Miscellaneous Data
Parts 1-3: Command Structure
Part 4: Early Days – Republic of Vietnam
Part 5: Table of Organization and Equipment
Part 6: PMOS and Other
Part 7: Battalion Direct Support Objectives and Principles
Parts 8-10: Officers/1st Shirts/Company Clerks, Operations Supported, and Reference Reading Material
Introduction
This portion of History Section is intended to allow for additional material, data and the like, which is pertinent to the mission of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), but not included within specific “History” portions of specific years.
Such material is added for further elucidation regarding areas covering Chain of Command Structure, various individual units associated with such command structures, both directly and indirectly, Table of Organization and Equipment and other, for historical purposes and enlightenment.
Command Structure
Part 1: Basic Command Structure
There is a good deal of confusion both on and off line regarding actual command structures of a unit when looked at from the bottom up, or the top down. In a Company sized unit such as the 228th (viewed from the bottom up) the following would apply:
First, in a simplified form, there would be the Individual with a primary military occupational specialty. This individual would be a part of a Squad, which in turn would be a portion of a Platoon, which in turn would be a portion of a Company. It should also be noted, that there are other terms used and/or designated within a unit, or an entire unit itself, they being; detachment, section, etc! depending on designation assigned by a higher authority.
A Company is headed by a Company Commander (usually a Captain), followed by an Executive Officer (usually a 1st Lt.). Platoon Leaders whom are all Officers (aka OICs’ range in rank from 2nd Lt. to 1st Lt., on occasion a Warrant Officer). Within the Platoon there is usually an individual overseen by said Officer called a Non Commissioned Officer (aka: NCOIC) who hold the rank ranging from Buck Sergeant to Staff Sergeant (usually a Staff Sergeant with pay grade of E6 – E7), depending on availability and unit strength allocated. Within the Company there is a Headquarters and Headquarters personnel who usually operate under the direct oversight of the Company Commander and/or his Executive Officer. These personnel usually oversee the day to day operations of the Company from a paperwork perspective consisting of “written morning report, orders, correspondence, judicial matters, rosters, assignments, files and the like”. Such work product is handled within what is called an Orderly Room. In addition to the Company Commander, at times an Executive Officer, there is a 1st Sergeant (aka: 1st Shirt), a Company Clerk, sometimes an assistant Company Clerk, Mail Clerk, Company Armorer, and Commanding Officers Driver. In addition and depending on structure, there are other personnel considered to be a part of a Company Headquarters which varies by unit or its mission. Within the 228th the following personnel were considered to be part of Headquarters personnel; Company Commander, First Sergeant, Mess Sergeant, 1st Cook, Motor Sergeant, Company Supply Sergeant, Company Clerk, Assistant Company Clerk, Company Armorer, Company Generator Operator, Company Supply Clerk, Company Communications Clerk, Company Mail Clerk, Class I Clerk, Class II and IV Clerk, Class III Clerk, GR Clerk, L&B Clerk, Clerk TDY to Major Ward of 15th Support Brigade, Company Commanders Driver.
Note: Usually most of the above personnel would be quartered with their respective personnel they performed duty with, but not always. In the 228th for example, the Company Clerk, Assistant Company Clerk, COs’ Driver, Company Armorer, Company Generator Operator were quartered in the same Field Tent {later wooden structures}. Personnel, were pretty much allowed a good deal of latitude as to where they quartered, in a number of cases with friends and not necessarily by platoon of assignment. Thus the Company Mail Clerk, and other unit personnel were allowed to quarter wherever they liked…the Company Supply Clerk and his assistant in the Company Supply Field Tent, the assistant Class I clerks spread about, as well as a few other assorted personnel. In other words there were no absolute “hard” fast rules regarding quarters, although the bulk of personnel (90%) did quarter in field tents of their particular platoon assignment.
A Company as a general rule of thumb reported to a superior command known as a Battalion. This can vary depending on command structure. The Battalion in turn reported to a Group which can also vary depending on structure. The Group would in turn report to a higher authority (in this case regarding the 228th) a Support Command, who in turn reported a higher authority and overall Command Structure; 1st Logistics Command. This Command, reported to another higher command authority, which in turn also reported to a higher authority command structure, and so on until eventually all data generated at the Company level reached Washington D.C., The Pentagon, Department of Defense and the Commander in Chief (President of the United States).
Although cumbersome, a good deal of redundancy, consolidation and the like, it is amazing to realize, that within a short period of time from beginning to end point, the Military knows on a day to day basis, the exact general, if not specific status of any given unit right down to each individual person on any given day and moment in time.
It is not the purpose or intent of this writing to present a detailed analysis of command structures and the many intricacies involved therein. It is the intent of this Website to show the basic Command Structure and flow chart of higher authority regarding the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), in order that the reader have a basic understanding of the complexity, if not general flow of a command structure (for time period 1966 -1967).
Especial thanks to then 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker for providing the following flow chart materials in conjunction with other online research and other known material by personnel involved with these matters.
As of July 1966 regarding the 228th, the following applies as a top down Command Flow Chart:
1st Logistics Command Republic of Vietnam, Saigon
Headquarters United States Army Support Command, Saigon
29th General Support Group, Long Binh
266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support), Long Binh
228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), Long Binh
As of 4 -7 October 1966, the only change to the preceding is as follows:
228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), Tay Ninh Province
Part 2: Command Structure Detail – 29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP
The following is a more precise breakdown of all units under the command of the 29th General Support Group whose superior higher authority was Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, who in turn reported to the 1st Logistics Command.
Note: The main unit will be listed in “Bold” followed by its subordinate units directly assigned within said unit. This will be followed by other command units also in “Bold” with their assigned subordinate units who all reported to the 29th General Support Group and were under their particular jurisdiction and oversight.
29th General Support Group:
Assigned Subordinate unit: 3rd Ordnance Battalion (Ammo), its assigned and subordinate units being: 42nd Ordnance Detachment, 54th Ordnance Company, 78th Ordnance Detachment, 550th Ordnance Detachment, 551st Ordnance Detachment, 576th Ordnance Detachment…all (Ammo).
185th Maintenance Battalion (Direct Support) – Subordinate Unit of 29th:
Assigned and subordinate units: Headquarters and Main Support Company (Direct Support), 19th Light Maintenance Support Company (Direct Support), 94th Maintenance Company (Direct Support), 140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (Direct Support), 177th Ordnance Detachment, 218th Collection, Class and Salvage Company, 349th Signal Detachment – Radar Repair, 540th Light Maintenance Company (Direct Support), 551st Light Maintenance Company (Direct Support)
266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support) – Subordinate Unit of 29th:
Assigned and subordinate units: 75th Heavy Material Supply Company (General Support), 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), 570th Repair Parts Company (General Support), 624th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), w/other units assigned as time progressed and Long Binh Supply Point expanded.
Note: Within History Section 1966-1967 it is noted, that Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) had been stripped of 100 personnel at Tent City A, by 1st Logistics Command. It was further noted, that Company B upon arrival in Long Binh and within the week had its Laundry and Bath Platoon assigned TDY to the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion of the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi. In addition the entire Bakery Section (excluding one person) had also been assigned TDY to the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi. After 20 July 1966 {Company B, now the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS)} also had its General Supply Platoon TDY at Bien Hoa Air Force Base.
Excluded from History 1966-1967, was the additional fact, that the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) POL {Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants} Platoon was TDY with the 64th Quartermaster Battalion HQ and HQ Detachment {later 64th HHC Petroleum Battalion}, as was the POL Platoon of the 223rd Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), and the 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) while stationed in Long Binh. When re-assigned to Tay Ninh in October 1966, the 228th regained the bulk of its POL Platoon, but did have personnel still TDY with the 64th through 1967.
Part 3: Command Structure Detail 2 – HQ UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON
Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Saigon in addition to the 29th General Support Group and its preceding subordinate units, also had the following major commands (on par with the 29th) under its operational control as of early August 1966, they being:
507th Engineer Detachment w/12 assigned sub detachments. – 90th Replacement Battalion w/3 Detachments. – United States Army Mortuary, Vietnam. – 29th Financial Detachment w/5 assigned units. – Vung Tau Sub Area Command w/20 assigned units. – Headquarters and Headquarters Company w/3 assigned units United States Army Support Command. – 506th Field Depot, Headquarters and Headquarters Company w/14 assigned units. – 48th Transportation Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment w/9 units assigned. – 64th Quartermaster (later Petroleum) Battalion w/6 assigned units. – Aerial Delivery Company (Provisional) w/1 Detachment assigned. – Tent Camp Bravo, Camp Red Ball, and last, the 537th Personnel Service Company.
Note: The various assigned subordinate units to the named main entities described above are not listed in the interest of brevity considerations, as for the most part, said units (with a few exceptions) had virtually no contact with the 228th and/or its operational mission. However, said data is available through contact portion of this Website, and/or may be posted at a later point in time….pending amount and degree of interest expressed. ….Submitted by: Arthur B. Neighbor w/contextual data provided by Paul B. Walker
Early Days – Republic of Vietnam
- Introduction
- Long Binh at the Arrival of 266th
- 266th Predecessors and 228ths Sister Units
- 506th/228th Similarity
- Long Binh Quartermaster Missions, 1966
- 266th Area Security and 64th Quartermaster BN
- 266th Expanded RVN Support Mission
- Changing at 266th's Arrival
- 266th Command and Mission Changes
Part 4: Early Days Republic of Vietnam Long Binh, RVN and Additional
This supplement to the 228th S&S CO History is about “the early days” (1966) of the 266th QM/S&S BN, its predecessor S&S BN (Prov), the 228th (originally Company B, 266th) and its early sister units in Long Binh for those interested in that period.
This information is prepared by 1LT Paul Walker (506th QM/S&S CO, MAR 66 – DEC 66 and 228th S&S CO DEC 66 – FEB 67). (Note: All first person references are my observations or opinions, and responsibility for any errors or misinterpretations is entirely mine.)
With the 506th QM/S&S CO at Long Binh (MAR66 – early DEC66), most of the time I was either Security Officer or Operations Officer or both, so was supposed to know what units were where and what they did, etc. Unit locations and missions are shown below, which is hopefully largely accurate.
266th Quartermaster/Supply & Service BN Units and Missions MAR66 – DEC 66
(including predecessor Supply & Service BN (Provisional) MAR66 – JUN66)
Note: At the time of posting re: above “Table of Units and Missions” there were minor omissions, that could not be corrected prior to posting of said table, they being: (1) July 1966 – October 1966, General Supply Platoon 228th Supply and Service Company (DS), TDY Bien Hoa Air Force Base. (2) The 64th Quartermaster Battalion (later Petrol Battalion) in addition to having the 538th and 556th Transportation Companies (POL) assigned, also had (July 1966 – October 1966) the POL Platoons TDY to the 64th consisting of the 228th, 506th, and 624th Supply and Service Companies. In October 1966, the 228th regained the bulk of its POL Platoon when re-assigned to Tay Ninh in October 1966. It is known, that as of 1 February 1967, there was still one (1) individual {SP4 Ralph Heatlie} assigned to the 228th who remained TDY with the 64th in Long Binh….A.B.Neighbor
Long Binh at the Time of the 266th’s Arrival:
At the time of the 266th’s arrival (1JUL66), Long Binh consisted of very few units compared to the enormous complex it would become in 1967 and after. The northern tip of what would later become the Long Binh “triangle” was at the junction of National Routes 1A (southwest to Saigon), and Route 15 (southeast toward Vung Tau). At this “top of the triangle” was the 60th Ordnance GRP (predecessor of the 29th General Support GRP). Extending from there down Route 1A were the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, Supply & Service BN (Prov), 69th Signal BN, 159th Engineer GRP, and 48th Transportation GRP. Extending down Route 15 were the 185th Ordnance BN (M&S) and 3rd Ordnance BN (Ammo). Across Route 15 was 3rd ORD’s extensive ammo dump. All the preceding units were contiguous. Isolated about midway along the “base of the triangle”, was the 64th Quartermaster BN (POL). Although these units’ perimeters were linked (except the 64th), each was entirely responsible for its own perimeter and security.
266th Predecessors and 228th Sister Units:
The Supply & Service BN (Provisional) was the 266th’s predecessor. It included the 624th Quartermaster CO (DS), 506th Quartermaster CO (DS), and 569th Quartermaster CO (Composite). While the 624th and 506th were organizationally complete QM DS companies, the 569th was mostly an organizational shell of some kind.
The 624th had been in-country since 25AUG65, with arrival Long Binh sometime after; the 506th in-country since 2NOV65, with arrival Long Binh in DEC65.
The 624th and 506th had reported to the 185th Ordnance BN until the formation of the S&S BN (Prov) around 1, MAR 66, which was deactivated and replaced by the 266th shortly after its arrival at Long Binh on 1, JUL 66.
The CO of the S&S BN (Prov) was MAJ Bounds and the XO MAJ Harris. Harris served as acting CO from 21, MAY 66, after Bounds was transferred to Saigon and until the Provisional BN was dissolved following the 266th’s arrival. The original 624th CO was CPT Estes, replaced by CPT Aikman (transferred from the 569th) in APR 66, followed by CPT Kuster JUL – SEP 66 (subsequently assigned as 228th CO). The original 506th CO was CPT McCarthy, replaced by CPT Wood (new in-country) about 5JUL66.
The S&S BN (Prov) area was somewhat of a rectangle, a bit over 1/2 mile deep and 1/4 mile wide (perhaps 80 acres or so). The Depots occupied the rear half (at least) of the area, with the Class III Depot being the primary safety concern. The perimeter joined the 93rd Evac and 185th Ord BN on one side, and the 69th Signal BN on the other; the front adjoined Route 1A, across which there was a relatively small ARVN transportation compound, otherwise just open area; and the rear adjoined what was referred to as the “Haul Road”, across which there was nothing but the scrub brush and scattered small trees typical of the area at that time and a very gently rising slope which then descended to the little creek Soui Ba Lua.
