966 – May 1967), the 266th S&S BN (DS) is annotated as follows:

1st Logistics Command; superior of HQ USASUPCOM, Saigon; superior of 29th General Support Group {Long Binh}*; superior of:

266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support) – Long Binh*

41(st)* APU ….. (Army Postal Unit)* | 82nd Quartermaster Platoon (Laundry) | 223rd Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) | 229th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) | 483rd Field Service Company……..(Note: GS or General Support Designation dropped or not annotated in report) | 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) | 624th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support)

* Locations or annotation added by submitter for clarity.

Submitted and Posted 7 February 2013 – SP4 A.B. Neighbor