There were two triple-concertina perimeter fences, six guard bunkers (posts 1, 2, and 3 facing Route 1A; 5, 6, and 7 facing the Haul Rd (Post 4 facing 69th Signal BN had been eliminated in mid-April, when the perimeter was tied into that unit’s), with trenches between the bunkers. At the time of the 266th’s arrival, the S&S BN (Prov) area was secured by 624th and 506th personnel, with the 228th subsequently participating.
Similarity of 506th and 228th Leadership and Priorities:
CPT Patrick McCarthy had a reputation for GI’s first (wherever possible), mission a darned close second, and appearances a pretty distant third. In Officers’ training, I had been taught that a leader only has to do just two things (1) accomplishment of the mission and (2) welfare of the men (simple!). CPT McCarthy taught and modeled that if you put #2 first, then #1 almost always takes care of itself. And, getting the job done was what it was about, and appearances were unimportant if they interfered with getting the job done. And that’s what I learned with the 506th.
With the coming of the 266th BN, my experience was that all too often, it was appearance first and getting the job done second, and maybe the GI’s were in there somewhere. So, later in 1966 (early DEC) it was with some trepidation that I headed off to join the 228th. But, I found to my delight that CPT Kuster and the GI’s of the 228th were thankfully very much the same as the 506th.
Long Binh Quartermaster Missions in 1966:
By early 1966, the 624th had the Class I, Class II&IV, and QM Maintenance missions; the 506th had the Class III, Graves Registration, and Laundry and Bath missions in Long Binh. Also by this time, US Army Support Command Saigon (USASCS) had made a decision to store very large quantities of bulk Class I (rations), II&IV (general supplies), and III (petroleum products – “POL”) in Long Binh as what was then known as the Long Binh Sub-Depot, operated by the 624th and 506th in addition to their DS missions.
The QM missions at Long Binh were more rationalized on 14MAR66, as the 624th was assigned the DS missions and the 506th the Depot missions. The 624th’s DS mission was for command and support units at Long Binh, and some limited support for the 173rd AB. The 506th’s Class I, II&IV, and III Depot missions supported local Long Binh, 173rd AB, 1st ID, and some limited support for the 25th ID. In addition, the 506th’s Class II&IV Depot mission actually extended throughout most of RVN, including support to Vung Tau, Cam Ranh, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. The Depots were operated by the 506th under the command of the S&S BN (Prov) and later the 266th, “as directed by” USASCS. Command of the Class III missions was assumed by the 64th Quartermaster BN (POL) in MAY66, although still staffed by 624th and 506th GI’s TDY.
266th Area Security and the 64th Quartermaster BN:
After the 266th’s arrival, security conditions remained much as they had been before (the almost-nightly outgoing artillery fire had become infrequent by April). There were occasional incidents of individuals observed at the rear outer fence, being fired on, but never hit. (It was impossible to know if these sightings were real or imagined, but if they were outside or into the fence, guards were expected to chamber and fire.)
More serious incidents were outside the immediate area, most involving the 3rd Ord’s ammo dump (about a mile northeast of the 266th area, which was hit at least 3 times in the fall. On the night of 28-29OCT, an entire pad of 8-inch shells (M-110 howitzer ammo) was destroyed, resulting in 2 KIA and 6 WIA (and TV and newspaper coverage stateside). There was one WIA in a firefight along the 48 Trans’ rear perimeter, date uncertain but likely JUL66. And, Highway 1A had the occasional sniping, and a rare instance of machine gun fire in SEP66. Small suspected local VC units were occasionally reported in the “base of the triangle” area.
The 266th area housed vast stocks of POL (mostly in 55-gallon drums in the CL III Depot), which was the primary security concern. There were several theories about how explosive all that stuff was (mostly Mogas, Diesel, Avgas, and JP4), and we never really wanted to find out. Even so, it was a constant challenge to keep guard personnel focused and avoid complacency, because incidents were few. One of the problems with Long Binh at the time was this deceptive relative “security.”
The 64th QM BN was quartered in parts of the area later occupied by the 266th, from around 20APR66 until mid-JUN66, when they occupied their own area near the center of the “base of the triangle” in Long Binh. This was the first unit area that was not contiguous to other units along either Highways 1A or 15. It was over a click off of 1A, down the (then) narrow usually hard-packed gravel road that ran in a more-or-less leftward curve from 1A to 15 (thus, “the base of the triangle”, with the 1A/15 junction being the apex). There were a scattering of local hootches here and there on down that road, a couple of very small Vietnamese villages a bit to the south, and the occasional 5+ man local VC group in the area up to no good, and it was (at that time) an area to avoid wherever possible. I don’t know what USARV (or whoever) was thinking when the decision was made to isolate the 64th from the other units, but it contributed to the two 64th KIA (2LT Webb and SFC Leuthold) on 5JUN66. They were going to check out progress on prepping their new area, when shot up badly. Webb was at the 506th mess for lunch that day, and they were on the GR tables by mid-afternoon.
266th Expanded RVN Support Mission – the 506th’s CL II&IV Depot:
(Warning: Following, I’m including a bit of detail here, since many may not be aware that – for a time – the 266th was supporting most of RVN in some way or other via the 506th’s CL II&IV Depot mission.)
The II&IV Depot occupied about seven acres in the left rear of the 266th area. It was a 24-hour operation, because a great deal of work was dependent on what was coming off ships at Saigon Port, which was entirely unpredictable. With Route 1A secure enough for night travel, and the emphasis on “clearing the port” and “turning the transportation”, large or small shipments could appear at any time and trucks had to be offloaded with minimal delay. Likewise, many outgoing shipments (explained later) were dependent on when ships were available for loading, day or night.
The 506th’s II&IV Depot received items from CONUS directly off the ships from Saigon Port. They were mostly larger crated or palletized and banded items, although sometimes small and loose. They were supposed to be “suitable for outside storage”, but this was not always true. (We never knew what was coming, when, or how much until the trucks showed up, so had to be prepared pretty much for anything anytime.) Lots of the stock (maybe as much as 1/4 at the time the 266th arrived) were 1600cuft prefab refrigerators, that came in 9 crates plus 3 compressors. (I believe most supplies and equipment were still coming into RVN through Saigon at the time, so we wound up with pretty much the only in-country stock of quite a few of these larger items.)
The II&IV Depot supported local Long Binh, 173rd AB, 1st ID, and the 25th ID. All these would pick stuff up with their own transport. Otherwise, we’d haul stuff over to Bien Hoa to go on Caribous/C-123’s/C-130’s, load out a Chinook in the yard, haul stuff down to Cogido dock (on the Song Dong Nai, off Highway 1A to the right a bit before crossing the bridge) to load out barges (to float, surprisingly, down the Dong Nai to Vung Tau), etc.
But, most of it had to go back to Saigon Port to be loaded out on ships and up the coast to Vung Tau, Cam Ranh, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, or Da Nang. Since we only had one 5-ton tractor and S&P trailer assigned, transport for most all that had to be arranged through 48th Transportation Group. This was usually less than 10% Army transport and 90%+ Vietnamese civilian transport (the small flatbed trucks that were just up-and-down all over Route 1A, since it was secure enough that the VN civilians would drive it).
We’d get just a few hours notice whenever there was a ship available “inboard”, and a limited window before it was pushed “outboard” at Port – the ships were actually “double-parked” – so it would be pretty frenetic to arrange all this transportation (sometimes well over 100 trucks) and get them loaded out, individually started down 1A, policed up where they might have gone to sleep off on the shoulder, and (hopefully) all checked in shipside at whatever hours of the day or night we were moving the stuff, like “herding chickens!” It was very eerie roaring through Saigon after curfew with a 5-ton S&P rig, with absolutely nothing else stirring (in this otherwise teeming city) except occasional MP’s or “white mice” behind sandbag barriers here and there.
(Note: The 506th’s responsibility for these shipments officially ended when trucks were loaded out at Long Binh and on their way. Not content with just that, we took on the extra responsibility for insuring every truck actually arrived at the correct ship at Saigon Port. This required repeatedly “running” Route 1A back and forth between Long Binh and Saigon, with two GI’s using the OIC’s jeep and armed with M-14’s, to find and get moving those trucks pulled off for a rest break; and one or two GI’s at Saigon Port to guide and check them in at shipside on the docks, while loading would be continuing at Long Binh.)
CL II&IV tonnage handled for these various operations were routinely 50 tons/day, with peak weeks averaging over 100 tons/day, and peak days of 200 – 250+ tons. Forklift hours were just brutal on the equipment, but if two 10,000lb rough-terrain (RT) forks could be kept running, we were generally okay. Authorized up to 9 forks of various sizes, usually three or so were actually available due to deadlined (usually for parts) or TDY elsewhere. Diesel-powered 10,000lb Payloader scoop loaders converted to forklifts were by far preferable to the Army’s regular RT forks (which were maintenance nightmares).
II&IV staff was typically OIC, NCOIC and 12 or so GI’s (4 forklift operators, 3 Receiving & Issuing Section, 2 Shipping Section, 3 Storage Section) and 12 or so VN civilians (10 yard laborers, 2 clerks). Hours were challenging for staff, especially when running night-and-day nonstop for several days to get shipments out to Saigon Port. Like many units in RVN (and notably the 228th), the 506th was chronically understaffed.
Changing Leadership and Priorities After the 266th’s Arrival:
The 624th and 506th had been initially very pleased to have a “real” battalion (the 266th), but generally became disillusioned pretty quickly. There were new requirements for E-6 and above to always wear fatigue jackets (no more just t-shirts) even in the work areas, “zero tolerance” (I don’t believe that was a term back then) for any kind of correction (not even one) on any kind of typed report, picking at wording in reports and bouncing them back if they didn’t like the wording (sometimes an issue of fact vs. fiction), fixation on “police” out in the yards, distaste for mud (which was hard to avoid, what with rain and all), etc. and I could just go on-and-on about all the “stateside” CS that soon (as we saw it) afflicted our previously relatively unpretentious existence (not that some CS hadn’t occurred before, but the frequency and magnitude of it just increased exponentially).
In the spirit of keeping “negatives” to the lighthearted kind, and offered on the (sort of) “fun” side, here’s just a couple from the 266th’s very early days☺:
First, the 506th CO (CPT McCarthy) was pretty quickly transferred to Saigon. He was a bit superstitious, specifically involving his fatigue (baseball) cap never being laundered since arriving in-country, so it had become encrusted with eight months of latterite dust, sweat, salt residue, etc. “Word-of-mouth” from reliable sources (later becoming 506th legend) had it that as soon as the266th CO first saw that cap, a quick transfer was planned for McCarthy. (Could this really be true, I wonder? – yeah!)
Second, the 266th never really appreciated the 24-hour operations required by the Depots. By mid-July, claiming a security risk, a directive was issued requiring the Depot OIC to personally escort every VN civilian truck at night between the main gate and the Depot yards. This mind-numbing rule was followed for five nights (up almost continuously every night, plus days) until the (seemingly obvious) case could be demonstrated that no one could remain reasonably functional indefinitely under such a rule, and that any GI from the Depot night shift could perform this duty.
Finally, early on in the II&IV Depot (and illustrating the kinds of decisions that had to be made between “mission” and “appearance”), during one of the times there were trucks backed way up the road toward the main entrance, running 10,000lb RT forklifts to get them offloaded and turned (“turn the transportation” was an absolute rule, since these were trucks used for offloading ships at Saigon Port and had to be turned “immediately if not sooner”, since at the time there were ships literally “double-parked” at Port and backed down the Saigon River). When these onslaughts of incoming trucks arrived (there was never any advance notice), we’d put as much as we could in the stacks where they were supposed to go, but inevitably some of the crates or palletized items would have preexisting damage, or we’d create some damage ourselves (because most of the chocks on the crates were not deep enough to accommodate the thickness of the RT forks, or they weren’t on the trucks in a good position for offloading, so we’d have to tilt, nudge, jiggle, etc. to get the forks under the things being lifted), and so there would be chunks of wood, snapped banding, and all manner of debris etc. accumulating, and we’d set any damaged crates, palletized loads, etc. off in a corner and whenever (it could be many hours or even days) everything was turned and we had breaks from the incoming trucks, we’d go back and repair, re-palletize, re-band, etc. whatever needed it, and after a few hours (or sometimes days) everything would usually be #1 (until the next time).
Sorry for the digression, but just to set the stage a bit. So, soon after the 266th’s arrival and during one of these offloading marathons, an emissary of the BN CO appears, finds my PLT SGT (exemplary SSG E-6 Dinova), and directs him to stop with the offloading until the debris was policed (which would have required an inordinate amount of time and delay). SGT Dee finds me, and we ask ourselves, “what’re we gonna do?” and answer “we’re gonna turn the transportation”, so we kept on offloading and creating ever more debris as we went. (The emissary did not return to check on execution of his directive, and this was one of the first of many flirtations with minor insubordination with the 266th, in the interest of getting the job done and/or the GI’s sanity.)
On the upside, there were a number of truly helpful BN staff. I recall in particular, 1LT Jon Putz, who was the 266th’s Maintenance Officer. Putz was a big help in keeping the Payloader 10,000-lb RT forklifts (diesel-powered converted scoop loaders; anyone fortunate enough to have these marvelous workhorse machines assigned will likely remember them fondly) available and running (which was often a challenge due to the hours we put on them). The regular gasoline-powered 10,000-lb and 6,000-lb RT’s were just pieces of s—t in every way (and the warehouse-type forks not suitable for the bigger stuff that the II&IV Depot handled, plus bad in mud), so it was just critically important to keep as many of the Payloaders going as possible, and Putz had a very good appreciation for that.
266th Command and Mission Changes – Late 1966:
On 11OCT66, the 266th Battalion Commander LTC Sheffey was re-assigned, with LTC Scopel of 29th General Support Group acting as interim Commander until the arrival of LTC Joseph Tambe in late October 1966.
When the last of the depots were transferred in mid-OCT66, the 506th was assigned to DS of the 11th Armored Cav at Long Giao (sometimes referred to as Xuan Loc, but actually about 15 clicks south of Xuan Loc city down Provincial Route 2, and referred to as Blackhorse by the Cav), similar in many ways to what the 228th accomplished at Tay Ninh, but on a smaller scale.
For some reason, the transfer of the 506th’s II&IV to Long Giao was delayed from OCT66 until JAN67, which accounted for my (fortuitous for me) availability for transfer to the 228th in DEC66.
And, as noted previously, it was a pleasure to become associated with the 228th, which was so similar to the 506th in the excellence and dedication of its leadership and GI’s to getting its mission accomplished.
TOE – Table of Organization and Equipment – Direct Support Company
Part 5: TOE – Table of Organization and Equipment – Direct Support Company
Organization Extract:
The following data is extracted from TOE 10-107D of DOA in order to simplify, yet give a clear understanding of the mission, duties and functions associated with a Direct Support Company from 1960 – 1966. For clarification purposes the basic function of a Direct Support (aka “(DS)”) entity changed somewhat under COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966, as several functions allocated were dissolved, while others were bolstered. However, the basic function of the unit mission remained intact from July 1966 to 1973.
Prior to 20 July 1966 the bulk of Direct Support company sized units were under the command of a “Quartermaster Battalion, Direct Support”. The COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966 changed the designation from Quartermaster Battalion, Direct Support to “Supply and Service Battalion, Direct Support”. The same change of designation applied to any Company which was subordinate to the Battalion.
Example: Prior to 20 July 1966 and in 1963 Fort Lewis, Washington HQ and HQ Company (aka: HHC) 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) and Company A and B 266th Quartermaster Battalion, (Direct Support) were activated. On 20 July 1966 the HHC 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) was re-constituted as the HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support). Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) was “inactivated”, with the remnants and bulk of personnel re-assigned to newly “activated” 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support).
The Mission of a Direct Support Company: “To provide direct support quartermaster supplies and services.”
The Assignment: Organic to a Quartermaster Direct Support Battalion {Supply and Service 20 July 1966}
The Capabilities: At Full Strength – Reduced Strength – Augmented {see further below for various calculations in numbers}
1) Provide quartermaster direct support supplies and services for approximately 16,000 troops.
2) Operate a supply point(s) for the issue and/or distribution of Class I and Quartermaster Class II & IV supplies.
3) Is capable of baking 8,000 pounds of bread daily and providing fresh bread for approximately 16,000 troops based on 1/2 pound per man per day. {see note regarding Bakery Section at end of Organization posting, prior to Equipment posting}
4) Operates a Class III {aka: POL} supply point to provide (a) Storage – 9 Collapsible Tanks (10,000 gallon) = 90,000 gallons – with 3 Collapsible Tanks (3,000 gallon) = 9,000 gallons – (b) Local Delivery (2 trips – 75% availability of vehicles), 1,200 Gallon Trucks (5 ea.) = 6,000 gallons, with (4 ea.) 5,000 Gallon Tank Trucks = 20,000 Gallons. In total the preceding would account for 125,000 gallons.
Note 1: It is a known fact and provable by photographic evidence (see photo galleries) that the understrength 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) during the time period November 1966 – May 1967 owned and operated (7) Collapsible Bladders (3,000 gallon) = 21,000 gallons – with (14) Collapsible Bladders (10,000 gallon) = 140,000 gallons, in addition to (2) Large 100,000 to 150,000 gallon metal storage tanks, along with several hundreds of stacked 50 gallon drums of varied petroleum, oil and lubricant products. In addition, rolling single and double tanker trucks of 1,200 gallon and 5,000 gallon capacity were operating on a daily basis, supplemented by numerous additional tanker trucks arriving from Saigon, Long Binh, Cu Chi and other locations. In total {excluding 50 gallon drums and tanker trucks beyond those of the 228th assigned equipment} the 228th would have been working with between 340,000 to 437,000 gallons. Or, put another way; nearly (3 1/2) three and a half to (4) times its design factor while understaffed to do so. Further, a good deal of petroleum products were also airlifted to Tay Ninh Base Camp, the numbers in gallons or tonnage an unknown quantity as of this this posting……ABN.
Note 2:Regarding Class II&IV capability (item 2 preceding), the understrength 228th as of February 1967 had the resources needed to routinely handle up to 50 tons per day. However, during major operations and by stretching resources to the utmost, up to 150 tons per day were handled. For instance, this daily tonnage volume occurred during the 22-day period of Operation Junction City Phase I 21FEB67 – 14MAR67 involving shipments from Saigon/Long Binh and to Trai Bi, French Fort and Dau Tieng in support of this operation……PBW.
5) Operate a Salvage Collecting Point
6) Perform field maintenance (3rd and 4th echelon) on all quartermaster light equipment, with limited (3rd echelon) field maintenance on heavy equipment. – (a) provide mobile contact repair teams. – (b) provide units supported with organizational repair parts and maintenance and operating supplies.
7) Provide Laundry, bath, and clothing exchange services. Maintain prescribed stocks of clothing for emergency issue to replace contaminated clothing.
8) Provide Graves Registration Service {Collection and Processing of remains}
9) Individuals of the unit can fight as infantrymen when required. The unit has the capability of defending itself and its installation against hostile ground attack.
10) Basis of Allocation: Two Companies per Quartermaster Direct Support Battalion (changed 20 July 1966)
11) Category: The Company is designated a category II unit per AR 320-5
12) Mobility: 75% mobile; 100% mobile when augmentation section is authorized.
The TO&E specified three (3) levels of unit strength, as covered in some detail following: “Full Strength” (intended for combat conditions), “Reduced Strength” (intended for non-combat conditions), and “Augmented”. Examples of “non-combat” conditions, from the 1966-67 period, would have been CONUS, Germany, and Korea. Vietnam was clearly “combat” conditions. As will be shown following, the 228th and its sister companies in the 266th operated under the “Reduced Strength” (non-combat) TO&E, although typically supporting far greater than the 16,000 troops intended. And, the 228th was almost always well below even that “Reduced Strength” level. Data in the following sections will illustrate that the 228th commonly supported well over twice the number of troops intended (as measured by number of individuals supported per 228th individual actually assigned for duty.) In this way, review of the TO&E clearly reveals the very high levels of efficiency achieved by the 228th……P.B.W.
At the time (October 1960 – July 1966) the total authorized unit strength per Company (A and B, 266th, the existing 506th and 624th) were broken down into three (3) parts. Part 1 was considered a “Full Strength” Company, which could perform the mission and duties under “Combat” conditions, consisting of the following:
Officers:………………………………….1 CPT. – 5 LTS. – 1 WO {Warrant Officer}…….7
Non Commissioned Officers:………1 E8 – 2 E7 – 9 E6 – 12 E5 – 4 E4……………….28
Enlisted:………………………………..28 E5 – 99 E4 – 121 E3 – 13 E2…………………249
Total Full Strength:…………………………………………………………………………….284
Note 1: “E” designates enlisted pay grade. However, it should be noted that the difference between NCO and Enlisted titles represent that NCO are ranks from CPL to MSGT, while Enlisted ranks range from PVT to SP {Specialist 5}. In the actual “Organization” of a Direct Support Company there was no allocation for CPL rank either as an NCO or enlisted ranks. However, a Specialist could be made an acting CPL or SGT if a particular situation warranted. In particular when dealing with infantry units where “stripes” technically outranked a Specialist of the same pay grade. It should also be noted, that the term “enlisted” applied to all those indicated, but the enlisted ranks were composed of personnel who were either 3 year active duty {RA or Regular Army} while a good number were 2 year active duty {US or Draftees, voluntary or conscripted}. A similar situation applies to Junior Officers below the rank of Captain. In particular, some officers were ROTC and were two year active duty as opposed to OCS officers whom were 3 year active duty….both groups subject to a 7 year obligation…2 years active, 5 inactive reserve, or 3 years active, 4 years inactive reserve {sometimes active for both groups depending on manpower needs]. In either case, at the end of active duty an individual could re-enlist for three years, and/or could enlist from inactive to active at anytime during {sometimes after} the 7 year obligation {depending on circumstances, manpower needs, etc!}.
Note 2: From an Orderly Room perspective TOE {aka; TO&E} although technically “Table of Organization and Equipment” was thought of and utilized as “Table of Officers and Enlisted” assigned or attached. Equipment never entered into the picture, as there was always a Junior Officer assigned the duty of “Property Officer” for the Company whose job and function was to account for, be responsible for, be on the hook for, all authorized equipment allocated to a Company. To be brief, this was a nightmare for whomever was assigned this duty. Any and all equipment became his responsibility, although each Platoon OIC was in effect also responsible and on the hook for his sections equipment by default. In essence, if the equipment was not in inventory and unaccounted for, then the OIC of such equipment technically had to pay for same from his own wallet. This did occur, but not in the 228th 1966-1967.
Part 2 (following) was considered a “Reduced Strength” Company which could perform the mission and duties of a “full strength” Company under “Non- Combat” conditions.
Officers:…………………………………1 CPT. – 4 LTS. – 1 WO…………………………..6
Non Commissioned Officers:……..1 E8 – 2 E7 – 9 E6 – 11 E5 – 1 E4…………………24
Enlisted:……………………………….16 E5 – 83 E4 – 93 E3 – 13 E2…………………….205
Total Reduced Strength:………………………………………………………………………..235
Part 3 designated an “Augmented” addition of personnel to a “Full Strength” or “Reduced Strength” Company of 284 or 235 consisting of the following:
Officers:…………………………………..1 LT
Non Commissioned Officers………….1 E7
Enlisted…………………………………..3 E4 – 5 E3 – 2 E2
Total……………………………………….12
A “Full Strength” Company with authorized Augmentation totaling 296 personnel, as well as a Company at full strength without augmentation totaling 284 was designed to support 16,000 troops under “combat and battlefield” conditions.
A “Reduced Strength” Company of 235 (or 247 augmented) was also designed to support 16,000 troops under “non combat” conditions. Note: In Fort Lewis Washington, as well as other “Direct Support” Companies of the Army Quartermaster Corps, this number “235” was definitively in use. In addition, each Direct Support Battalion did indeed have (2) Companies of “235” allocated.
Under the COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966, the Table of Organization and Equipment for a Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) was changed, in that, a “Reduced Strength” Company was authorized and allocated a total of 233 personnel {Officers and Enlisted} in a “Combat” or “Non Combat” situation. In addition, a Battalion was no longer limited to having “2” Companies only under its command. In some cases there could be “4” to “5” Companies (or more) as well as detachments, and/or other entities subordinate to the Battalion.
Note 1: This particular loss of two (2) personnel, their rank and position is an unknown to the writer. It is suspected that 1 individual was a “Warrant Officer”, replaced by a 2nd or 1st Lt, which is a wash. One specific loss being an “NCO” with pay grade of E4. Not sure as to whom this person or position might be. At first, it was thought the loss of NCO status might have applied to the Company Clerk, but this theory was disproved, as US Army data located well into the 1970’s and later, discusses, the fact; “the Company Clerk regardless of rank is to be considered an NCO {non commissioned officer} at all times” . The position of Company Clerk was unique onto itself. In essence and per Army Regulations the Company Clerk was exempt from all duties beyond that of Company Clerk. As a general rule of thumb, the Company Clerk answered to no one but the Commanding Officer, but as a matter of activity went through the motions of recognizing and following orders generated by the 1st Sergeant, Executive Officer while also observing various chain of command structures related to other officers and NCOIC’s of higher rank within the Company or outside it. Nevertheless, most officers and NCOIC’s of a unit who did not directly work in the Orderly Room, tended to give very wide berth to the Company Clerk, and very rarely (if at all) questioned any statement or voiced opinion of said Company Clerk. {Note: As an interesting aside, the position of Company Clerk was first instituted within the Roman Army. His job function was to perform a daily Morning Report and status of all personnel to and for the Legion Command. In addition, he was responsible for all payroll, orders, promotions, communications and correspondence. He answered to no one (regardless of rank) except the legion commander. He was paid three to five times the salary of the ordinary soldier of the same rank, but less than an officer who headed a section of the legion. He was exempt from all duty, excepting those specified specifically by the Legion Commander….thus the position of Company Clerk of modern times harkens back thousands of years, and for the most part retains a somewhat unique position within the entire chain of command structure. This uniqueness applies from the Company level upwards to Battalion, Group, Regiment, to the Pentagon. At each level of command, there is always a chief or head clerk, whose sole and only job function is to account for, and know the status of all personnel within the command on a daily basis…..hence the ubiquitous term used in all services of the United States Armed Forces…Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard…”Don’t mess with the Company Clerk”, and the reason most enlisted and officers of any command structure tend to steer clear of the Orderly Room and/or the Company Clerk, or person in a similar position.}
To Continue: This means, that the second individual loss occurred in the enlisted ranks as well. Pin pointing is much more difficult. What is known, and repeated more than once in the History of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), is that the 228th was operating at between 50 to 81% authorized {reduced strength} through four (4) major “combat and battlefield” operations between 7 October 1966 – 1 March 1967. As an example, the following is a “known quantities” regarding personnel as of 31 October 1966 and 1 February 1967 regarding the 228th in War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province.
31 October 1966 – Tay Ninh Province:
Officers: Total 5 – (1 CPT, 2 1LT, 1 2LT Assigned, 1 2LT Attached)
Enlisted: Total 167 – (2 E7, 6 E6, 17 E5, 21 E4, 114 E3, 6 E2, 1 E1 Assigned – 9 E2 and E3 Attached)
1 February 1967 – Tay Ninh Province
Officers:………………………………….1 CPT. – 5 LTS Assigned – 2 LTS & 1 WO Attached………9
Non Commissioned Officers:……….0 E8 – 3 E7 – 8 E6 – 4 E5……………………………………….20
Enlisted:…………………………………5 E5 – 64 E4 – 86 E3 – 8 E2 – 2 E1………………………….160
Total:…………………………………….189 {less 28 TDY elsewhere}
Tay Ninh Total:………………………………………………………………………………………………….161
Differential between Actual Personnel above and Authorized below:
Officers:…………………………………..1 CPT. – 4 LTS – 1 WO………………………………………….6
Non Commissioned Officers:………..1 E8 – 2 E7 – 9 E6 – 11 E5……………………………………..24
Enlisted:………………………………….16 E5 – 83 E4 – 93 E3 – 13 E2……………………………….205
Total:…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….235
Minus 1 NCO CPL E4 and one other unknown enlisted individual (assumed COSTAR Directive change)………………………………………………………………………………………………………….233
A Side Issue Note:
As stated previously: A Direct Support Company under COSTAR Directive of 20 July 1966 no longer allowed for the pay grade of one (1) CPL E4 to be considered a Non Commissioned Officer. Thus all NCO ranks started with the rank of Buck Sergeant E5, and ended with Master Sergeant E8. All other “Enlisted” ranks had a pay grade of PVT E1 – PVT E2 – PFC E3 – SP4 (Specialist) E4 – SP5 E5. It is assumed, that within Officer ranks, one (1) WO was dropped with a 2nd added. Thus, there had to be (1) one additional enlisted individual removed from the Organizational Chart…which would account for the net change of authorized “235” to “233“. It is hoped, that at some point in time, this assumption can be either proved or disproved. It does seem to comport with known facts in that, prior to said COSTAR Directive there are no known Warrant Officer assignments or NCO E4 enlisted designation. The assumption is further bolstered, in that there was 1 CPT and 5 Lt. allocated to a Direct Support Company as of 1965 and possibly earlier. No slot had been allocated for a Warrant Officer.
For clarification purposes in the years 1966 -1967, a PVT E1 was the rank held by enlisted in Basic training, and for (4) four months afterwards before being considered eligible for promotion to PVT E2. PVT E2 was obtained after holding the rank of PVT E1 for a period of four months. Eligibility to be promoted to PFC E3 was obtained after holding rank of PVT E2 for (4) four continuous months. The rank and pay grade of SP4 E4 could not be obtained without 13 continuous months of active duty and/or a minimum of 6 months time in grade as a PFC. A pay grade and rank of SP5 E5 could not be obtained by enlisted without 24 months of continuous active duty concurrent with a minimum of 13 months time in grade as SP4 E4 as well as re-enlisting for an additional 3 years of service.
Exceptions: If deployed and en-route to, or in a a War Zone an individual could receive an early promotion from PFC to SP4 E4. Six such cases took place aboard the USNS General Nelson M. Walker on 1 June 1966 {Company Clerk, Company Supply Clerk, Company Armorer, Company General Supply Clerk, Company L&B Clerk, and Company GR Clerk} retroactive to 31 May 1966 the date the Battalion boarded ship. The second exception involves temporary orders, whereby an enlisted rank can be an “acting” enlisted rank. Example: An SP4 E4 can be promoted to Acting Buck Sergeant, or Acting Corporeal, etc! However, regardless of “acting” rank, the individual is still paid according to his actual rank and pay grade despite the fact he might be wearing a rank of different or higher authority.
For Officers a similar situation occurs. Upon completion of either ROTC or OCS an individual is “commissioned” as a 2nd Lt. After approximately 12 months of continuous active service (depending on situation) the individual is promoted to 1st Lt. He would remain in this rank, unless after two (2) years of continuous active service, and subsequent re-enlistment for three more years of service, he would at some point (usually on or about 3 and 1/2 years of total active service be promoted to Captain….sometimes sooner.
Exceptions: Outstanding “Superior” continuous performance whether active duty or active reserve duty could result in an early promotion. Second, either enlisted or officer ranks could receive a “Battlefield” promotion to a higher rank from a superior command, which was temporary (not always) in nature. Thus it is possible for any enlisted rank to be given a battlefield promotion to officer for the duration of a particular circumstance of time. By the same token an officer could receive a higher ranking “battlefield commission” from 2nd Lt. (or other) to a higher rank under certain specific circumstances as well. In both cases (enlisted and officer ranks) such an advancement in rank by a higher authority was usually withdrawn after the end of a particular action or circumstance (not always, but usually).
Otherwise, all promotions are subject to specific conditions. Every so often Department of Army allocates a certain number of promotions. This allocation trickles downwards to the Battalion level. The Battalion in turn allocates a certain number of promotions for certain pay grades within a Company. In the case of the 228th, such allocations were sparse. There were many individuals deserving of being promoted to a higher pay grade, and who met all existing requirements for such promotion. When you have 110 eligible, and only 36 allocations, a difficulty ensues, whereby 1/3 of those eligible can be promoted. The difficulty becomes one of whom to promote over whom.
To sum up, and from a personal perspective, I would like to state for the record, that the nearly 74 enlisted who remained as PFC through their entire tour of duty, deserved to be promoted to SP4 E4 in my book, but it was a matter of authorized allocations from Battalion level that prevented same. For that I apologize. Neither a Commanding Officer, or any subordinate had the authority (except under very specialized circumstances) to over-ride allocations beyond that allocated from the Battalion level of command…..A.B.N.
Organization Conclusions:
A “Full Strength” Company (without augmentation) of 284 designed to support 16,000 under “combat conditions” means that each individual assigned within the Company, would be supporting 56 individuals.
A “Reduced Strength” Company (without augmentation) of 235 designed to support 16,000 under “non” combat conditions means that each individual assigned within the Company, would be supporting 68 individuals.
Under the COSTAR directive of 20 July 1966, a Company (without augmentation) of 233 designed to support 16,000 under “combat“, or “non combat” conditions, means that each individual would be supporting 69 individuals.
The 228th with 189 assigned (81% of authorized strength) by 1 February 1967 had been supporting upwards of 23,000 combat troops in the field in addition to other non combat units approximating (rough guess) 5,000….for a total of approximating 28,000 troops….meaning that each individual assigned within the Company would be supporting 148 individuals.
Subtract the 28 personnel TDY to other locations, would mean that each individual of the 161 physically in Tay Ninh would be supporting 174 individuals.
At a minimum, as the total being supported varied by operation, one could utilize the “design” factor or 16,000, divide by 161 and still arrive at a figure that indicates each individual physically in Tay Ninh and the 228th would be supporting 99 individuals as of 1 February 1967.
The above detail is illustrated as a guide and reference to the reader to point out, that the personnel (officers and enlisted) of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), Tay Ninh were performing duties well beyond their intended design and expectation. This observation applies to all Classes of Supply.
However: complementing 228th staffing, between late November 1966 and early March 1967 there were nearly 500 all purpose troops attached to the 228th. These troops were used to assist in all manner of supply functions including Class V {munitions, generally an Ordnance responsibility}, but for the most part in building up supply points and movement of varied materials outside of {sometimes within} the 228th specific internal operation and mission. These nearly 500 attached to the 228th were assisting the 228th in the “set up” (e.g. site preparation) of various Class Supply Points, while those directly assigned within the 228th were engaged in the actual day to day “operation” of the various Supply Points (excluding munitions {Class V} after February 1967). Once the setup was largely completed, these troops continued in varied supply operations both within and outside Tay Ninh West Base Camp until the end of March 1967, when the bulk of these all purpose troopers were returned to their respective assigned units.
Equipment Extract:
Although available, the breakdown of actual equipment authorized and assigned a Direct Support Company will not be discussed at length. In general listing every item of equipment necessary to the operation of a Direct Support Company would be prodigious and very time consuming. Furthermore, there are many items referenced that are definitively post WWII although in semi effect October 1960 – June 1966.
Basically, all equipment necessary; field tents, arms, clothing, parts, vehicles, desks, lockers, bunks, bedding, stoves, reefers, machinery, generators, communications equipment were available and numbered in the hundreds if listed item by item…a good deal holdover items post WWII
Of interest are a few odds and ends for example: In a Direct Support Company (prior to July 1966) 3 Wristwatches were allocated. One .45 caliber pistol, (5) 7.62 caliber machine guns, (235) M14 7.62 caliber rifles, one of which had a tripod and used as a rocket launcher. There were supposed to be 235 Bayonets w/Scabbard. However, and to the best of the writers recall, there were no Bayonets or Scabbards within the 228th or its predecessor Company B, 266th. I personally never had one, I never saw one (Convoy or otherwise), and a close inspection of the Guard Mount photograph in Photo Gallery indicates the same….no Bayonets or Scabbards. Note: Per 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker, while assigned to the 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) in Long Binh, and prior to his re-assignment to the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) in Tay Ninh, he did in fact have a bayonet and scabbard, which he turned into Property Officer of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support). While assigned to the 228th in Tay Ninh, he was not issued a Bayonet or Scabbard.
Furthermore, as witnessed and known by those assigned within the 228th, there were a good deal more than just “1” ,45 caliber pistol, as all Officers carried same when assigned as Payroll Officer, Officer of the Day, Guard Duty Officer, Convoy and or other duties requiring arms. In addition {with little exception} Officers seemed to carry .45 caliber tubular grease guns, rather than the 7.62 caliber M14 that all enlisted troops carried. The one exception to this general rule of arms was the Executive, Stock Control, Class II and IV Officer, {1st Lt. Paul B. Walker} who often preferred being armed with both an M14 and .45 caliber pistol while assigned to the 228th in Tay Ninh.
Also of interest, because of their critical importance to the operations of the 228th, are trucks and materials handling equipment (MHE). The materials handled by the 228th were both bulky and heavy, and had to be moved on-and-off trucks, within the yards, and to-and-from supported units on and outside of Tay Ninh base camp. The “Reduced Strength” TO&E authorized (6) 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps), (3) 3/4-ton trucks, (18) 2-1/2-ton trucks (“deuce-and-a-halfs”), (4) 2-1/2-ton tankers, and (6) 5-ton tractors with (4) 5000-gallon and (2) stake-and-platform (S&P) trailers, as well as additional specialized vehicles and smaller trailers. Authorized MHE included (3) 6000lb rough-terrain (RT) forklifts. Actual equipment often varied from authorized equipment, and included up to 10,000-lb RT forklifts. Mechanics provided by the TO&E were critical to keeping as much of this equipment up and operating as possible.
Another reason for not listing all equipment, is that it is quite clear, that a good deal of items listed are obvious WWII field items. Wooden field desks (we had metal), wooden field chairs (we had metal). No mention of steel bunks, individual metal lockers, personal footlockers, and a good number of other items commonly in place and being used by the Company prior to deployment in June 1966 from Fort Lewis, Washington.
For the record, the 506th and 624th Supply and Service Companies in Long Binh apparently did use and have a good deal of the equipment described, they being in country RVN by nearly a year earlier (1965).
Prior to deployment of the 266th a field exercise was conducted in Fort Lewis. At that time, a worn WWII wooden field desk and typewriter were in place {exactly as described in Equipment table}. Trying to use was a different matter. More than a half dozen typewriter keys were broken or missing. The carriage would not slide, was rusted and badly damaged. The wooden field desk fell apart in a heap of rubble due to missing parts, screws, broken hinges, cracked, broken and warped wood. The wooden chair was not a chair, but rather a fold-up wooden square with four legs, two of which, were broken. In other words the whole ensemble was a pile of useless junk, top to bottom, inside and out. I never saw it again. If I had, I’d burn it, destroy it, bury it, and hunt down the Property Officer.
In summation, it is quite obvious, that a major equipment change had occurred within a Direct Support Company prior to 20 July 1966 (CONUS for sure), and that for one reason or another units already in RVN were in process of possibly upgrading, whereas newer units arriving at or around mid 1966 either already had newer equipment, and/or by 20 July 1966 had obtained such equipment….a listing of such updated equipment an unknown as of this writing.
Special Note: Per photograph in Photo Gallery “b” submitted by SP4 JD Stewart, there is a photograph taken in the Orderly Room October 1966 in Tay Ninh showing SP4 Louis Valentine {Company Generator Operator} and behind Valentine the shelf of Army Regulations and Field Manuel material used by the Company Commander and Company Clerk. It is quite clear, that FM 10-101TO&E applied to Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS), whereas right alongside said Field Manuel is FM 10-107D TO&E which in fact “did” apply to the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) under COSTAR Directive of 20 July 1966….however, the “equipment” listing is still inaccurate, as the Company had and was using more up to date equipment…...ABN
Extracted data and other respectfully submitted by A.B. Neighbor 22 May 2010
Base TO&E data {1960 -1966) supplied by Paul B. Walker from his extensive personal library and archives.
Primary Military Occupational Specialty
Part 6: Primary Military Occupational Specialty
The following consists of two parts. The first part (A) shall cover briefly the manner and form of individual Primary Military Occupational Specialties (PMOS) created and used post WWII until the 1980’s, when they changed once again. Put best, part (A) describes The Vietnam Era PMOS Code System of the United States Army.
Part (B) is informational in nature, and covers areas that many an enlisted person of the time did not know about officers, and non-commissioned officers, with the emphasis on officers below the rank of Captain.
Submitted By:
SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor – Company Clerk – 228th S&S Co (DS) – July 1966- May 1967………1 July 2010
(A) During the Vietnam Era (1960 -1973) the United States Army had developed an alphanumeric coding system to designate an individuals PMOS or “Primary Military Occupational Specialty”. For enlisted (drafted or regular Army) the code consisted of 5 digits. The first three digits consisted of 2 numbers and a letter indicating an individuals position, while the last 2 digits consisted of 2 numbers indicating a relative skill level.
These designations were generally based on several factors once a person had completed Basic Training. The first factor involved, related to the test scores achieved on the Army General aptitude test which was quite similar to the SAT’s (Standard Aptitude Tests) given to High School Graduates desirous of attending College in the 1960s.
However, the testing went beyond the general SAT’s in that such testing also covered a good number of areas related to other skilled and non skilled areas not found on SAT testing of the time. For example, an entire section was devoted to automotive skills, motorized vehicles, how a vehicle functioned, etc!, and ones ability to name, and/or answer questions about engines, carbs, drive trains, the role of pistons, valves, points, spark-plugs, various wiring, generators, transmissions and the like. The same was true for other specialized fields, such as electronics, basic chemistry, cooking, mechanics and a good number of other skill sets.
The second factor involved beyond specific and overall scoring, dealt with several subjective factors related to physical ability, psychological factors, personality and other skill sets( noted during basic training by Drill Sergeants, which found there way {not always} into a persons personnel file (discipline problems, ability to follow orders, leadership skills and the like). Other objective and subjective attributes of an individual might also be annotated.
To be brief, an individual was interviewed by an NCO (usually an SSG E6) where an individual was asked what he would like to do. If his skill set and testing matched up, the individual would either be assigned a tentative PMOS as a starting point for his 2 or 3 year hitch. At the same time, an objective or subjective decision was made as to whether the individual would be assigned directly to a unit from Basic Training and/or assigned to AT or AIT (Advanced Training or Advanced Infantry Training for further training).
For enlisted (2 year draftee or 3 year enlisted, regular army) a PMOS is an alphanumeric system composed of 5 digits. The first two numbers and letter designate ones position, i.e.; (for example) 76A {general supply-man}. The remaining two digits are numbers, and indicate the relative level of proficiency.
The last two digits range from 10 – 20 -30 -40 -50 designating proficiency level. The proficiency levels are as follows:
10……………….Basic
20……………….Specialist
30……………….Team Leader Specialist – Specialist E5 – E6 and E7 (rare to find a SP7 anywhere)
40……………….NCO (Non Commissioned Officer) – Buck Sergeant E5 – Sergeant First Class SFC E7
50……………….Senior NCO ………Master Sergeant MSG E8 – Sergeant Major SMJ – E9
The third digit of the first 3 (a letter) and depending on allocation and type of unit assigned to, ranges from the letter A – Z. The higher the letter designation, the more skilled the individual is in the particular field or position.
For example: a 71A was a “general clerk”. A 71B was a “clerk typist”. A 71C was an “executive administrative assistant”. A 71D was a “legal specialist”. A 71E was a “court reporter”. A 71F was a “postal clerk”. A 71G was a “patient administration specialist”. A 71H was a “personnel specialist” {with other titles depending on type of unit assigned to…. “classification interviewer” – “manpower sergeant” – “records branch supervisor” – “reports or suspense clerk” . The last 2 digits, as listed preceding being the level of proficiency. Thus, in the writers PMOS and the type of unit assigned to, I was considered a 71H20…… “Company Clerk & Personnel Specialist”.
However, it is also true, that many an enlisted (drafted or otherwise) performed duties outside of their designated PMOS, sometimes well beyond, and in a different PMOS entirely. For example: I began service as a 76A10. Later as Mail Clerk I was considered a 71F20 “postal clerk” without a change in PMOS. Still later as a PFC I performed as Company Clerk with a change in PMOS to 71H20. For example the second person sent to Mail School had a PMOS of 56B20 – “General Supply Warehouseman”, but for well over a year performed as a 71F20 – ” company postal clerk”
Within the 228th S&S Co (DS), it is my understanding that in mid 1969 the Company Clerk held a PMOS of 64B20 – “heavy duty vehicle driver”……all perfectly fine and normal, as long as the mission and job were accomplished, which it was.
There is another designation called a SQI (Special Qualification Identifier) which I never saw in my time in service. What would occur, is that in addition to the 5 digit code, there was a 6th digit in the form of another “letter”….each letter designating the “special qualifier”, such as qualified parachutist.
For a Warrant Officer there was also a 5 digit alphanumeric code system. The first 4 digits indicated the individuals position, while the last digit indicated an (SQI), or special qualifier. For the record, I never saw a Warrant Officer with a 5 digit designation. I always saw WO1 – WO2 – WO3, etc! and nothing more.
For a Commissioned Officer the PMOS was for the most part a 4 digit number, which in my two years of service (1965-1967) is true. I did witness via orders a five digit number followed by a four digit number in parenthesis, the newer 4 digit number representing the current designation being used throughout the Army, as Officer PMOS number designations were being transitioned at the time period. However, Officers also had an SQI available in the form of a “letter” as a 5th digit, which I was never witness to.
It is my thinking, that this 5th digit “SQI” was seldom used in Quartermaster Corps of the Vietnam Era. If it had been, then orders received would have had these special qualifiers, and they didn’t. Example: Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support), and the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) had 2 Airborne Rangers as Commanding Officers. One had a PMOS of 4000 (Captain B.A. Kuster) while the other had a PMOS of 4200 (Captain Jerry D. White).
To date this writer has been unable to locate the PMOS of 4000 in any Vietnam Era Officer listing. It is thought, that the PMOS of 4000 represents “General Supply Officer…all fields”, but not positive. A 4200 PMOS is a “Supply and Service Officer”….formerly a “Quartermaster Supply Officer”. Now, if both were Airborne Rangers and Qualified Parachutists, which both Cpt. Kuster and Cpt. White were, then there should have been an SQI identifier following their individual PMOS’s….but there wasn’t.
The 228th S&S Co (DS) while in Tay Ninh 1966-1967 also had 2 Officers {Lt.’s T. Bourlier and J. Schneider both fellow OCS Graduates} with a PMOS of 1203 which is a “Tank Officer”. In addition the 228th had 3 Officers with a PMOS of 4419, which is not listed in Vietnam era codes. However, and its speculation on the writers part, the PMOS 4419 is an indication representing a ” Supply Officer” or “All Purpose Officer”, in addition to the term “Quartermaster Supply Officer”. I believe it might also represent, that the particular individual was a result of Senior ROTC graduation from college as opposed to OCS graduates.
ROTC Officers akin to a “draftee” had a 2 year active service obligation, with 5 year (active or inactive) reserve duty obligation, the same as ‘drafted” enlisted. However, the PMOS of 4419 also existed beyond the rank of 2nd or 1st Lt. If an Officer with a PMOS of 4419 continued in active service beyond 2 years, one would find individual Officers with the rank of Captain or above. Note: As an anomaly, there were orders issued indicating a PMOS of 5 digits (all numbers) for Officers as well. These orders would contain the 5 digit number (such as 71542, or 74000 as examples) and at the end of such orders indicate the new PMOS as a 4 digit code in parenthesis. It is therefore assumed, that in some cases there was a transition process being implemented as late as July 1966, whereby older 5 digit PMOS numbers were being changed to reflect the newer updated 4 digit numbers. Complicated matters, but an issue that had to be dealt with whenever orders were issued by higher authority.
Within service an enlisted Draftee’s service number began with a “US” whereas a 3 year enlistee had a service number that began with “RA” (designating Regular Army). The total active duty obligation time for “US” was 2 years with 5 years reserve (active or inactive). For “RA” it was 3 years active duty and 4 years inactive or active reserve. For ROTC Officers their time period was the same as a Draftee; 2 years active duty, 5 years reserve (active or inactive). At the time, if one had served a full tour in a Combat Zone, for the most part, they did not have to serve in the “active” reserve, and for the most part where carried as “inactive reserve” until the final month of the 7 year obligation was completed. This held true (as far as I know) for enlisted draftees for sure, and possibly for ROTC Officers.
With regard to PMOS structure: As described, PMOS means “Primary Military Occupational Specialty”. However, there was another designation in play called a DMOS.
A DMOS was used as a designation whereby a person with a PMOS was not assigned or performing duties associated with his qualified PMOS, and therefore (by orders, written, verbal or otherwise) would have the designation DMOS, which stood for “Duty Military Occupational Specialty”, or put another way, the person was assigned and performing duty outside his designated PMOS, for which he may have been qualified or not.
Although forgotten by this writer a review of Morning Reports submitted some 45 years ago in 1966, the term DMOS was used by the 228th. Of further interest, this writer was reminded, that in October through November of 1966 and by Morning Report “per an attached enclosures” a good number of enlisted personnel assigned and attached were listed as performing in a particular DMOS rather than their primary PMOS. This was due to a shortage of assigned personnel with the proper PMOS for allocated slots open within the 228th TO&E {Table of Organization and Equipment}.
The Army PMOS structure, alphanumeric designations began with “000.000.000” and ended with 988,000,000.
In other words, the United States Army had an alphanumeric designation structure which covered virtually every type of skill imaginable. There were designations for Veterinary services through Nike Missiles… Band Members through all components of running a Railway System. You think of it, and the Army had a designated PMOS for it.
A PMOS could be changed at the Company level with Battalion approval. This was not a common practice, and for the most part individuals might have worn many hats, performed many jobs if not within their PMOS, then by DMOS, and/or without any official recognition by orders or otherwise. In other words, if a job needed doing, it got done regardless of PMOS, Officer or Enlisted. This was especially true within the 228th from its very inception. And, I’m fairly sure I’d be on safe ground by stating other Supply and Service Companies formed 20 July 1966 forward did the same thing, if not prior. I’m fairly sure the same occurred within many other combat and non-combat entities as well. In particular during a time of War.
The designations of US and RA preceding an enlisted persons service number no longer exist, in particular with the end of the Draft. Furthermore, and for the most part, nearly all PMOS alphanumeric designations were changed in the 1980’s, while service numbers were converted to Social Security numbers in the 1970’s.
(B) The Truth About Junior Officers and their Trials and Tribulations:
Most enlisted ranks, in particular those who served two or three years (sometimes more), have no idea or concept as to what junior officers below the rank of Captain had to endure.
From an enlisted point of view (Private E1, Private E2, Private First Class, Specialist 4 and all ranks up to Sergeant Major…..as far as I know), the following applied:
All clothing, meals, medical, weapons, quarters, and nearly anything and everything were paid for courtesy of the US taxpayer.
The only thing an enlisted person had to purchase from his own pocket was shoe polish, metal polish, and locks for a footlocker and wall-locker. Other items such as off base housing or quarters were pretty much paid for with an added “per diem” to ones monthly paycheck.
Enlisted (with some exceptions) pulled Guard Duty, Kitchen Police (KP) and other special duty assignments.
What most do not realize, is that junior officers in particular had a number of extra duties to perform as well.
First, all officers (regardless of rank) were required to purchase their own clothing, uniforms and dress uniforms. This cost was at or near $600.00 for Officers Special Dress Uniform which they might wear once or twice (unless a career officer). Specialty white dress gloves alone could run as much as $30.00 per pair {present day cost 2010 approximating $150 to $200}. Note: Utilizing an inflation calculator based on 1965 dollars the following would apply.
1965…an item costing $30.00 would cost $207.00 in 2010
1965…an Officer Dress Uniform costing $600.00 would cost $4,037 in 2010
1965…a 1st Lt. pay of $550 would be require $3,700 in 2010
1965…an E4 pay of $231 would require $1,554 in 2010
Should the reader desire to have a little fun, and truly see the true damage of inflationary costs of one given year verses present day dollars necessary to acquire the same goods click on the following link:
Officers (regardless of rank) had to pay for all meals, although they received a “per diem” allotment to help defray the cost of such meals.
In addition an Officer although paid more per month than enlisted, when all is said and done, it wasn’t that much more.
Example: In 1966 -1967 a Specialist 4 E4 was paid $191.00 per month. If in a recognized Combat Zone no matter what the rank, the individual received and additional $40. Thus, a SP4 E4 received $231.00 per month. A 1st Lt. earned approximately $550 per month with an added $40 if serving in Combat Zone…plus a small “per diem” approximating .42 cents per meal per day.
In addition to the pay differential (E4 verses 1st Lt,) there would be cases where an NCO with the rank of SSG E6 with plenty of time in grade, would make more than a 1st Lt.
Note: Under present day “All Volunteer Service” the following applies as to pay scale of annotated ranks with two or less years of service, as of September 2010.
E1…$1,447 – E2…$1,672 – E3…$1,705 – E4…$1,889 – E5…$2,061
O1…$2,745 – 02…$3,162 – 03…$3,660 – 04…$4,163
Please note that enlisted ranks have outpaced inflation factor, whereas Officer ranks did not. Example: An E4 in 1966 earning $231 per month in RVN with inflation calculation would be earning $1,554 in 2010, but an E4 earns $1,889, or a $335 gain beyond inflation factor.
A 1st Lt. (02) in 1966 was paid $590 per month in RVN with an inflation calculation amounting to a pay factor equalling $3,970 in 2010…but an 02 is presently paid $3,162 in 2010, which amounts to an inflation loss factor of $808.
Enlisted for the most part, and depending on the unit strength would catch Guard Duty or KP every third to 6th day.
Example: If the 228th was ever at full strength of 233 officers and enlisted (which it never was) then the following applied: Technically, the only enlisted person exempt from Guard Duty or KP by Army Regulation was the Company Clerk. However, it didn’t work that way, which I’ll try to explain. By AR if one served Guard Duty and/or KP one day, then the following day was supposed to be a day off.
OK, lets assume that certain key personnel served Guard Duty (excepting the Company Clerk)…for instance the Mail Clerk, The Cooks, The Company Generator Operator, The Company Communications Clerk, The Graves Registration Clerk, The Class I Clerk, The POL Class III Clerk, The Class II&IV Clerk. It’s obvious what would happen. All work in these key positions would either be sorely tested, and/or non existent the following day. No mail for a day, no generators being operated or maintained for a day. Quality of meals and workload of Cooks would be heavily tested, Communication Shack would nearly cease operations, The II&IV Yard would be hard pressed as would Class I, Graves Registration, Class III POL Yard, and L&B functions…..Thus for the most part (1966 -1967) all these individuals were considered exempt from Guard Duty and KP duty.
One then takes the # 161 Officers and Enlisted assigned and physically located in Tay Ninh as of 1 February 1967. From that # you subtract all enlisted exempted from extra duty, which leaves a number approximating 120. Subtract out the Company Commander, the 1st Shirt and one is left with 5 Officers assigned, 2 Officers attached who were 2nd and 1st Lt.’s.
Now divide the 120 enlisted by 7 days, and it means that every 17 days one person might catch Guard Duty or KP. However, that 17 days changes radically when you must post a Guard Mount of 30 individuals per day, as well as individuals (about 7 to 10) to Kitchen Police. So divide 120 by 30 and that means one is liable to catch Guard duty every .66 days, or rounded up…every day.
Such was not the case from November 1966 through January 1967, as the 228th was exempted from Guard Duty by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, as the 228th was up to its eyeballs in setting up all Classes of Supply, feeding daily convoys of Class I, Class II&IV, CLass III, and Class V… Class VI (Alcohol and Cigarettes – PX etc!) were handled by the 196th.
In addition there were 500 “all purpose” troops attached to the 228th late November 1966 – early March 1967, which is why the numbers change. Since there are some 620 individuals to draw on for Guard Duty or KP (less approximately 40 individuals TDY or in critical positions and others TDY to other locations) you now have approximately 490 individuals divided by 30, which means the odds of catching Guard Duty or KP become one or the other (sometimes both) once every 16 days or thereabouts.
What enlisted tend to forget, is that there were only 7 officers to draw on (1 of whom was TDY elsewhere). That means, that every 6th day an Officer was assigned as OG (Officer of the Guard) with “no time off” the following day.
In addition, every month one of these 6 (sometimes 7) officers was assigned as Payroll Officer. That means he would usually be absent from the Company for nearly a week to 10 days. Why? Because he had to make his way to Saigon Finance Center, pick up the payroll for the Company (approximating $35,000 to $36,000) dollars in MPC, travel to all locations where 228th personnel were stationed (Long Binh, Cu Chi, Quon Loi, Tay Ninh and other). This means that once a month the chances for an officer to be assigned as OG dropped from every sixth day to every 5th day for a week, during the last week of a month.
{Note: All attached personnel were not paid by the officer assigned to Payroll Duty for the 228th. Instead, an officer from the attached persons unit of assignment would have to travel to Tay Ninh to pay the attached personnel.}
It was no different for NCO (Non Commissioned Officers). Senior NCO’s were the NCOIC of Guard Mount Duty who tended to be E6 or above. Since the Company only had 8 personnel in this category, it also meant that similar to an Officer, the NCO’s were also pulling this duty about every 5th to 6th day. This number dropped, as some of the NCO’s were also TDY elsewhere, and/or were exempt (Company Supply Sergeant, Mess Sergeant, 1st Shirt} thus the NCO’s physically in Tay Ninh tended to be assigned Guard Mount duty every 5th day as well.
The 1st Shirt, The Mess Sergeant, and the 3rd E7 were exempt from serving as NCOIC of Guard Duty. However, and it should be noted, the 1st Shirt did conduct formation of Guard Mount and inspections. Otherwise, it was the 1st Shirt who put together Guard Duty Rosters in pencil, where they would be typed as a daily Guard Duty and KP roster and posted daily on the Company Bulletin Board.
There was another anomaly regarding Guard Duty rosters. By early March 1967 all attached personnel returned to their respective assigned units, excepting those who had been re-assigned from “attached” to the 228th, and became “assigned” to the 228th.
The solution to how to handle Guard Duty was improvised by the 1st Shirt. He couldn’t have one person serving Guard Duty or KP every .66 days. It’s an impossibility. He was now short some 480 personnel who had been attached. The unit now had approximately 120 available for Guard Duty. Divide 120 by 30 and that means Guard Duty would be served every third to fourth day, with the following day (24 hours) off by Army Regulation.
It was therefore decided by the Commanding Officer and 1st Shirt, that a “Permanent Guard Duty” roster would be created, and so it came to be. Every month, in theory the listing was changed, in that no individual (enlisted) should have served Guard Duty beyond 30 days straight. The Army Regulations were tweaked, in that an individual did not get the following “complete” 24 hour day off.
Instead, the individual served Guard Duty 1800 hours to 0600 hours was allowed to sleep during the day, eat, shower and show up for Guard Duty that evening at 1800 hours to begin the cycle anew. We were in War Zone, we were required to perform Guard Duty. As such, and being under-stength by some 28 individuals TDY elsewhere, and still short a full compliment of personnel numbering about 53, with the added loss of nearly all attached personnel, there were no other options open as to how to handle the matter(s).
The only other option (as annotated previously) was to have “ALL” personnel serve Guard Duty and or KP. Even so, and assuming such a matter was accomplished (excluding the Company Commander), then it would mean that every swinging d____ would be serving Guard Duty every 2nd to 3rd day. That amount would math wise, would be even smaller and move to every 1st or 2nd day, if KP were included. In other words, the Company would change from a Direct Support – Supply and Service Company to a “Guard Duty and Kitchen Police” Company overnight…..with the idea of supporting the Base Compound, Battlefield operations and the like being in there somewhere….if at all.
Conclusions:
Junior Officers, in particular (2nd and 1st Lt.) along with senior NCO’s within the Company got just as raw a deal as the Enlisted ranks in terms of extra duties above and beyond their assigned positions as a Platoon Leader or Platoon NCOIC. Furthermore, they ( all Officers)) had to pay for all clothing, meals and other, that enlisted and NCOIC’s did not. In addition, and little known, is the fact, that each Officer was on “the hook” for stolen, missing or lost equipment that could not be accounted for within his Platoon. He was personally liable for the entire replacement cost(s) involved, and might possibly face a Court Martial for negligence, conduct unbecoming an Officer, etc!, on top of payment for such items.
When an enlisted person thinks he might have been given a raw deal for whatever reason, he might also consider that his senior NCO’s and Officers didn’t have such a good deal either. Fact, not fiction.
During the 1 year 8 months I spent in the Orderly Room, this writer worked with 5 different 1st Shirts (one of whom was “acting” 1st shirt for 7 days}, and 6 Company Commanders {2 of which were “acting”, and one of which I served with twice, i.e.; Captain Bernard A. Kuster at Company B, 266th, Fort Lewis and RVN Long Binh, and once again with the 228th, RVN in Tay Ninh Province}. The math is misleading due to those in “acting” capacity. Nevertheless, one could state, that on average, I worked with a new 1st Shirt every 4 months and a new Commanding Officer every 3 and 1/3rd months during my nearly 2 years of active duty. The only constant by in large, were the approximate 110 enlisted (drafted and regular Army) belonging to both companies, and 1 Officer (1st Lt. William I, Eckhart) who was also with both Companies for nearly 18 months performing his L&B operations in three different locations RVN. These core personnel, in effect, were the “Glue” that kept the Company together as we at least knew each other, and remained together for nearly 2 years. Add in the fact that by having the same Commanding Officer twice {nearly 10 months}, and with whom the core group was familiar, made a great deal of difference as to how the Company operated.
Note: In fact, and with regard to RVN only, I worked with 1 First Shirt for 20 days in Long Binh {MSG Carlos Baruz}, a second 1st Shirt for 10 months, Long Binh and Tay Ninh {SFC Balbino E. Billamor} and 1 acting 1st Shirt for 7 days while SFC Billamor was on R&R. With regard to Commanding Officer’s in RVN, I worked with Captain Bernard A. Kuster for 20 days in Long Binh, 1st Lt. Laurence A. Clark (Acting CO) for 3 months in Long Binh, Captain Bernard A. Kuster in Tay Ninh for 3 months, followed by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker (Acting CO) for 1 week, and finally; Captain Jerry D. White in Tay Ninh for another 3 months…when I rotated in late May 1967.
Senior Officers of Captain and above were not particularly living in a peachy keen world either. In the Military there is always someone above you. As with the rest of life in general, the higher ones position, the more command responsibility you were charged with. All Officers were charged with carrying out a particular mission while equally being charged with the welfare of those personnel under their particular command. Those were the two most important items and responsibilities of an officer, with all else flowing from those two main charges. As in any situation in life, there were excellent officers, very good officers, good officers, average officers, and a minor few who should have been private E1’s, or never allowed into the position of any command whatsoever.
I can state, that the 228th 1966 through 1967 was blessed with a cadre of NCO’s, Junior and Senior Officers who were proficient, fair minded and performed their respective duties with great skill and proficiency. Further, I would state, that the vast bulk of them went beyond their respective charge of duty, and easily gained the respect and admiration of all those who worked with and for them. We did have an exception on rare occasion, but nothing of earth shaking proportion, that couldn’t be rectified in some form or manner.
Submitted By:
SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor – Company Clerk – 228th S&S Co (DS) – July 1966- May 1967………1 July 2010
Battalion Direct Support Objectives Principles
- Introduction
- Characteristics, Principles, and Objectives
- Organization for Supply and Service
- Equipment Extract
Part 7: Battalion Direct Support Objectives and Principles – 15th Support Brigade – 29th General Support Group and 25th Infantry Division After Action Report 1966-1967
Extracts per Army General Order 8862A, provided by 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker
“The supply and service battalion is the organization of the field army specifically designed and equipped to provide food, fuels and lubricants, designated supplies and equipment, and specified services to non-divisional troops and units in the combat zone.”
General support groups provide combat service support to divisions and to direct support groups. Direct support groups provide the specified supply, service and maintenance support to non-divisional troops and units.
This difference in mission between direct support groups and general support groups has led to differences in organization and method of operation. Direct support groups are primarily customer-oriented and provide supplies and services on a retail basis. General support groups are primarily commodity-oriented and provide support on a wholesale basis.”
Submitted By:
SP4 A.B. Neighbor with contextual evidence and eyewitness accounting provided by then CPT B.A. Kuster; Commanding Officer 228th (October 1966 – January 1967) along with After Action Reports of 25th ID as identified.
Operating Characteristics of a Direct Support Battalion:
“Direct support supply and service operations are essentially the same whether they are performed in the corps area or the army service area. The area of employment does make a difference, however, in the composition of the supply and service battalion. A battalion operating in a corps area, where it is usually part of the support brigade, consists of a headquarters element, two supply and service units (companies) and a motor transport element. Battalions operating in the army service area, where it is usually part of an army rear support brigade, contains a second motor transport element.
Direct support supply and service to be effective, must impose little administrative burden: must be responsive in detail, rapid in action, and mobile and resilient in operation; and must be tailorable to the requirements of supported units. Direct support supply and service installations must therefore be prepared for frequent movement to keep pace with supported units. As sound supply doctrine emphasizes continuation of support during such movements, it will be normal for direct support and supply and service units to move by “leap-frogging” or echelonment. (1) Under the first system one supply and service company of the battalion will bypass the other, each assuming the appropriate support mission in turn. (2) In movement by echelonment, each company moves by elements. The company commander details part of the personnel to continue operations at the present location until stocks are exhausted or disposed of otherwise. The remainder of the company personnel displace to the new site to set up the operations.”
Operating Principles of a Direct Support Battalion:
“(a) Direct suport supply and service will be provided on an area and/or mission basis. (b) Direct support supply and service units will be located to provide maximum supply and service to supported units. (c) Direct support and supply and service units will receive backup supply and service from general support groups. (d) Direct support supply and service units will provide Class I, class III and all class II & IV supplies, except those made available through army wide services. Unit distribution is anticipated and preferred for all classes of supply.(e) Throughout shipment of supplies, particularly class I, bulk class III, and major class II and IV items, none will be exploited to the extent practicable. (f) Direct support supply and service units will maintain, as a maximum, a two day level of supply. (g) Inventory control for the field army will be centralized at army support command level. Direct support group headquarters will not be in the channel for routine supply actions and will become involved in supply management on a a by-exception basis only. Stock control; at direct support supply and service units will be held to the minimum.”
Objectives of a Direct Support Battalion:
“(a) Increased operational control and flexibility of combat support. (b) Simplified operational planning and technical training. (c) Responsive supply action in place of large inventories of supplies. (d) Improved single source supply support for non-divisional troops and units in the combat zone. (e) Increased security potential in operating units. (f) Reduced administrative burden of supply. (g) Realistic span of supervisory control. (h) Effective dispersion of supply support installations and facilities.”
Organization for Supply and Service Support:
The Battalion Structure:
“The supply and service battalion consists of a headquarters element and subordinate supply and service and motor transportation elements. The headquarters is provided by the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Supply and Service Battalion Direct Support (TO&E 29-216). The operating elements are two identical Supply and Service Companies (TO&E 29-217). The motor transportation element is the Transportation Light- Medium Truck Company (TO&E 55-67).”
Note: the TO&E designations differ from TO&E postings of previous section, but basic composition components expressed in TO&E 10-107D dated 19 October 1960 can be considered close to that approximating TO&E 29-217 {presently unavailable}. From study, it can be stated, that data contained in the TO&E 29-216 and 29-217 series seems to comport with known activities at the battalion level in 1965 – 1966. Another change had to have occurred on 20 July 1966 under COSTAR directive. But again, for all intent and purposes the basic function(s) of the battalion remained quite similar….see TO&E section.
Battalion Mission
“The mission of the supply and service battalion is to provide supplies and services, less those provided by the army-wide services, to non-divisional units in the combat zone.”
Capabilities
The reader is invited to pay especial attention to the following, as the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) stationed in Tay Ninh, War Zone C , 1966-1967 with an understrength, reduced strength assignment of personnel approximating 50 – 80% of authorized unit strength was in effect performing the duties of a battalion and beyond. By “beyond”, the unit was performing duties nearly (and in many cases) twice over the capabilities allocated and expected of a battalion, (excepting – (a) Emergency clothing impregnation, decontamination of areas incident to chemical, biological, and radiological operations (b) provide maps to field army support command units, and (c) bakery functions of which it had none; the bakery section deployed and TDY with the 25th ID in Cu Chi from early July 1966 – mid May 1967, with 1 baker TDY to HHC 266th S&S BN in Long Binh)……ABN
“The battalion at full strength can (1) Provide designated supply and service support to approximately 30,000 non-disvional troops. (2) Operate supply and service points to receive, store, issue, and distribute class I, class III, and class II and IV supplies, except repair parts, maintenance materials, cryptographic supplies, medical supplies, and quartermaster air drop items. (3) Provide storage for approximately 280,000 gallons of bulk petroleum. Distribute locally approximately 156,600 gallons of bulk petroleum daily. (4) Provide motor transport in support of group operations. Capabilities are based on a vehicle availability of 75% and depend upon area of battalion employment. (5) Bake and provide fresh bread for the troops supported. (6) Operate salvage collecting points. (7) Provide the following services: (a) Graves Registration (b) Laundry, bath, and clothing exchange (c) Emergency clothing impregnation (d) Decontamination of vital areas, installations, and material incident to chemical, biological and radiological operations. (8) Maintain prescribed stocks of clothing for emergency replacement of contaminated (or worn) items. (9) Maintain prescribed reserves of designated supplies (10) Provide maps to field army support command units.
The battalion is dependent upon other units for medical, dental, and religious services. (228th relied on 45th Surgical Hospital also stationed in Tay Ninh for medical and dental, with religious services provided by 196th Light Infantry Brigade “the chargers” aka: ” the burning worm”).
Anomaly areas to preceding:
(1) During the time period 1966-1967 the tactic of “leap-frogging” and/or “echelonment” practice of movement by a battalion was not employed. The 266th Supply and Service Battalion remained in a rearward position in Long Binh the entire year. The 277th Supply and Service Battalion remained in the rearward area of Saigon, but moving to Long Binh on or about late 1967 to compliment the 266th. In addition, there was no “leap-frogging” accomplished, or ordered of any Supply and Service Company…The 228th S&S Co (DS) remained in Tay Ninh from October 1966 through August of 1970. The 506th S&S Co (DS) had been in Long Binh from early 1965 to October 1966, and then re-assigned to Bearcat or Long Giau. The 624th S&S Co (DS) remained in Long Binh from early 1965 to 1973.
(2) In mid 1967 the newly arrived 567th S&S BN (DS) had a forward echelon of personnel stationed in Tay Ninh (By 1968, the main body of the 567th having been returned to CONUS, the 567th became the TNLSA {Tay Ninh Logistics Supply Activity}. By early 1969 the 277th S&S BN (DS) moved from Long Binh to Tay Ninh, while the 266th was moved rearward near Saigon as opposed to forward per TO&E.
(3) The only forward movement from rearward stations 1966 – 1967 was accomplished by Companies assigned to a Battalion and or Group overseeing said Battalion(s). Thus, the 228th S&S Co (DS) was the most forward unit of the 266th operating in Tay Ninh 1966 – 1967. As such, and the reader is referred to TO&E section, History, etc! the “understrength” 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) was operating and functioning at the Battalion level and exceeding same in nearly all manner of operations {exceptions listed previously}. Note: From Long Binh 1966 -1967 the 506th S&S Co (DS) was also a forward Company of the 266th located at Bearcat. The 624th S&S Co (DS) remained in Long Binh 1966 -1973. By August 1970 the 228th reversed position from the most “forward” S&S (DS) Company to the most rearward located at Can Tho of the Delta area.
(4) The TOE showing a limitation of two (2) identical direct support companies per Battalion never occurred after COSTAR Directive of 20 July 1966. In fact, the Battalion could have 4, 5 and 6 companies under its operational control. The HHC 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS) from the very get go, had the 228th, 506th, 624th Supply and Service Companies (DS) and a short time later in 1966, the 75th Heavy Material Supply Co (DS) as well as the 570th Repair Parts Company (DS)-(FWD)
(5) Of the 2 Battalion Commanders {1966 – 1967} charged with oversight of companies subordinate on a regular basis, one {Lt.Col. Joseph Tambe} met this requirement from October 1966 – June 1967, by visiting Tay Ninh Forward Supply Area of the 228th one (1) time for an approximate two (2) hour visit in February 1967 and immediately left due to warning of impending Mortar attack. It was the first and last visit by Battalion Command three months prior and six (6) months thereafter. Note: There are several reasons for this non visitation by Battalion Command on a regular basis. a) The 228th had , was, and continued to operate at a superior level without oversight from arrival to rotation. As such little oversight was mandated or necessary. b) Since inception on 20 July 1966 through rotation of the bulk of personnel prior to 1 June 1967, there had been no Article 15 or Court Martial instituted, issued or warranted. c) The cadre (officers and enlisted), assigned and attached were composed of outstanding individuals whose sole purpose was complete dedication to accomplishing their mission. d) The 228th operating as a level II organization on par with a Battalion or greater performed its duties and mission flawlessly. e) The 266th stationed in Long Binh was participating in the buildup of the largest major Supply entity in Vietnam in conjunction with the 506th Field Depot, such that, by June of 1967 forward Long Binh had become the largest supply complex in Vietnam with paved roads, olympic sized swimming pools, bowling allies, and home to the 90th Replacement Center. In addition both Personnel and Finance Centers of Saigon had set up operations near Long Binh in Bien Hoa…in effect the 266th had its hands full in conjunction with the 277th S&S BN (DS) and its subordinate units along with the 506th Field Depot and 29th General Support Group.
(6) The Bakery Section of Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support) consisting of 20 personnel were shortly after arriving in Long Binh, re-assigned as TDY to the 25th Infantry Division in Cu Chi, excepting one individual. On 20 July 1966 under COSTAR Directive Company B was “inactivated” and the 228th S&S Co (DS) “activated”. As a result, and as best recalled, the 19 Bakers TDY to Cu Chi were re-assigned to HHC 266th S&S BN (DS), TDY to Cu Chi, with the 1 Baker remaining assigned from Company B, 266th to the 228th, but TDY to the 266th. Thus, when the 228th was assigned to Tay Ninh on 4 October 1966 (arriving 7 October 1966), the 1 Baker assigned the 228th was never stationed in Tay Ninh, but remained TDY to the 266th in Long Binh for his entire tour. A second anomaly occurred with respect to the Bakery Sections on 20 July 1966. The Bakery sections of the 506th and 624th S&S Companies (DS) being in the same situation as the 228th, lost their Bakery sections as well. They too were assigned to the 266th, but re-assigned to the 569th provisional detachment as the Bakery operations center of Long Binh, under the oversight of the 266th S&S BN. A third anomaly occurred, in that apparently (speculative) the 266th after the inactivation of Company B, 266th never bothered to read or report its own generated Orders, in that the Bakery section of former Company B, 266th was awarded an MUC while TDY with the 25th ID in Cu Chi in early 1967. It is an anomaly, as according to General Orders #38 of Consolidated and authenticated award of MUC’s awarded in Republic of Vietnam 1966 -1970 and signed by General Westmoreland, the L&B section of the 228th (TDY to the 25th ID) was awarded an MUC as was the “Bakery” section of the 228th (TDY in Cu Chi)….(see Bakery Section in Miscellaneous Data and History)
An anomaly concerning the 228th and semi associated with the 266th S&S BN (DS) and 29th General Support Group,15th Support Brigade, USASUPCOM and 1st Logistics Command related to Operation Junction City in War Zone C:
(7a) Per 25th Aviation Battalion Website; After Action Report #54 dated 6 April 1967, 25th Infantry Division, signed by Donald W. Johnson, Maj., QMC, Adjutant referencing Operation Junction City, is a surprising and interesting read.
Extracts:
“The 15th Support Brigade* provided the majority of Logistical support to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and elements of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division”
“Limited support was supplied by 25th Supply and Transport Battalion”.
“Class V was handled by 1st Logistical Command*”.
“Tay Ninh was a FSA (Forward Supply Area} of the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion”
The After Action Report further states that “During Junction City Transportation functioned in three locations; Cu Chi, with 2 Officers and 2 Enlisted, Trai Bi with one Officer, and Tay Ninh with 2 Officers and 1 Enlisted”.
*All the preceding references in “bold”, in particular to the 15th Support Brigade, neglects to state, that the units involved (15th Support Brigade) were all subordinate units of the 29th General Support Group {excluding 3rd Light Maintenance Company (Div) (DS) which became a subordinate of 610th Maintenance Battalion (DS) prior to October 1968, the 610th being a subordinate of the 29th GS Group 1966-1968}
It is assumed, that the portion referring to “1st Logistical Command Class V” is a not so obvious reference to that portion of attached personnel within the 228th; i.e.; 551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo), a subordinate unit of the 29th, 3rd Ordnance Battalion. The 228th S&S Co (DS) then stationed (boots on the ground) in Tay Ninh handling storage and distribution of nearly all supply Classes (I, II, III, IV, V, L&B, GR) since October 1966….see following Organization Chart of 228th November 1966 – March 1967.
228th Supply and Service Company (DS)……………………the Core Unit/Command and Control – 266th and 1st Logistical Command
Attached personnel (nearly 500} to the 228th (carried on Morning Report of 228th) from following units:
507th Engineers Detachment………………………………….on par with 29th General Support Group
551st Ordnance Detachment (Ammo)……………………… subordinate of 29th GS Group
140th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (GS)…..subordinate of 29th GS Group
483rd Field Service Company (DS)……………………………subordinate of of 266th S&S BN (DS)
48th Transportation Group……………………………………..on par with 29th GS Group
75th Heavy Material Supply Company (DS)………………..subordinate of 266th S&S BN (DS)
For reference purposes and notstationed or assigned in Tay Ninh.
Components of the15th Support Brigade: 1966-1967 stationed in Long Binh:
854th Signal Detachment (Mobile Rad)………….subordinate of HHC 29th General Support Group
610th Maintenance Battalion (DS)………………..subordinate of 29th GS Group
HMSC 610th Main Support Company (DS)………subordinate of 610th Maintenance Battalion (DS)
3rd Maintenance Company (Div) (DS)…………… ( ?) – By October 1968 a subordinate of 610th Maintenance Battalion (DS)
61st Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (DS)…..subordinate of 266th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)
297th Signal Detachment (Mobile Rad)………….subordinate of HHC 29th GS Group
548th Light Maintenance Company (DS)………..subordinate of 277th Supply and Service Battalion (DS)
Extract: “Convoy activity performed by 15th Support Brigade Operation Junction City”:
Saigon to Tay Ninh Convoys: 6,217 Vehicles; 42 Convoys
Class I…………………………….2,946 tonnage totals
Class II &IV……………………. 2,741
Class III………………………….7.863
Class V………………………….10,148
Tay Ninh to Trai Bi Convoys: 2,585 Vehicles; 92 Convoys
Class I……………………………….611 tonnage totals
Class II & IV……………………….211
Class III………………………….1.439
Class V……………………………1,522
Tay Ninh to French Fort: 732 Vehicles; 32 Convoys
Class I……………………………….137 tonnage totals
Class II & IV……………………….148
Class III…………………………….554
Class V…………………………..1, 021
Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng: 1,452 Vehicles; 40 Convoys
Class I……………………………….338 tonnage totals
Class II & IV……………………….244
Class III…………………………….800
Class V………………………………129
The preceding numbers give a small flavor of activity within and outside Tay Ninh Base Camp during the last major Operation {Junction City} experienced by the 228th its assigned and attached personnel of nearly 700 assigned and attached personnel November 1966 through March 1967 in Tay Ninh….the 228th and attached personnel not alluded to in any manner shape or form by 25th ID After Action Report…..see Section “N” of History 1966-1967 29th General Support Group.
Involved in nearly all convoys from rearward supply points to forward supply areas were elements of many quartermaster entities and rearward supply points {Long Binh, Cu Chi, Saigon, etc!}, as well as personnel of the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) its assigned and attached personnel. Convoys arrived, were offloaded, sometimes fed by the 228th re-loaded and turned around each day at Tay Ninh Base Camp.
The 15th Support Brigade was part of the 1st Air Calvary Support Command as near as can be determined. {the 15th on par with 29th General Support Group and subordinate to USASUPCOM and 1st Logistical Command} then stationed in Long Binh. Of note, (see History 1966-1967 29th General Support Group – Section “N” there is a one line annotation within 29th GP report, that “on 1 December 1966 the 29th was attached to the 15th Support Brigade”).
\The 15th Support Brigade moved from Long Binh to Chu Lai (exact time period not mentioned) but must have been in the April to July 1967 time period as they continued supporting the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, per little data found online via the Internet. Of interest, is an annotation, that the 15th Support Brigade was inactivated in October of 1967, with (apparently) the bulk of its assigned subordinate units (as listed above) re-assigned back to the 29th General Support Group still stationed in Long Binh….per Organization Chart of 29th GS Group prior to 31 October 1968.
Note 1: At a later time the 15th Support Brigade must have been re-activated (time period and date not known) as the unit is not listed in Order of Battle, and data online is very sketchy. According to present day 15th Sustainment Brigade of 2010, the 15th Support Brigade operated in Vietnam 1966-1973 participating in Counteroffensives II – VII
Note 2: In Task Force Merritt late 1967 through early 1968 (see History 1967 -1968), the 29th General Support Group assigned personnel from the afore listed units formerly of the 15th Support Brigade to FSA of Task Force Merritt in support of Operation Yellowstone…..see 1967-1968 History of 228th, which remained in Tay Ninh until mid July to August of 1970 {nearly 4 years}.
(7b) Within the same Website of the 25th Aviation is a secondary After Action Report # 53 by 2nd Brigade, 25th ID with reference to Operation Attleboro Tay Ninh Province, dated 23 November 1966. The reader is advised to read AAR #53, paragraph # 13, under the heading “Administrative Matters”, part “c” entitled “Supply”. Although the 228th and its assigned and attached personnel are not referenced specifically, the words state, that “Supply was adequately handled by elements of the 1st Logistical Command”. The only problem encountered being: (paraphrased); “the inability of support elements to provide adequate Laundry services due to lack of proper pre planning, thus forcing Laundry operations to be subcontracted out.“
Without prejudice, this AAR #53 referencing L&B operations is somewhat humorous if not a “Catch 22”. This is stated as the entire 228th L&B Platoon had been TDY to the 25th ID with the 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, supporting the 25th ID Medical Hospital in Cu Chi Base Camp since July 1966.
During Operation Atlleboro a portion of the 228th L&B Platoon was pulled from Cu Chi by the 228th to set up and operate a Hot Shower Point adjacent to the Tay Ninh airstrip in mid October 1966, with some Laundry service provided to 45th Surgical Hospital….the point being:
(1) The 228th on arrival in Tay Ninh found itself smack dab in the middle of Operation Atlleboro. (2) If “pre-planning” was an issue regarding Laundry services, it would seem that the 228th’s L&B Platoon stationed and operating in Cu Chi with the 25th ID would have difficulty in accomplishing its mission by being at two locations at the same time. As such, all units stationed within Tay Ninh Base Camp as well as outside were placed in the position of having to “sub contract” and outsource all Laundry services. (3) If proper “pre-planning” was indeed the core issue, it would seem that an inward look at matters would be better than an outward, as it’s semi unclear whether the 2nd Brigade, 25th ID considered this problem of outsourcing of laundry to be the fault of “the” elements of the 1st Logistical Command or the 25th ID itself…hence the Catch 22 and humor of the matter.
Note: The understrength 228th FSA from Operation Atlleboro through Junction City was operating with very limited resources. The Company consistently requested the necessary manpower and equipment from higher authority (266th) to meet its mission and overwhelming demand for services as a Direct Support unit and Forward Supply Area. The unit was allocated laundry equipment to handle and support 16,000 troops. With our laundry equipment tied up and supporting the 25th ID Medical facility in the Cu Chi Base Camp of the 25th ID, it was impossible to provide adequate laundry assistance elsewhere. The unit did provide limited service to the 45th Surgical, but that burden could not be sustained without additional equipment and personnel. As such, the 228th its assigned and attached personnel could only set up and operate responsible Laundry service in one location. The 228th did provide Shower Point services at Tay Ninh, Quon Loi, Trai Bi, French Fort 1966-1967 with the limited resources available. The L&B Platoon at full strength under “combat” conditions was allocated 73 personnel. The 228th operating as a reduced strength company and understrength unit (see TOE in Miscellaneous Data this section Part 5) was allocated 54 personnel under COSTAR Directive 20 July 1966. In fact, the L&B Platoon had but 25 to 30 personnel with no more than 40 through four Battlefield operations (Attleboro, Gadsden, Cedar Falls, and Junction City…October 1966 through March 1967).
Submitted By:
SP4 A.B. Neighbor with contextual evidence and eyewitness accounting provided by then CPT B.A. Kuster; Commanding Officer 228th (October 1966 – January 1967) along with After Action Reports of 25th ID as identified.
Equipment Extract:
Although available, the breakdown of actual equipment authorized and assigned a Direct Support Company will not be discussed at length. In general listing every item of equipment necessary to the operation of a Direct Support Company would be prodigious and very time consuming. Furthermore, there are many items referenced that are definitively post WWII although in semi effect October 1960 – June 1966.
Basically, all equipment necessary; field tents, arms, clothing, parts, vehicles, desks, lockers, bunks, bedding, stoves, reefers, machinery, generators, communications equipment were available and numbered in the hundreds if listed item by item…a good deal holdover items post WWII
Of interest are a few odds and ends for example: In a Direct Support Company (prior to July 1966) 3 Wristwatches were allocated. One .45 caliber pistol, (5) 7.62 caliber machine guns, (235) M14 7.62 caliber rifles, one of which had a tripod and used as a rocket launcher. There were supposed to be 235 Bayonets w/Scabbard. However, and to the best of the writers recall, there were no Bayonets or Scabbards within the 228th or its predecessor Company B, 266th. I personally never had one, I never saw one (Convoy or otherwise), and a close inspection of the Guard Mount photograph in Photo Gallery indicates the same….no Bayonets or Scabbards. Note: Per 1st Lt. Paul B. Walker, while assigned to the 506th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) in Long Binh, and prior to his re-assignment to the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) in Tay Ninh, he did in fact have a bayonet and scabbard, which he turned into Property Officer of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support). While assigned to the 228th in Tay Ninh, he was not issued a Bayonet or Scabbard.
Furthermore, as witnessed and known by those assigned within the 228th, there were a good deal more than just “1” ,45 caliber pistol, as all Officers carried same when assigned as Payroll Officer, Officer of the Day, Guard Duty Officer, Convoy and or other duties requiring arms. In addition {with little exception} Officers seemed to carry .45 caliber tubular grease guns, rather than the 7.62 caliber M14 that all enlisted troops carried. The one exception to this general rule of arms was the Executive, Stock Control, Class II and IV Officer, {1st Lt. Paul B. Walker} who often preferred being armed with both an M14 and .45 caliber pistol while assigned to the 228th in Tay Ninh.
Also of interest, because of their critical importance to the operations of the 228th, are trucks and materials handling equipment (MHE). The materials handled by the 228th were both bulky and heavy, and had to be moved on-and-off trucks, within the yards, and to-and-from supported units on and outside of Tay Ninh base camp. The “Reduced Strength” TO&E authorized (6) 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps), (3) 3/4-ton trucks, (18) 2-1/2-ton trucks (“deuce-and-a-halfs”), (4) 2-1/2-ton tankers, and (6) 5-ton tractors with (4) 5000-gallon and (2) stake-and-platform (S&P) trailers, as well as additional specialized vehicles and smaller trailers. Authorized MHE included (3) 6000lb rough-terrain (RT) forklifts. Actual equipment often varied from authorized equipment, and included up to 10,000-lb RT forklifts. Mechanics provided by the TO&E were critical to keeping as much of this equipment up and operating as possible.
Another reason for not listing all equipment, is that it is quite clear, that a good deal of items listed are obvious WWII field items. Wooden field desks (we had metal), wooden field chairs (we had metal). No mention of steel bunks, individual metal lockers, personal footlockers, and a good number of other items commonly in place and being used by the Company prior to deployment in June 1966 from Fort Lewis, Washington.
For the record, the 506th and 624th Supply and Service Companies in Long Binh apparently did use and have a good deal of the equipment described, they being in country RVN by nearly a year earlier (1965).
Prior to deployment of the 266th a field exercise was conducted in Fort Lewis. At that time, a worn WWII wooden field desk and typewriter were in place {exactly as described in Equipment table}. Trying to use was a different matter. More than a half dozen typewriter keys were broken or missing. The carriage would not slide, was rusted and badly damaged. The wooden field desk fell apart in a heap of rubble due to missing parts, screws, broken hinges, cracked, broken and warped wood. The wooden chair was not a chair, but rather a fold-up wooden square with four legs, two of which, were broken. In other words the whole ensemble was a pile of useless junk, top to bottom, inside and out. I never saw it again. If I had, I’d burn it, destroy it, bury it, and hunt down the Property Officer.
In summation, it is quite obvious, that a major equipment change had occurred within a Direct Support Company prior to 20 July 1966 (CONUS for sure), and that for one reason or another units already in RVN were in process of possibly upgrading, whereas newer units arriving at or around mid 1966 either already had newer equipment, and/or by 20 July 1966 had obtained such equipment….a listing of such updated equipment an unknown as of this writing.
Special Note: Per photograph in Photo Gallery “b” submitted by SP4 JD Stewart, there is a photograph taken in the Orderly Room October 1966 in Tay Ninh showing SP4 Louis Valentine {Company Generator Operator} and behind Valentine the shelf of Army Regulations and Field Manuel material used by the Company Commander and Company Clerk. It is quite clear, that FM 10-101TO&E applied to Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS), whereas right alongside said Field Manuel is FM 10-107D TO&E which in fact “did” apply to the 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) under COSTAR Directive of 20 July 1966….however, the “equipment” listing is still inaccurate, as the Company had and was using more up to date equipment…...ABN
Extracted data and other respectfully submitted by A.B. Neighbor 22 May 2010
Base TO&E data {1960 -1966) supplied by Paul B. Walker from his extensive personal library and archives.
Part 8, 9, and 10
- Commanding Officers/1st Shirts/Company Clerks
- Operations Supported - War Zone C - III Corps - 1966-70
- Reference Reading Material
Part 8: Commanding Officers/1st Shirts/Company Clerks:
Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (Direct Support), Fort Lewis, Washington
1963 – 1964
1964 – 1965
Captain Terry J. Henry/ MSG McFadden/SP4 Gene Gardner followed by PFC Arthur B. Neighbor
1966 – 1967
Captain Bernard A. Kuster/SFC Rodriguez followed by MSG Carlos Baruz/SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor
Note: Company B, 266th Quartermaster Battalion (DS) “inactivated” – 228th “activated” Long Binh
228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support), Long Binh and Tay Ninh, RVN as of 20 July 1966
1966 – 1967
1st Lt. Laurence A. Clark (Acting)/SSG Balbino E. Billamor/SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor…Long Binh
Captain Bernard A. Kuster/SFC Balbino E. Billamor/SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor…Tay Ninh
Captain Jerry D. White/SFC Balbino E. Billamor/SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor
JUNE 1967 – JULY 1968
Captain Gordan I. Ozawa/MSG Edward Meeker/ SFC Leo Conway???
Captain Jimmy R. Ellington-/SFC Eugenio Rodrigues/???
Captain Jimmy Ellington/MSG Willie H.Dunlap/???
Captain Frank Shulhuski/SFC Eugenio Rodriguez/???
1LT George Graner,Jr/SFC???/???
JULY 1968 – JULY 1969
1LT George W Graner, Jr./SFC ???/???
Captain Richard A Carl, Sr- SFC ???
JULY 1969 – JULY 1970
Captain ???/Harry Card/SP4 Tom Rogers
Captain David Pilcher/Harry Card/SP5 Albert Di lorio
Captain Richard Imhoff/James Compton/SP5 Albert Di Iorio, PFC Darrell Martin
Captain Danny L. Pelton/James Compton/SP4 Darrell Martin
Note: Mid to late July 1970 228th re-assigned from Tay Ninh to Delta Area south of Saigon.
Delta Area – Can Tho and Bien Thuy – IV Corps – RVN – Mid July 1970 – February 1972 to November 1972
1970 – 1971
1971 – 1972
Note: 228th Supply and Service Company (DS) “inactivated” at some point between February 1972 and November 1972, RVN
Part 9: Operations Supported – War Zone C -III Corps – October 1966 – July 1970:
1966-1967
As the most Forward Supply Area (FSA) in War Zone C, of III Corps, the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) with nearly 700 “boots on the ground” (189 assigned, 500 plus attached) were directly involved in the receipt, storage and re-distribution of nearly all supply product necessary to Tay Ninh Base Camp, all units stationed within the base camp, and all entities (units) operating within a radius approximating 20 miles outside of Tay Ninh Base Camp.
The four battlefield operations {dates annotated approximate} supported by the 228th October 1966 – May 1967 (rotation time for bulk of 228th) were as follows:
Attleboro.………….14 September 1966 – 24 November 1966
Cedar Falls………….8 January 1967 – 26 January 1967
Gadsden……………..2 February 1967 – 27 February 1967
Junction City……..22 February 1967 – 17 March 1967
The 228th assigned and attached personnel were stationed and based in Tay Ninh Base Camp, with personnel TDY to other locations; Long Binh, Cu Chi, Trai Bi, French Fort, Quon Loi and on some occasions other locations for very short periods of time.
Rather than cite various After Action Reports, and other data regarding the four battlefield operations cited, the reader is requested to search online any one or all four of the above cited operations. Depending on the reporting unit (remembering that each one is reporting from their individual units perspective) the reader may or may not find reference to the 228th Supply and Service Company…sometimes referenced as 1st Logistical Command elements, sometimes not referenced at all. The reader will also discover that depending on the reporting unit, dates and time periods will vary as to starting and ending times. Further, the reader will note, that there are varying degrees of number of personnel involved in each operation, which differ from one reporting unit verses another. None are telling falsehoods. From their individual unit perspectives, the dates, times places and numbers all have validity.
From the perspective of the 228th its assigned and attached personnel, and as representatives of the 266th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support), Long Binh, 29th General Support Group, Long Binh, United States Army Supoort Command {USASUPCOM} Saigon, and 1st Logistical Command, Saigon, as “Command and Control Center” in Tay Ninh Base Camp, III Corps, War Zone C, all we can state, is that we (the 228th) were there and operating Class I, Class II&IV, Class III, Graves Registration, Laundry and Bath, and Class V (munitions) through all four stated operations.
The 228th in turn was supported and re-supplied from numerous areas of rearward supply entities, in the main from Saigon, Long Binh and Cu Chi. This was accomplished via daily convoy, and air lift operations by numerous ground and aviation entities (Army and Air Force)……all these varied units being participants in all four battlefield operations as well.
The 228th its assigned and attached personnel are proud to be associated with each and all of these varied units who performed their individual missions flawlessly. The 228th was but one part and portion of a huge collective whole. The 228th performed their mission function as did all other units involved regardless of whether it was a squad to a Division or larger.
Again, the reader is advised to perform an online search regarding all four operations. Other than that, the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) is most proud of its particular and unique contributions to each operation whether we are mentioned or not by others.
Submitted By:
SP4 Arthur B. Neighbor……11 September 2010
1967-1968
The reader is invited and advised to perform not only online search, but especially read the History Section 1967-1968 for a more detailed reportage of operations supported by the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) and its superior command; 567th Supply and Service Battalion (Direct Support), later Tay Ninh FSA and/or Tay Ninh Logistical Supply Area/Command. However, one of the most important operations supported is as follows:
Yellowstone… via Task Force Merritt FSA at Katum in particular {conglomerate of subordinate personnel of 29th General Support Group, 567th Supply and Service Battalion (DS), including elements of 228th}….see 1967-1968 History
Other Operations where support was provided by the 228th S & S Co
Diamondhead- 14May67-7Dec67
Saratoga- 25Feb68- 24Mar68
Camden- 18Dec67- 27Dec67
Wilderness- 01Mar68- 08Apr68
1968- 1969
Pending posting by personnel of the time
1969- 1970
Bold Lancer
1970-1971 {CanTho and Bien Thuy – Delta Area south of Saigon – All Pending}
1971-1972
Part 10: Reference Reading Material:
There is a superior Book available for sale, but also “free” to read online. The Book, written by Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Heiser Jr., entitled “Vietnam Studies – Logistical Support” was first published in 1974. General Heiser was 1st Logistical Commander, Saigon 1968-1970. His book although concentrating on 1968, is full of background material and logistics efforts prior to 1968.
For example, there is a photograph of the 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) POL yard in Tay Ninh 1966-1967 within the Petroleum Chapter The photograph is in black and white. A similar photograph in color (courtesy of 1st Lt. William I. Eckhart 1966-1967, 228th L&B OIC) can be located in the Photo Gallery of this Website 1966 -1967. Also on page 202, a flow chart of Supply entities of III Corps is shown. In it, the Tay Ninh Logistical Supply Area (Provisional) and 228th Supply and Service Company (Direct Support) are clearly shown, as of 1968. Note that the TN LSA and 228th are annotated as “Level II” organizations…See History 1967-1968 and 1968 – 1969.
Click on the following link to index of Lt. General Joseph M. Heiser Jr. writing. The link has remained active prior to and as of this date and posting – 28 December 2010.